



Nahuel  
Moreno

**Discussions  
in the  
International  
Executive  
Committee  
(May 1985)**

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# Discussions in the International Executive Committee (May 1985)

## 1. Bolivia: the general strike and the insurrection

### First discussion

**Felipe Negro (FN):** There are elements that characterise a revolution. First, the mobilisation started with an economic claim — for the bonus that had been granted to the rest of the workers to be extended to the miners — but immediately it raised “Down with Siles”<sup>1</sup> as one of its central slogans. That is, from the beginning of the mobilisation, the government was fought directly.

Second, the mobilisation was fully supported by popular sectors, by the peasantry. Throughout this period there was dual power, a direct questioning of bourgeois power. There is an edict of the COB [Bolivian Workers Centre] that is a guide of ten or twelve points on how to strike throughout the country. It looks like a government decree: it determines the hours of operation of the public services; it establishes the form of compliance of the strike according to the particularities of each zone, and so on. That is, the COB was running the country.

The COB also directed the occupation of La Paz. For example, the miners even directed traffic in the streets. It came out in the newspapers that the Minister of Education had to leave the car and move on foot; the same thing happened to the Yankee ambassador. The city of La Paz was taken by the miners.

Not only did the miners and the proletariat mobilise. All the popular sectors of La Paz were with the miners, not only mobilising — La Paz has one million inhabitants and there were two mobilisations of 60,000 people, of which 10,000 were miners — but also through effective solidarity. Two days after the arrival of the miners in La Paz, a network was already organised that guaranteed them food and shelter. That network incorporated radio stations, newspapers, etcetera.

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<sup>1</sup> **Hernan Siles Zuazo** (1914–1996) was then president of Bolivia.

The peasantry endorsed the general strike and made roadblocks in most of the country. The middle class of La Paz was clearly divided between sectors supporting and participating in the miners' mobilisation and sectors against it.

Another element is the deep crisis of the Armed Forces. In the first days of the occupation of La Paz, the Presidential Guard refused, in fact, to defend the Palacio Quemado<sup>2</sup> if the miners decided to take it. In *El Chasqui*<sup>3</sup> there are several examples of fraternisation and dialogue between workers and soldiers. One of those examples tells of a miners' picket going to a garrison to talk to the soldiers. A sergeant of that garrison — a cousin of the miner heading the picket — tells them if the miners ask for weapons they would give them to them because they're with the miners.

At the top echelon of the Armed Forces, there were sectors with the patriotic military coup d'état (supported by the MIR and the people of Paz Zamora<sup>4</sup>), sectors with the constitutional coup (sponsored by Paz Estenssoro<sup>5</sup> and Lechin<sup>6</sup>), and others with neither of those two positions. Essentially, due to low salaries and the budget, in the initial stage of the conflict, none of these sectors supports the government.

The bourgeoisie was also divided between these different coup projects, plus a sector that supported Banzer's<sup>7</sup> position of seeking a constitutional solution to reach the elections giving no coup d'état.

All these elements (popular support, workers' mobilisation, dual power, a crisis of the Armed Forces and the government, support of sectors of the petty bourgeoisie) provided the objective conditions for taking power. We believe this didn't happen due to the leadership, i.e., because the leadership didn't want to take power.

The situation changes from the thirteenth day of the strike. The government gets the support of the US embassy and gives a 500 percent increase to the Armed Forces. The intervention of the American embassy achieves the cohesion of the bourgeoisie, and the army begins to surround and support the government again.

The strike ends having achieved almost nothing. The miners achieve an economic claim — that the bonus be incorporated into the salary — and the rest of the workers' movement achieves the same, although not immediately, due to the deductions for the strike days. Thus, the strike ends with a defeat, but relative, both due to the crisis as due to the state of mind of the miners. Everyone should know the mobilisations of La Paz in which the miners came out shouting "We shall return". In the assemblies, the word defeat could not be used. The miners didn't consider it a defeat, but a postponed fight.

Another element is that a few days after the end of the strike, the proletariat returns to fight: the teachers, the public servants, the threat by the miners to return to La Paz, the wives of the miners asking for supplies in food stores, etc. Thus, the rise continues. Anyway, the result of the strike gives oxygen to the government and the prospect of an electoral outcome consolidates, which is what currently dominates.

[Let's go to] the politics of the party.

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2 **Palacio Quemado** (Burnt Palace) is the official residence of the President of Bolivia. It is located in downtown La Paz.

3 **El Chasqui** (The Messenger) was the newspaper of the IWL-FI's Bolivian section.

4 **Jaime Paz Zamora** (b. 1939) was one of the top leaders of the MIR [Revolutionary Left Movement], of guerrilla origin, which at the time was divided into two wings, the other led by Delgadillo. Years later, Paz Zamora turned radically to the right, was President of Bolivia (1989-1994) and applied the economic plans of imperialism and the big Bolivian bourgeoisie.

5 **Victor Paz Estenssoro** (1907-2001), leader of the bourgeois MNR (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement), twice president of Bolivia. In his first presidency (1952-1956) he was taken to power by the victory of the Bolivian revolution.

6 **Juan Lechin Oquendo** (1914-2001), was the top leader of the COB. He was Minister of Mines and Petroleum of the first government of the MNR in 1952, a position from which he directed the nationalisation of the mines. Also Vice-president of the Republic (1960-1964). In 1964 he broke with the MNR and founded the Revolutionary Party of the Nationalist Left (PRIN).

7 **Hugo Banzer Suarez** (1926-2002) was a Bolivian politician and military general. He was President of Bolivia twice: from 1971 to 1978, as a dictator; and then again from 1997 to 2001, as constitutional President.

During the whole strike the party raised as central slogans “Down with Siles” and “All power to the COB”, or “Government of the COB”. In the discussion we did afterwards, the whole leadership of the Bolivian party considered it had been a mistake to have kept “All Power to the COB” as the axis of our policy during the strike, and that “Down with Siles” should have been raised as a guiding slogan, to achieve unity with all sectors in favour of Siles’ fall. Chiquito, for example, stated that raising “All power to the COB” during the days of the strike was to support Siles. He thought this policy meant surrendering to Siles, because at the moment what was raised, and was crucial, was the fall of Siles. As the fall would result from a victory of the masses, the government that followed would necessarily be weaker. Then, to put forth “All power to the COB” was to distract the masses from the fight against Siles.

We believe the policy of keeping the main slogan of “All power to the COB” during the strike was correct. First, because of the placement of the party: the fact we had raised only “Down with Siles” wouldn’t have changed at all the concrete situation of the strike and the mobilisation. Second, because of the leadership, who didn’t want the COB to take power. Third, because we believe that raising or giving the full weight only to the slogan of “Down with Siles”, with no other alternative, allowed an opportunistic deviation and encouraged the right-wing coup d’état.

The other element is our party had to be identified as the party which wants the government of the COB, the government of the working class. We believe at no time during this period of rising did the party lose this identity it had systematically earned during the strike. We were the only ones who raised “All power to the COB”. With this policy, the party was in the forefront of solidarity and agitation. The Minister of Government showed one of our fliers on television, to show there were subversives who wanted to end democratic stability. The flyer was signed by the party and raised “All power to the COB”.

In an assembly meeting on the balance sheet of the strike that took place in a mine, a rank and file miner asked it be incorporated in writing to the balance sheet that the party that had given unrestricted, unconditional solidarity to the strike, was ours. It was approved unanimously, and our comrade was invited to greet the assembly, in recognition of the support and participation of the party in the strike.

The performance of the party, in general, was good, although with an error. We believe that, throughout the development of the dispute, our party, because of its placement — it isn’t the leadership, etc. — should have had as its axis the propaganda and not the agitation. Based on our possibilities we should have done, for example, what Lora<sup>8</sup> did: he produced a daily strike newspaper, he lodged 2000 miners in the University and every day he gave them courses, even in the stage of a higher rise. We started doing this at the end and it gave us a very good result. Our comrades focused on the three mines closest to La Paz to keep the continuity of the work and which allowed us to get to register 120 miners from those three mines, 24 of which — all of them strike activists — continue to meet with the party. The comrades consider seven of them as militants, and the rest are in the process of being recruited.

After the strike, the immediate perspective for the party, centred on the question of electoral politics, was discussed. Immediately after the strike ended, the comrades raised the line of a boycott of the elections, based on the existence of a sector of the workers’ vanguard of La Paz who didn’t believe in the elections. (That’s already raised in the second issue of the newspaper since the end of the strike, and in the letter from Pablito and Chiquito.)

Much more than that. In Oruro, there is a meeting of the COB, of the whole union movement, which votes the left front.

8 **Guillermo Lora** (1922–2009), the best-known Bolivian Trotskyist leader, was the head of the *Partido Obrero Revolucionario* (POR – Revolutionary Workers Party). As part of Michel Pablo’s current, during the Bolivian revolution of 1952 Lora opposed proposing the COB take power proposing, instead, the government of the MNR, first, and the “left wing of the MNR”, afterwards. For an exhaustive characterisation of the politics and the role of Lora, see Nahuel Moreno, *Lora renounces Trotskyism*.

**FN:** That's later. They call for a boycott before the COB plenary is held.

**N. Moreno:** Then it's more serious.

**FN:** A week after the boycott line coming out in the newspaper, an Enlarged National Plenum of the COB is held in Oruro, which raises a front of the entire left for the elections. The party modifies its policy and raises the front of the left.

**N. Moreno:** And if that isn't followed: boycott.

**FN:** Exactly.

**N. Moreno:** It's very good. I didn't know it was like that.

**FN:** The boycott is raised as an abstention, or blank vote, or in other ways.

We put to the comrades we saw none of the lines as correct, that the party had to take part as such in the elections. We saw very difficult the left front could be achieved because the day after having been voted by the Enlarged Plenum of the COB, four different sectors had already enrolled: Lechín joined the PC, I think, and with another sector and registered a name, the MIR of Delgadillo joined with other two sectors and registered another name, another sector was registered with another name, and others registered a unitary name, in case unity took place.

We said the unity of the left had to be a general propaganda slogan, knowing it wouldn't happen, and we had to launch our campaign as a party, register our candidates, ensure the legal requirements, and so on. I don't know how the discussion with Pablito was here ...

**N. Moreno:** I think he accepted it, but with doubts. He also raised that madness of the miners' party.

**FN:** He told the miners the immediate big task was to make a miners' party.

**N. Moreno:** No, but other more important factors are involved. The final tactic isn't that. We have a much broader tactic: the tactic of Palacios, of PS-1 [Socialist Party-1]. This is really the tactic we want to revive.

In the talks with Pablito the discoveries were incredible; increasingly to [our] advantage. I will start at the end. First: [Palacios] was a candidate for vice president with [Marcelo] Quiroga Santa Cruz. He is a colossal, immense mass figure. He is an older man, leader of the COB and it seems he isn't very talented; his great virtue is to be a very large public figure; ([Pablito] and you told me that). Second: The PS-1 has split and he represents a tendency that remains [alone] to go to the elections. He is very, very good with us. Permanently looking for Pablito to make his statements, prepare his reports, everything. He depends on Pablito to such a degree that, despite being a personality, he goes looking for him at home, calls him and says: "What time can I see you?" Even to pose tactical problems. And generally, he is a man of great honesty. (He isn't [like] Lechín, who has ten councillors, listening to everyone — ultraleft, far right, right-wing Catholics, all of them — and they're all his close friends, but he at the end gives the line.) Pablito says [Palacios] does what he says and therefore a front or an agreement with him is very feasible.

For example, the agreement with Palacios means that, with his name alone, we are almost certainly the second party in Oruro (because in the previous election, in Oruro he drew an incredible number of votes; it was the second party). If we go with him in a lot of mines we will be first, second or third because there are many activists [and mine leaders] in the mines who say: "We are from this party".

Well, this is the end. Don't believe we have told Pablito [these things from the beginning]. I want to tell you how everything began, so you don't [believe] we are clairvoyant. It was by trial and error, we looked like laboratory rats that are in a labyrinth from which they can't leave and in the end, they leave. Well, we were the same. In the days of the discussion, Pablito began to look like this, he refused to write. We discussed one thing, a resolution, we talked ... and it was something [else].

This change [to the tactics] of Palacios took place when we were [in a meeting discussing something else].

**FN:** At a certain moment, Hugo was giving a report and a letter came from Gabriel saying in the mines we were finding a lot of PS-1 workers who looked at us with sympathy and had no direction. Gabriel asked whether it wouldn't be convenient to seek unity with PS-1 for the elections.

**N. Moreno:** Then, all of us we begin to ask: How? The PS-1? and so on and so forth. And in another conversation, we concluded the front with these PS-1 people is the privileged tactic, the one you really have to vote to see whether you can take it to action. And the ideal tactic, the pinnacle, is Pablito as a candidate for deputy in Oruro, to see whether we can get a deputy. This is the privileged tactic. We shouldn't [take for granted] we will achieve it, or anything, but Pablito goes to give his all to see whether [it is materialised]. And otherwise, the propaganda tactic is to get 500 or 1000 votes [only], but [to appear] on television saying: "There is no way out here if the bourgeois government isn't overturned and the COB takes power", lowering it to minimum levels, because Pablito says there isn't even a single sympathiser of ours who understands the meaning of "All power to the COB". (I [tell this] so the comrades and the leadership of the IWL know the problems existing in Bolivia [even] with our own comrades.)

We told Pablito: "If this is the case, there is more obligation to convince even if it is 50 or 100 because in Bolivia there is no way out.

Pablito was surprised: "How?"

You appear on television and say: "In such a mining town, we, our party is the one that says if the union doesn't take power there is nothing to be done. Besides, they have already taken it, and what we propose is that the same be done throughout the country." If at this level they don't understand, well, we are very sorry [but] in Bolivia within a century and a half capitalism continues. If at this level they don't understand, [the revolution] will triumph in the entire world, except in Bolivia; something that it may be. It may be the secret for capitalism to survive in Bolivia. It is the only secret: that, starting with [leaders like] Lora, from Lora and his [tactics of] united front, to Stalinism, going through Lechin, have poisoned [the workers'] heads in such a way [they have been convinced] the biggest crime that can happen is the unions fulfil social political tasks. It is a tragedy, but against this tragedy, we have to fight.

**Alberto Frank (AF):** What about the Castroist wing of PS-1?

**N. Moreno:** It has nothing to do with us. It is very strong; Nicaragua gives them money, they have a lot of money. And they go to a front of parties...

**AF:** Could Palacios support the slogan of a government of the COB?

**N. Moreno:** Even if he doesn't raise it, we do, we are in favour. That's why we have to think about it well; we are discussing a very important tactical question. We have to open the discussion. We told [Pablito] it is enough [if Palacios accepts] a socialist front, even if he doesn't accept — we are sure [he will] — "All power to the COB".

[About this slogan,] to avoid vicious discussions we have made a modification, a very important tactical adaptation (we should write a theoretical document [in the form of a] thesis). We believe we have already defeated them. [The amendment] is "Government of the COB with all the parties of the left that agree to rule".

**FN:** That's what Lora and company say.

**N. Moreno:** No, not Lora. They begin to raise a front of parties to take power. So we are giving the line of not facing this slogan but of adapting ourselves to it, [since] we believe when we say "[Government] of the COB and the left parties", they will also say no; they will never accept it. But [at this moment] the controversy becomes beautiful because then it will be opposite. Our polemic will be: "Why can't the COB go to the government? Explain it to us." Instead of [polemicizing] whether party or union, we change the polemic: party and union. We made this tactical adaptation.

**Carmen Carrasco (CC):** With the line of the unity of the left, we raise the possibility of a front with Palacios and Delgadillo. We propose a front to fight for the unity of the left. It is very difficult it will turn out, but if it does it would be fabulous for us.

**N. Moreno:** No, deep down we don't want to. We yield to the grassroots of the workers' movement, but our ideal tactic is the unity of the left be not done. Our tactic is to hit [together] with Delgadillo on the implementation [of the resolution] of the plenum of the COB, [but without] compromising our position. We don't say "This is our line", we say: "It was voted, let it be fulfilled". Based on this, [we want] to see whether we bring Delgadillo to unity with Palacios. But Pablito says [this unity] is very difficult because [between Delgadillo and Palacios there is a lot of hostility. The tactic] isn't difficult on paper, but humanly it is almost impossible.

**CC:** Pablito says in La Paz the ranks of Palacios have a lot of [anger] for us because it is the ranks with which we broke.

**N. Moreno:** Exactly, I forgot about that.

**Lucas:** Delgadillo is the most powerful man on the entire left.

**N. Moreno:** And he's going very well. It is very interesting because he can be the man of the seizure of power. Let's make it clear: as soon as we achieve ten Delgadillos that, even if for opportunistic reasons, we really convince them [to say:] "I want to be president of the Republic", there the power is ...

**AF:** Around the corner.

**N. Moreno:** It's there. That's ten guys we have to convince.

**AF:** For now, there is no operative mounted in the style of a merger.

**N. Moreno:** No, no merger; electoral front.

**AF:** To do that, we have to kill three quarters of the party.

**N. Moreno:** Then it's bad.

**AF:** This expresses the five-year mess of failure of the entryist line.

**N. Moreno:** But because of them ... what do you mean entryism was wrong? Pablito himself says [there are] dozens and dozens of activists who claim to be part of the PS-1 [who are] alone, that nobody controls them. That was what we told him when he made entryism: [it was necessary] to go to the mines, that Quiroga had that [in his favour].

**AF:** Since that turned out so bad, now they're marked and you will hardly convince them.

**N. Moreno:** But of the front, we may.

**Lucas:** The party had a fundamental success, which was the location. There were three mining camps in La Paz, so the party divided into three parts and each one takes a **camp**: they're there every day with the miners; they go to the occupations, to the assemblies. This places the party very well, which appears nationally; there is a jump in the presence of the party.

Now, regarding the discussion of slogans, Pablito was the one who presented the idea. The discussion wasn't about what slogans were raised because the slogans were "Down with Siles" and "All power to the COB". What happens is there is a demonstration of 50,000 or 60,000 people on the Palacio Quemado with the slogan "Down with Siles". This is the day when everything can be swept away when everything comes into crisis. A sector, I believe the MIR of Delgadillo, calls for a meeting of all the left political forces and proposes a resolution that has as axis to overthrow the government of Siles (this sector was with the "patriotic coup"), our party raised "All power to the COB", Lora raised "dictatorship of the proletariat", Lechín said the president of the Senate had to assume the presidency. In short, everyone had a different policy. I think at that time it was correct to put out a statement from all the leftist forces, saying the government had to be overthrown because there

wasn't a united front proposing the fall of Siles. One day it is raised by Lechín and the next day it changes, later it is raised by Delgado.

At this time there were many problems. The army is quartered because it can't go out; if it goes out, it breaks down. The deliberative state was total: they discussed whether to do the same as in 1952, whether they surrendered the weapons. [After this demonstration] a miners' assembly was held and we believe there was a need to raise [toppling Siles]. The fall of Siles was discussed, but no one made propaganda, no one raised how to topple Siles, how to strike at the army at that moment, not even the POR, who published their newspaper daily.

I believe a declaration of a united front for the fall of Siles was valid, even if it didn't have the alternative slogan and each one had a different one.

**N. Moreno:** I think [so] too. This is the same discussion we had with Pablito. [Both of us go] towards the same side. I congratulate you on that, [although] it seems to me the conclusion is different. The Bolivia thing was so dynamic we forgot to tell you how we convinced Pablito. We also fully agree with [raising] "Down with Siles", and removing "All power to the COB". But not in the abstract. We told Pablito: "We aren't schematic; there can't be slogans for decades, [such as] "All power to the COB", [then] we adapt: we are to the bitter end with [the slogan] "Down with Siles", and not [raising] who takes power but who prepares the "Down with Siles". We reverse the problem, which is always the same. Let's eliminate who takes power, but another problem arises: who prepares the fall of Siles? This must be said: "That the COB with the left parties make the insurrection to overthrow Siles." We agree, we remove [Siles]. And we also agree that after removing him out, the [government] coming in is the one Paz Estenssoro wants, the "patriotic" military. We agree to lose this election. There, we do agree to lose the election. Why? Because, if we make militias, if we go to the army to [convince them] to make soldiers committees to overthrow Siles, the next government is weaker, then it is weaker. If it is the strike [what does it], without defeating the army, [the government that comes] isn't weaker.

It causes a terrible confusion in the mines, because Lechín will say this government solves everything, and [the miners] will leave [La Paz] with the optimism of [expecting] they will solve it.

That was the discussion. We also agree. One can't be schematic and [say] always "All power to the COB, all power to the COB".

In [that plenary] we were wrong, tactically wrong. We should have attacked Lora as a sectarian, [for] ultraleftist. We should have said: "What is this about the dictatorship of the proletariat? Here what is an urgent thing is we all be in agreement in overthrowing Siles, then I propose a tactical agreement to dismiss Siles, how do we do it?" Let us be clear we would have been totally defeated, [but] the controversy should have been this, and it would have served also for propaganda. (What is dangerous is that we think it's a strategic mistake, it's a fifth order tactical mistake. [That's] logical in a young party, we can't ask them to have a tactical adaptation.) Lechín would have said: "No, we have to continue, what we are doing is perfect, and if we can't get the military to overthrow them, nobody can overthrow them." This would have been Lechín's response; this would have been the response of the MIR; this would have been everyone's response.

**Mercedes Petit (MP):** They would have said: "We can't overthrow them because there are no solid organisations."

**N. Moreno:** "There are no weapons." And here, we had to say: "It can be overthrown because the COB can overthrow it". They would tell us: "To overthrow [Siles] isn't a task of the COB because it is a union; it is the task of the political parties." And it is always the same discussion. They would repeat the policy of ...

[Ours] is a small party. It stood up, it was principled. All the same, it was a "great —between quotation marks — mistake" of the comrades, tactical, [because] with this we wouldn't win even single worker. It is always the same controversy: the COB should not be government, nor do politics, nor be a political party. It is a polemic of substance, that, with

Lora, comes from the year 1947, when he makes a bloc with Lechin and says: “No sir, this bloc based on the unions must be broken”, instead of saying “Let’s make a party”. In 1947 we put forth to him: “If we don’t make a party, Lechin will go to the MNR. Lechin is with us, let’s not be foolish. Let’s make a party, we impose discipline and we have Lechín as the head of our party.” And [Lora], with the argument that Lechín reflected unions and unions can’t take power ... [It’s] the same old story. It is always the same mania.

**Lucas:** This issue of the propaganda of “All power to the COB” is general, but around the fact the fall of Siles was posed, there was a key tactic, which was to pose the question “How do we topple Siles?” That question isn’t asked.

**N. Moreno:** That’s why I say it’s a mistake of [youth]. It’s a tactical error, [though] a big one.

**AF:** In the mobilisation, nobody proposed to occupy the Palacio Quemado?

**Lucas:** The march stops in front of government house. The army doesn’t stop it, the guard doesn’t either, however, they don’t enter. They don’t know what to do, and they leave. There is a brutal confusion. Nobody says “Let’s go in.” Some chief gives the order: “Let’s go, let’s not screw things up.”

**N. Moreno:** Ah, sure! Not one, but all [the chiefs]. [Not even] 99 percent, but 100 percent. If there had been one...

**Lucas:** Of course, that one was missing.

**N. Moreno:** That’s the misfortune.

This point — the problem of demonstrations — we should discuss it thoroughly. There’s the case of Uruguay, which was the same. That is why the coup comes in Uruguay, which is such a democratic country. There is a demonstration of 500,000 people in a city of one million inhabitants. Twenty-five percent of the country [was] demonstrating. Then, they all [run away]: the president, the ministers, the police, and the army. There they didn’t retreat saying “it’s not our business”: [they all escaped].

**FN:** Today in Uruguay the CP brings the debate to say it was very good, and it was a victory because it allowed resisting the dictatorship for years.

**N. Moreno:** Almost the same argument as Lora.

**Lucas:** Lora didn’t do focus much on the union problem but in the conscience: [he said] the proletariat has no conscience to take power.

**FN:** Pablito’s report is it didn’t grow much.

**N. Moreno:** Lora has no future as long as we are strong. He was always an intellectual. He was the general secretary [of the party] and all members of the political bureau were painters; they were all professors. His brother, who was a great union leader, wasn’t part of the political bureau. I don’t believe in Lora: a guy who makes a political bureau out of painters has no future. He has a future because of his great talent, his great personality, but this pulls little. He has not been destroyed because of the crisis of Trotskyism, [but] three years of our consequent action, Bolshevik, with cells ... We have already shaken [his ground] several times. (In addition, Lora is a personalist: as soon as two or three capable guys emerge in his party, he will bust them himself.)

**Lucas:** I wanted to add another element. We have a list of 12 or 15 great union leaders who broke up with Lechin and with everybody. They’re independent union leaders who go behind the line they like, as in Oruro. In Oruro, we are strong because of this. There, they took power. They thought the mayor and the police chief had to be kicked out. They met, they took them out, and also the prefect. They settled and put out a decree saying that the Expanded Plenum of the COB of Oruro name such a comrade — a worker — as mayor. As they didn’t know what to do with the prefecture, they named the chief of police as prefect.

**N. Moreno:** That has to be found out. That’s the biggest thing... It finishes the discussion.

**Lucas:** I bring this up because there are a number of leaders, let's say five, who are general secretaries. In Bolivia, being a general secretary means being the political-military leader of your union. If a secretary general tells his workers: "Come out all with a banner that says 'All power to the COB'", they do it, even against Lechin. We have a secretary general who gave this order to the workers and they complied.

**N. Moreno:** Really?

**Lucas:** Really. There Lechin commands everything but he commands because most of the general secretaries support him. But in the union, in the demonstrations, in the struggle, the boss is the general secretary. Some of these leaders have relationships with Pablito, although none of them joins our party, each of them leads 10 times more than we do. It occurred to me the possibility of seeing whether it is possible to coordinate them to form something like a coordination of general secretaries. Because that nobody sees the possibility of governing the COB is true, but there are very strong people who say: "We really want the COB to rule, but how do we take power?"

**N. Moreno:** The coordination of general secretaries is very interesting.

**FN:** Isn't the Expanded Plenum of the COB of the general secretaries?

**N. Moreno:** Yes, but we have to aim to [raise] "Expanded Plenum of the COB in favour of such thing", or something like that. [That is,] branded. It's a great idea. It is the same line we have discussed in the IWL: as soon as we have 20 or 30 union leaders ready to do work... And we hit that wall: we don't achieve a tendency.

**Lucas:** They go to the Expanded of the COB, but individually. Thus, although they manifest themselves, who weighs is the majority.

**N. Moreno:** But, for example, when the government house [issue happened], we with those people [could have taken] government house. [In 1955] we in Argentina were nothing and we were top dogs [of the mobilisations]. (Let's say the truth: there was a non-explicit united front of the secret service — SIDE — and us. Don't laugh, why are we going to lie?). We burned the churches, and more than the churches: we burned the priests' headquarters, in front of Plaza de Mayo there is a vacant [lot]; we burned [the building that was there]. And this [happened like this] because of those crazy things [of the moment]. A leader says: "Let's burn such a thing" because he believes in the masses. In those moments, the bureaucracy is worth little.

**Lucas:** In Bolivia, the other path was the fall of one or two barracks. If that happened, everyone could have uprisen. But nobody said which barracks. And with a union [we could have taken...]

**N. Moreno:** ... the initiative. We, with one or two unions. Well, that's what you have to develop, what you say, [develop it] even in courses, to show what the initiative of a party can achieve in this situation.

## Second discussion

**AF:** This about a revolution in Bolivia makes me doubt because supposedly there had been one already.

**N. Moreno:** Yes, and what does it have to do? Also in Spain [something similar happened].

**AF:** Well have to periodise. I like the definition that in Bolivia there was a workers' revolution. Then, at some point the stage became transient.

**N. Moreno:** No, but one thing is to be triumphant.... Those revolutions are left with great triumphs.

**AF:** One of these days we'll to do a kind of catalogue of terms.

**N. Moreno:** No, that is the mistake. You can't make a catalogue of terms because absolutely nothing fits into any definition. Who didn't understand this is lost because what happened in Bolivia forces us to redefine absolutely everything.

For example, what the French [say in relation to Colombia]. They're right in their schema. How do they reason to say nothing happens in Colombia? If we had to make the written, theoretical discussion, [right now] I can tell you everything they will say:

One, that Colombia has ceased to be agrarian.

Two, that capitalism has developed enormously: "Colombia is already an urban country of high capitalist development; in the countryside, there is a great capitalist development, there are large cities, etcetera, etcetera." They'll say: "Don't annoy us with the 1940s; don't annoy us with Maoist examples."

Three: "Well, there are disturbances but do they touch the nerve centre of capitalism? Not at all, absolutely nothing happens. Thus, it is a stable situation, with '*jacquerie*'<sup>9</sup> — as they say — [which], next to the French *jacqueries*, are of the fifth order."

This isn't the case. It's just the opposite. Colombia is falling. ([This reminds me of the way] my friend Faraldo argued to convince me when I was Hegelian. He would systematically tread on my foot and say: "Stop messing around, it wasn't the thought, and you, with Hegel, say what is real is thought." He stopped stomping on me when I said: "No, I'm a materialist.") Colombia is falling. It has nothing to do [with what the French say]. It is a capitalist regime but it is falling. There is guerrilla everywhere, the army doesn't dominate, it is a totally unstable situation, and all this is taken in its dynamics. [And it's like this] with a top-notch democratic regime, the oldest in Latin America. But it was always like this, it is a national characteristic: Colombia always lived democratic regimes with terrible civil wars. So, what you say — "we have to make a catalogue" —[can't be]. No, because this is the discussion. Every time something happens, everyone starts the discussion: "What's this?"

**AF:** I was referring to the fact there are certain events or groups of events that allow us to name situations in one way or another. In the discussion about the situation in the Dominican Republic, the comrades posed that calling this situation revolutionary means we were left without terms to define a situation of more generalised problems. In Argentina, some of this was seen in the discussion with Convocatoria:<sup>10</sup> some conceptual imprecision remained. We can say there is no conceptual precision possible because the realities are unprecedented.

**N. Moreno:** Not unprecedented. They're different combinations of abstract categories but they're happening every day, because the characteristic of the historical process is that everything is new, the previous isn't repeated. There is no revolution equal to the French, and yet all the other [bourgeois] revolutions copied the French. So, what I want to tell you is that nothing in history surpasses the concrete analysis of the reality of each process: there is no revolution equal to the French one, there will be no February revolution equal to the Russian.

**AF:** Then, I propose a thesis preceded by that because we must get the militants used to the classical terminology.

**MP:** It seems to me the problems we have with those we polemicize with aren't because of the terms but because of the content. Convocatoria, or Ennio and Aldino, minimize the struggles, minimize the crisis. They see imperialism is strong and the masses screwed up. It isn't a problem of labels.

**N. Moreno:** [They] think imperialism is winning in the world, and it is going to a colossal economic development and it will defeat everybody.

[In relation to what you said of the term] revolution, we call revolution [to what happened in Bolivia] because power could have been taken. And in this, together with

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9 Revolts. From the revolt of the peasants of northern France against the nobles in 1358.

10 Convocatoria (Call) was a tendency which emerged within the Argentine MAS arguing, among other things, the situation open after the fall of the 1976–1983 military dictatorship was not a revolutionary situation

Trotsky, we are great, because Trotsky calls [February revolution to the strike with factory occupation of France in 1936]. This is why Mandel rewinds the film and says in France [in 1936] there was no revolution, nor did the revolution begin, nor did anything happen of what Trotsky said. [Mandel says] we have rarely seen a man err as much as Trotsky did in Spain. Mandel is great because he knows if he accepts the theory [we have], together with Trotsky, that the 15-day strike with the occupation of factories was a colossal February revolution...

In the Ecuadorian discussion itself, you should have said: "We have to define." I think in Ecuador there were more or less five or six revolutions in a year and a half, not one or two. Why? Because it was on the verge of power being taken.

I think Trotsky is a genius when he says in France, where there is no feudalism, the February revolution took place. He is a genius. They could have [refuted him saying:] "How 'February' if not a shot was fired? Trotsky is crazy. The army didn't turn around, there was [not even one] desertion. There wasn't a single thing from February, nothing, nothing." But there is one thing of February: the masses had already triumphed.

I think we have to redefine whether 1968 in France was a revolution and not a revolutionary crisis as [the Mandelists] say. That is, it isn't that power remains up in the air but that power is already available — this is why it is a revolution — to be won, the possibility is raised [to take it] and it isn't taken. And we must desacralise the phrase.

In Bolivia, [it's] what he said: if we had a small leadership of 10 leaders... [It is] like in Uruguay when the entire Presidential Guard ran: power was left empty. Then it is no longer a crisis of power: it is total emptiness; the masses have already won. And in Russia too: [the masses] were defeated in the 1905 revolution but [it is called] revolution [all the same]. The February revolution triumphed.

Then the definition is good. Why? [Because] for us Marxists, every definition, more than historical and super scientific, is instrumental. What do we want to say to our comrades? [For example,] how were we reasoning for Colombia?: If the [guerrilla front of Gaspar] Franco, the M-19 and all the others — which are 80 percent of the guerrillas — manage to unite (and [there is no God] who says this] can't be), if all are united, the problem of El Salvador is raised to a level 10 times greater, and also with the guerrillas in Venezuela and Ecuador.

We want to arm our International, otherwise, the revolution appears as a schema, something difficult, and what we want to show is there are revolutions every day. You need that: 20 guys with a lot of influence in the workers' movement to take power. And it's simple. It takes place every 10 or 20 years; there are other countries where it takes place every 50 years, but it takes place. And in this you're right: not we have to look whether this or that happened. In Bolivia [there was a revolution] because Lechín said "Let's take power" and there was a day when power was taken. And that is a revolution; it isn't a crisis, it is a revolution.

**AF:** In the last two years there were three or four more.

**N. Moreno:** No. I think [there was] nothing like this one. It is qualitative. For me, [it is] infinitely superior to everything we saw in recent years. But assume there were.

**AF:** At least one, the general strike of a few months ago.

**N. Moreno:** Did 10,000 miners go down with dynamite; was the whole army terrified, did the National Guard say "Take government house"? I never saw that.

**AF:** It wasn't so deep.

**N. Moreno:** We have to study it, [but] anyway, it wasn't [like] the last [general strike], because [now] there were 10,000 armed men, fighting, with dynamite in their hands and shooting. It is something monumental. If this isn't a revolution, what is it? It is qualitative. But it may be what you say: in Bolivia, there has been a [revolution like] that of 1905 [in Russia], which is what you say, and this one, which is full February. We have to find what it looks like. Any analogy is always different, but the content is what Mercedes tells you.

Every time we see power is on the streets, and [it can] be taken, the class is organised to take it, we call it a revolution.

That is why we would have to re-study 1968 in Paris, because [in this case] De Gaulle goes, the army doesn't answer him, everything is in the hands of [the masses]. [De Gaulle goes to the units of] the French army in Germany. What? A president runs away from his own country, goes to another country? [This means] he is screwed up. The army doesn't answer to him. I don't know what manoeuvre he had to do to board the plane; [he had to go] to I don't know what military airport. The CP saves him. Therefore, we must say the problem of power was raised. [That] was Trotsky's criterion. Why does Trotsky define as revolution the strike with the occupation of factories in France? Because power is in the hands of the working class, nobody takes it away.

And I say [this also] for other cases, for anomalous situations. This is why the discussion with *Lutte Ouvrière*<sup>11</sup> about Colombia is very nice. They see nothing. [If right] now in Colombia all the guerrilla fronts, including the FARC, meet and say: "Gentlemen, we have built a front like [the one they] did in El Salvador, for the armed struggle to overturn this government ", for me civil war has opened. It is a process superior to the revolution: it is already a civil war. And the schematics would come [and tell us:] "How civil war? If power has not yet been taken." The categories are mixed because for me it would be civil war. It would be a 10,000-strong military force, or 6000-strong, with the strength they have and as the vanguard of a peasant movement of two or three million.

## 2. The situation in Spain

**N. Moreno:** The crisis of the CP is total. Carrillo<sup>12</sup> has split from [Gerardo] Iglesias, and the Iglesias line is one of convergence, [but] not [a convergence] of the left. [Iglesias put out] a very curious document and, deep down, very profound, although appallingly badly written. You have to read it because it is very important.

My report is a little bit partial because I need to read two pages that didn't arrive, so maybe this isn't the case and [the document] takes into account the parties. What Iglesias proposes is a convergence not of the left. I point this out because there is a tendency to take it as an invitation to all parties to make a front, [but] not a left front. Carrillo is the one who poses as a permanent policy that [the front] be from the left.

**Lucas:** It is Iglesias who is on the right.

**N. Moreno:** Sure, the opposite. Convergence is a confusing, tricky thing, but, at heart, not at all confused: it is the unity of social movements, that is, women united with environmentalists and those who are against war. Nothing of the national problem, nothing of ETA, nothing at all. The core is that one, it doesn't raise the party or anything, [but a] social movement. That is, the guy proposes the Communist Party with the ecologists, [and so on, and so forth]. And he raises a whole series of questions well to the right on the role of the proletariat, of the new middle class... without naming the middle class. Nothing I say is how he says it. [The document] must be followed with a magnifying glass [to learn] what it means to say. I don't think he does it to hide his reasoning but because he must be an intellectualized worker and not influenced by the new current, then [his document has] a very strange language.

The others raise the traditional line of the CP, vindicating the entire previous line of Carrillo, but posing they have to defend the party, the acronym of the party, and call to the front of the left as they have always done.

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11 *Lutte Ouvrière* (Workers' Struggle) is the name by which the French Trotskyist party *Union Communiste* (Communist Union) is usually known, after the name of its weekly paper.

12 **Santiago Carrillo** (1915–2012) was General Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) from 1960 to 1982.

Iglesias argues this movement, this convergence is needed to break the two-party system and, in this way, force Felipe González to reach an agreement. [He reckons] if Felipe González doesn't have the monopoly and neither does the right, then these social movements, having 10 or 15 percent of the votes, will force Felipe to rule with them, to count on them to rule. That is the axis of his reasoning. It is very strange because, as Carrillo denounces —he gives the quotation but without specifying [where he got it from] — the own Iglesias says convergence isn't going to be achieved, nor a front of the left, nor anything. But Iglesias has said it is a strategy, so they can understand [each other] because Carrillo says: "Why to insist so much with that and the electoral problem if you say it doesn't lead to anything?"

This has to do with the discussion; because I think [our Spanish comrades] are confused, so I wanted to clarify my personal interpretation.

Comrade Jesus and, I believe, most of the leadership — possibly Marina also, although I don't know her position — made an extensive political document whose core is the stage has changed in the political sense. [The document states] that, from the stage of struggles, we had entered the stage that Enrique had concocted, i.e., the electoral stage: the centre of everything is the electoral activity. [As] at the end of October there are elections in Galicia, and next year there are several elections, including those of deputies, then the party already has to adopt an electoral tactic, especially to respond to the crisis of the CP. Then they hold the stage of struggles will continue to the bitter end but that, for the party, as an activity, an electoral stage is opened because all the parties have already considered the electoral problem.

And [Comrade] Cabezas sends a very nice letter, full of questions, where he raises — not with the clarity [I will use] — that this is very hurried, that maybe he is a unionist, that he is in Workers' Commissions and sees no one with Iglesias, that everybody says it is a cathouse, i.e., this is the crisis of the CP with no objective current showing up to solve it. He also says that, before the activists, he doesn't see for now the possibility of unity or that the [different] sectors join, and that, if we come out saying we are with Convergence, or in favour of discussing with Gerardo Iglesias, the others sectors will be furious and those who are in doubt — [which are the sectors] he mentions — will split from us when telling them we are for Iglesias because those who are in doubt are against the three.

Cabezas also disagrees with [the characterisation] we have entered a stage of relative passivity, that is, that the defeat of shipyard workers caused a low. He says yes, this defeat led to a low, but you have to frame it within two facts. One, which we have said, that the Spanish proletariat due to the influence of Stalinism has greatly lowered its class consciousness. [It is a proletariat] that previously fought against Franco [and that] is now monarchist. The Stalinists themselves are monarchists. Thus, there is a tremendous lowering [of the proletariat consciousness level]. Two, there is a fundamental structural crisis since 1982 and, within that low, the proletariat and the masses have begun an increasingly intense struggle, which starts from a lower level of consciousness. He then states we should not confuse this level of consciousness with the fact there is a growing crisis and a rise in the workers' movement, even if there are ups and downs.

So he takes the two factors — without joining them very well [because] it isn't a document, they're observations — to say if this is the stage, we have to keep insisting on the problem of union struggles, national struggles, and the crisis of the regime. He quotes serious cases of elements of a very serious crisis, [for example] the problem of Justice.

[?]:<sup>13</sup> He says the crisis is deeper than what the document raises.

**N. Moreno:** Yes. And it is getting bigger.

**CC:** Unemployment is 20 percent.

**N. Moreno:** Oh, yes, unemployment is terrible.

**FN:** Also the crisis of the institutions, of the parties.

13 [?] means we haven't identified the speaker.

**N. Moreno:** [The crisis] of institutions and the mess with Justice: there are some terrible troubles of all kinds. He points out that, due to the crisis of the bourgeoisie and the struggles of the workers' movement, the stage is much more revolutionary than the picture [painted by the document], independently of the fact that at this moment there is a decline in the struggles, but this is secondary

Jesus' letter ends by saying they went from 800 to 1500 newspapers sold and they go to 2000 in the short term; they have taken the newspaper to 16 small pages and have a good success in three factories in Madrid. At the same time he insists the party is becoming increasingly proletarian, they're penetrating the workers' movement and proletarianising the whole party. They took around 300 people, in all of Spain, to the May Day rally, I think 170 in Madrid, but they say the proletariat in Madrid is the one that moves the least.

Well, then I spoke [with them] giving them another point of view. My proposal was: "Why change horses in the middle of the stream? [The fact] the entire bourgeoisie considers it an election year doesn't mean we have to accept what the bourgeoisie says. We can even announce we will abstain, we won't accept and we will campaign [against the elections]. We accept our play, not [that of] the bourgeoisie. And then, if you're doing so well, what's the problem in continuing like this instead of [deciding] already, a year from now, what the tactic will be?" This on the one hand.

"What do you do in the face of the CP crisis? But to act on the crisis of the CP, you don't have to accept electoral tactics or start negotiations with Iglesias. We also do what suits us. For now, what is best for us is to criticise the three, to say the plan of Iglesias is the most to the right, a piece of trash, and the plans of the three are rubbish. And we are very happy the CP is in crisis and it is in crisis because it is opportunistic. And what it is needed is to make a revolutionary communist party, something that none of the three will do. [In short, to make] an uncompromising criticism and, in the meantime, continue penetrating and penetrating [the workers' movement]."

The problem was fixed right away because, before talking to me, they were chatting [and agreed that] nothing was happening. There is no sector of the CP dragging anyone; there isn't a single person of the CP thinking about the elections. Well, they themselves were thinking the situation is very difficult, there have been opinion polls and all the polls resulted in the CP, [adding up all the sectors, gets very few votes], they don't go anywhere. And then they were also in doubt.

This is something else I put to them: "What is your perspective? If there is an objective current of the vanguard going there, put it as an element of reality and we vote what is the tactic to respond to this objective phenomenon. But, according to your description, there is no objective phenomenon, that is, there is no vanguard current of the workers' movement saying 'Let's unite with the CP', or 'We go with Iglesias', or 'We go with Convergence'. So [you have to] follow the modest path you had." Because I saw as ridiculous the line of going to Convergence to discuss, I thought with that line they wouldn't win anyone and they would only win, with a lot of work, if they continued with what they were doing.

Well, then they said right away yes, they had already thought [the tactic of going with Iglesias] was a tactic they could see wouldn't serve them well.

### 3. About *Lutte Ouvrière*

(The reports by Alberto Frank and Lucas are presented in summary form.)

**AF:** *Lutte Ouvrière* is arguing with the Unified Secretariat (Usec) since the conference of Jack Barnes questioning Trotskyism was published. They support the Usec against the direction of the American Socialist Workers Party (SWP), defending the permanent revolution.

They defend Trotsky, but in a dogmatic way, vindicating without criticism the text of the Theses of the Permanent Revolution.

**N. Moreno:** They see nothing of the world revolution.

**AF:** That's right. They're progressive in the sense they defend Trotskyism, but only up to there.

**N. Moreno:** And what about Mandel? Do they support him?

**AF:** They support the USec in general against the SWP and at the same time they attack the USec because it replaces the working class with nationalist directions. But they don't name Mandel — they don't mention anyone by name unless they have broken up with him, as is the case with Barnes —; they only speak of the USec.

To show how *Lutte Ouvrière* sees the process of the world revolution, I'm going to read you a quote:

"Today there is undoubtedly the same political distance between the nationalist revolutions that have taken place in the course of the last 35 years and the proletarian revolution, than between the *jacqueries* repeated incessantly in the middle ages and the French Revolution of the eighteenth century."

For them, the class content of the revolutionary processes of the last 40 years directly doesn't exist because the proletariat didn't lead and because there was no revolutionary communist party at its head.

**N. Moreno:** The phenomenon of *jacqueries* is a partial phenomenon. From the 14th century, from 1300 to 1450, there is a great question of what could have happened... And there is the theory the capitalist regime, monopolistic, arises then by a manoeuvre of feudalism, because the peasants drive them crazy, together with the artisans. Just the opposite of what they say. That is, it can be a very good antecedent of what happened. And the dispute was for the State. What would have happened if the *jacqueries* made a state? Instead, there were 150 years of brutal, transitional fight of the workers of that time — who were not an industrial proletariat but artisans. Together with the peasants, they drove the landowners crazy. And it is said, the Wallerstein School says, it was another line of development for humanity, because it was a line truly in favour of the workers, and it could have won. It lost. And the capitalist regime is a consequence of this loss.

**AF:** They think the permanent revolution doesn't advance; there is no struggle for the world revolution if the working class is silent, and, as it is silent, what has happened is effectively *jacqueries*.

**N. Moreno:** Then there is no permanent revolution in this postwar period.

**AF:** In other paragraphs, they say it has been taken place in another way, distorted, and so on, and so forth. They're total euro-centrists. But they're all articles from a year ago; now they must be discovering America.

**N. Moreno:** Yes, but if they go there and say there is no revolutionary situation... I was thinking precisely about some debaters in France, who took the quotations of the judges from there, from Popayan, and took the reports by the Prosecutor's Office, and they said: "Excuse me, comrades, to see whether you understand us —, what would you think if in all Grenoble the judges don't work, because Justice, everything, everything, etc., etc. ... the workers, the whole department — I don't know what is the name of the Grenoble department — and if in another department the entire bourgeoisie pays taxes to the workers' organisations, does it still pay the State? Would you think the situation is normal?"

**AF:** This discussion has a derivation towards the problem of nationalist organisations. Taking Trotsky's positions on South Africa, for example, they make an accurate judgment about the nefarious role of nationalist leaderships. But they do it from a sectarian position that puts them on the razor's edge to capitulate to imperialism itself. They don't see the nationalist phenomenon because they don't see this process of permanent revolution,

deformed, ultra-deformed or whatever. This baffled them in the face of the struggle of French imperialism, where they began defending the rights of the white minority, the *caldoches*.<sup>14</sup> Then they corrected, and from doing nothing for the kanakas,<sup>15</sup> now their newspaper is all in favour of the kanakas, they're maniacs of independence and they forgot the *caldoches*, of whom they now say they're equivalent to the *pie d noir*<sup>16</sup> of Algeria.

And in relation to the workers' states, they have a terrible mess: they're for the political revolution but, regarding which state? They don't say what kind of State they are, but they allow a glimpse in other places they're neither workers state, nor bureaucratised, nor degenerated, nor anything.

**N. Moreno:** Don't they say we have to defend them if they're attacked by imperialism?

**AF:** No. There is no quotation for that. But in another part, they say "Defend Castro from imperialism if he were attacked". When they see the objective process of nationalism, then they move on to the other side, like any good sectarian: defending Ortega, Castro, that is, even the leaders.

**N. Moreno:** The leaderships as well?

**AF:** Yes. Regarding Cuba, they argue with the USec asking them where they got the miraculous formula to convert the Castro government from the government of Urrutia, which was a coalition with the bourgeoisie, into a workers' and peasants' government at the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1960, and in a workers' state after the expropriation. They see nothing of what happened. The USec discusses with them from revisionism. We could take part in the controversy and have a picnic with both.

**N. Moreno:** Forever and ever.

**AF:** On England, they have a good polemic article against the capitulation of the LCR<sup>17</sup> to Scargill,<sup>18</sup> attacking the latter for being a bad leader of the miners' strike.

**N. Moreno:** Is the LCR in favour [of Scargill]?

**AF:** Yes.

**N. Moreno:** Oh, oh!

**AF:** Of Lambert, *Lutte Ouvrière* makes a meal of him, criticising with quotations his policy of making a Workers' Party.

**N. Moreno:** It is surreal [...] Lambert is increasingly coherent. Why do they [criticise] him? Quotations of what? Of Lula?

**AF:** No, of the PT in Brazil, of what Lambert wants to do in France.

**N. Moreno:** But already [something] better than the speech of that guy, [the Lambertist leader who closed saying] "Long live the united, [single,] and democratic Republic!" there can't be.

**AF:** Going to *Lutte Ouvrière's* positions on the French Communist Party. On the one hand, they capitulate to it because they say it's good for the CP to recover; that it would be bad if it had continued deteriorating because that recovery raises the morale of the militants. What they did see is the phenomenon, which the LCR doesn't see, that the CP and also the CGT went to the left from the moment the CP left the government in September-October. The LCR goes around trying to do something with the dissidents, which are equivalent to the Iglesias wing of the Spanish CP. In relation to them, Marchais is on the left, he is the French Carrillo.

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14 **Caldoche** is the name given to European inhabitants of the French overseas colony of New Caledonia, mostly native-born French settlers. The term "*caldoche*" has a pejorative connotation.

15 **Kanakas** were "workers" from various Pacific Islands employed in British and French colonies.

16 **Pied-Noir**, literally meaning "Black-Foot", was originally a term coined to refer to any white settler born in Africa, later evolving into a slang name for French settlers in Algeria.

17 **Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR)** – Revolutionary Communist League, French section of the USec.

18 **Arthur Scargill** (b. 1938) was President of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) from 1982 to 2002. He led the union through the 1984–85 miners' strike, a major event in the history of the British labour movement, defeated by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher.

**N. Moreno:** Yes.

**AF:** The dissenting wing of the French CP, which is currently a minority, is that of Pierre Juquin. *Lutte Ouvrière* correctly says it is the right wing.

**N. Moreno:** Ah, well! The new, those who made the opposition in Congress.

**AF:** Juquin is to the right in that debate.

**N. Moreno:** And to the right for the social location. Do you know or not? Because they're from counties, from departments both. One is of small producers. And they love him. They adore him, even the right. One of these populist socialist mayors who defends them like crazy. And the others are from the great centre of atomic research and everything, where all the technicians are. It is already the middle class of the middle class. The two bosses. Both reflect federations with specific social problems. But confirmed: that is, the social democracy of these people has a social base.

**AF:** There is a debate *Lutte Ouvrière*-LCR, where they don't agree.

**N. Moreno:** The League wants to unite [with *Lutte Ouvrière*].

**AF:** Yes. *Lutte Ouvrière* discusses with them but they never make clear definitions. They never talk about revisionism, etcetera.

**Lucas:** In relation to the national question, they don't accept our policy. In Guadeloupe, for example, where they have an organisation, they say you have to go to the black and poor workers' movement. They already give a battle against the nationalists so that, when they take power, they have already discredited them a little.

**N. Moreno:** Why do they say they disagree with us?

**Lucas:** Because we defend the united front against French imperialism.

**N. Moreno:** Then, they, on the face of a great demonstration for the expulsion of imperialism, don't go? [If this is so] there is no unity [between IWL and *Lutte Ouvrière*]. Aren't they for independence?

**Lucas:** Yes. They say they are. But, for example, in a speech before our Central Committee, they didn't once utter the term "French imperialism"; everything against the nationalists. When one asks them, they say: "Yes, we are for independence, it will be inevitable and a nationalist government will come."

**N. Moreno:** So they see a big difference between us and them in the colonies?

**Lucas:** I think so, so much that it is one of the great points of discussion opening with them.

**N. Moreno:** But they're against Trotsky in an absolute way. But then they're more revisionist than Mandel. Hell! But then they're against the permanent revolution to the bitter end.

**AF:** That article is sectarian.

**N. Moreno:** But that's not something of a sect. Trotsky would call them traitors.

**MP:** Of course; they would be against Trotsky's policy for China, for example.

**N. Moreno:** Sure. As in Mexico with oil.

**MP:** They would be against everything that Trotsky said for Mexico.

**N. Moreno:** Sure. That is, they're in the wing that Trotsky denounced can't even step on the Fourth: those who said "rrr...revolutionary", who attacked, who have as the centre of their policy to attack Cardenas. Trotsky is very clear: They can't belong to the Fourth; you have to throw them out. Do you want...? No sir! The Galicia group can't be, can't step in. That is, in this, they're more revisionist than Barnes, much more. I say to prepare the letter with her, that we have great doubts whether there will be an agreement because we think they're the extreme... To scare them. Here is a tragedy. You, who claim to defend Trotskyism, are hopeless... And take Galicia and this and that. Did they say: "We, in this issue, would disagree with you"?

**Lucas:** There is a discussion with the comrades. They say they have an anti-colonial policy, a policy of independence. But they don't clarify at all what it is. Our conclusion is their policy is different. Their slogan is "For a government of poor blacks".

**N. Moreno:** Are they for the Malvinas belonging to Argentina or not?

**MP:** I didn't get them to say a word about Argentina. I think they have a Thornett type position.

**N. Moreno:** We have to start the discussion, with the method we use for them: open up the party. And we, at every place they go, hit them hard, Latin American style. And to their leadership, ask them: "So Cuba isn't the same as [the USSR]?" And bring statistics, and be prepared. Do you want to explain why the crises are the same in Cuba and in the USSR? For example, savings, etcetera. Let's see, explain: Why is the economic phenomenon exactly the same?

The same with the independence of Guadeloupe, which is the main point you have to discuss. For Trotsky, the great line in South Africa was "Black Republic". And Angola. And catch them like this, well documented, and hit them and see what happens.

## 4. Discussion on Colombia

(The discussion on Colombia in this International Executive Committee began with a report presented by Lucas, a member of the International Secretariat and the leadership of the PST (C). We have transcribed the most important paragraphs of that report.)

**Lucas:** The situation took an important leap in the class struggle. The crisis of the truce began and is developing. So much so that the guerrillas, in fact, in practice, have been divided between the FARC<sup>19</sup> on the one hand, which act in favour of the truce and the government, and the M-19,<sup>20</sup> which is practically in permanent combats. They fail to deliver a military defeat to the M-19, despite the attempts.

This is only a reflection of the very important development of the guerrilla movement at the national level. The M-19 began to get into the cities, influencing enough neighbourhoods and marginal sectors. There is a significant strengthening at the national level of the Frente Ricardo Franco [dissident grouping of the FARC that opposed the truce], which would be winning sectors to the FARC. The indigenous guerrilla of Cauca is also greatly strengthened, which makes it almost a liberated area. But the phenomenon within the mass movement, popular, marginal to the working class, is the M-19. What marks the national situation is the guerrilla movement.

Along with that, the mass movement has taken a very important leap. The trade union movement has been giving many partial struggles, and there is a very important peasant rise, which isn't guerrilla struggle but actions of peasant masses. There are some popular actions, such as neighbourhood civic strikes.

Two or three months ago the electoral campaign began theoretically, but in reality, it doesn't start. Some politicians say the war opens before the elections.

The economic strategy of the bourgeoisie is to reduce the real wage by 40 percent in about a year and a half. (It is a change in relation to the period 1982-84, in which not only the real wage wasn't attacked but slightly increased. Betancur's strategy, despite the crisis, wasn't to attack the real wage to solve the problem of the guerrilla.) Then it is foreseeable there will continue to be resistance from the mass movement, such as the teachers' strike that is being prepared.

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19 **Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)**. Its supreme leader was the legendary Manuel Marulanda Velez ("*Tirofijo*" [Surefire]), whose real name was Pedro Antonio Mariín.

20 **19 April Movement (M-19)**, was an urban guerrilla which ended up signing a truce with the government. Its supreme leader was Carlos Pizarro.

In conclusion, what we see is that the mass movement advances, but within the mass movement, the working class is evidently the most behind. The peasant movement is on the rise, and the guerrillas are strengthening, especially M-19. The mafia opposes the government and is apparently the one that supplies M-19 with weapons. They make political campaigns: against imperialism, against extradition.

A *Luchar* is a revolutionary political phenomenon that nobody controls. We believe it is a vanguard phenomenon with certain elements of mass influence. Among the leaders part of *A Luchar*, there is an agreement in the sense we must go forward, we must have the political audacity, etc. But a wing has emerged from the ranks — we don't know the reasons behind, whether it is a militarist wing or fomented by the leadership of the guerrilla — that argues *A Luchar* is a political-union phenomenon to coordinate actions, which has to coordinate with the popular, peasant and student sectors but within *A Luchar* these sectors don't have to exist.

This has shocked all the forces, including us, who have clear we have to develop *A Luchar*, we have to put out a newspaper, leaflets, we should strike in agreement with some forces. Most forces agree *A Luchar* must be developed as a political force that tends to a mass political movement. We say *A Luchar* isn't an alternative revolutionary leadership but it must be developed as a political force that is a component of a revolutionary project also integrated with other existing forces. Our proposal is that with all these forces we should go to a revolutionary project, an alternative revolutionary leadership that for us is the construction of a revolutionary party.

In the Central Committee, we voted to act politically subordinated to *A Luchar*. That is, we give battles within *A Luchar*, but ultimately what *A Luchar* says is done. As of the emergence of this sector, we have questioned this way of acting but we don't know how to continue. We considered changing this policy of subordination and we intend to propose an internal discussion bulletin, through which our positions be widely known, or to publish a magazine and contribute our positions there.

**AF:** Don't we have characterisations of the internal currents, of the changes that have taken place in the positions of some of them?

**Lucas:** The only explanation is that it is a phenomenon. For example, the vanguard force was the CTS,<sup>21</sup> and the CIS<sup>22</sup> was the rearguard, they were the ones who said: "This is political-union". Now they say: "We see reality and we bet on this. This is a political project, and although we don't know exactly where we'll take it, to a party or what, the action of the revolutionaries goes through here. Then we'll develop it as union, popular, peasant, doing political struggle..." And all the leaderships say this.

**N. Moreno:** One question, which is: What is the program of *A Luchar*? What political project are we going to push for? I see the party badly now. There are elements of empiricism that can be fatal; that is, suddenly [*A Luchar*] is armed and the party is armed, [and it goes to] a party catastrophe. We have said in *A Luchar* there can't be anyone who doesn't attack the CP every week as opportunistic and if [we can't agree on this], is *A Luchar* broken? Because I get the impression that, with this of "we are the ones of *A Luchar*", we are entering Mandelism. It's very dangerous. And maybe it is very, very positive what they say that [*A Luchar*] is a political-union front. This is why theoretical issues [are important].

Every time I see it more confusing. And I begin to be afraid we will be buried because this empiricism [can lead] to everything exploding. And, when everything explodes, we are left with nothing: they go everywhere. It is very dangerous to say: "I don't know where we are going". If you say "I don't know where we are going" when we start to move forward, suddenly one will say: "No, where you go, I don't want to go; I don't want a unified party that systematically attacks the CP." Another will say: "I want a Maoist party." That's what I'm afraid of. I don't see the programmatic points of *A Luchar*, or of a wing of *A Luchar*.

21 **CTS (Union Work Committees)** was a union current part of independent unionism.

22 **CIS (Union Integration Current)** was a union current part of independent unionism.

The only problem [of] whether or not *A Luchar* goes towards a party is very dangerous, to the extent we don't have clarity towards which party and towards which program it goes.

Not for nothing we are against the truce. We have that point [in common]: Against the truce. What else? What other points do you say? Because, for example, "For the socialist revolution" is implicit, but not explicit. This is very dangerous.

**Lucas:** Actually, the point we have is the truce and everything related to it.

**N. Moreno:** Then it's a political-union front.

**Lucas:** And also the national strike and the uncompromising struggle against the government.

**N. Moreno:** Yes, but "uncompromising struggle against the government", what does it mean? M-19 [is also against the government]. Yes, we are screwed... What happens if you present a program and say: "Three months of discussion and that's it, and if it isn't approved we don't continue? Does *A Luchar* continue but as a political-union front?" What happens? Are they going to accept this? I think not, they will say: "No Siree, three months we accept nothing." We are accepting [the policy] be: "Go ahead, go ahead." And then they defeat us there.

Black E: Go ahead without defining the proposal. In the proposal you make the emphasis is: "Let's expand *A Luchar*, let the guerrillas come, let the whole world come', without defining within which programmatic limits we expand.

**N. Moreno:** And that's dangerous. If we squeeze, we break... *A Luchar* is a great thing. Although it may not look like it, [with] what I say I'm defending it. It is something great. And perhaps the most lucid are those who say: "It's a political-union agreement." [Although for me] it isn't even political-union: [it is union]. That is my first doubt. If we press the accelerator and the engine doesn't respond, maybe we distance ourselves from a lot of people. And why? *A Luchar* has already shown it is a very progressive current, immensely [progressive] in the union field, for me. It is one thing that the entire IWL has to learn.

But now we also have to learn the other, **Lucas:** how theory helps enormously to the practice. [This] means, it is decisive to define whether [*A Luchar*] goes for a true revolutionary political party or not. Because if we define they don't, our allies are those of the most retrograde wing of the CTS, eventually. Thus, here in the cold, I wouldn't dare say: "This is the progressive wing and this one isn't." Because in the wing that says "Let's go ahead" maybe there is the guerrilla sector that wants this movement without aim [because] they consider us "a wild beast" and especially because of our extraordinary capacity. [Because] the guerrillas think: "We have none like Lucas or like Simon; nothing is similar to that party, hell! this is good for us." But, for what? For a little mess of two or three years. And they [also] are willing to enter another truce tomorrow. Because it isn't clear in the program. Then it can be fatal for the party itself.

Instead, when these questions are clearly defined, we don't take the line of not recruiting other people and we do [take the line] of continuing to grow. So, everything we have to discuss these days is very delicate.

**AF:** As a partisan project, shouldn't we tend to close politically with those who are there? That is, wouldn't it be better to ask we agree right now to open the political discussion to see whether what there is can become a party?

**N. Moreno:** It can be.

**AF:** If we raise this, do they reject it?

**N. Moreno:** For me, yes.

**MP:** *A Luchar* can really be a phenomenon of union-revolutionary type, which gives us exceptional conditions to go towards the revolutionary united front, the workers' party and grow. But if we mix it, we will be left naked and without a party.

**N. Moreno:** That's right.

**[?]:** What do you do with the non-union sectors?

**N. Moreno:** That's extraordinary. Why can't come to a trade union movement artists and students, peasants and all who want to? There I would be in favour, once specified. What's the problem? This is secondary. The problem is, what are they coming for? Are they coming for the trade union movement? Then artists come to support our union activity, that's perfect.

**Lucas:** In *A Luchar*, in the background, there are different projects without being explicit. We want the revolutionary party and there are wings of *A Luchar* discussing the same thing. There are people who see it as a mass political front of a guerrilla sector. Others see it as an autonomous mass political movement. The sector that reacts and puts brakes on it is the one that defends the project of the CTS; they're those that state the revolutionary project is the National Liberation Army (ELN), which has to have a trade union front, a popular front, and a peasant front.

The programmatic aspect is being discussed. We, Pan y Libertad [Bread and Liberty Movement] and the CIS propose we have to give a programmatic framework to *A Luchar*.

**N. Moreno:** But maybe we are the ones who have to be against even of those who say we have to go to a party. The first thing is the program. Not even [discussing the] party. The discussion is so simple! [But I think] you're facing it all wrong. You say: "*A Luchar* is the greatest thing there is, and it is a revolutionary union tendency." And we already have to define it that way, even if there are opportunists who are for unity with the bourgeoisie. From the union standpoint, it is [that:] a revolutionary union tendency has arisen organically in Colombia. And it isn't something else. It is very dangerous everything we are pushing; [it is] confusing wishes with reality.

[Following] this has to go a note of ours to all of them saying: "With a revolutionary union tendency in Colombia we do nothing. We do a lot but we do nothing, because the problem of peasant struggle isn't solved, and so on. And then we want to discuss this program [with] *A Luchar* and with those who want, to agree on going to a front of revolutionary type and not union revolutionary." I believe it's that simple, it's very simple. And more than ever, to publish a precious party newspaper — not this bulletin — that raises this every week. This is an alternative.

The other alternative is: you don't want to make this mess? You do it with the leadership. "Well, comrades, our party will start a fierce campaign for a revolutionary political front; as we get along so well we would like to [do a] seminar or whatever to discuss for 15 days or a month before going out with that. But we will come out with that, because if there isn't [a revolutionary political front] this revolution sinks; nobody will manage to grab the M-19; a barbarous mess with the FARC will come."

We must delimit [positions] for this policy, which [has to go] into the history of the Colombian revolutionary movement, even if they reject it and we're left alone. Because otherwise, the empirical path will be fatal for everyone. I do think so, there are projects. They're studying them themselves but [they are] their [projects].

So, first, we are the champions of keeping *A Luchar* as a revolutionary current and we don't want to interfere. We won't propose *A Luchar* be transformed into a party or anything [like that] because we are very respectful of those who are to the bitter end for the strike, of those who are to the bitter end against the government, and of those who are to the bitter end for mobilisation and we won't be ultimatumist or those who try to manipulate *A Luchar*. I think that's great for them. We are the champions of *A Luchar* being what it is today. If it stops being and it's what we want ... well, it's a celebration, we win the lottery.

[But] the weak point I see in *A Luchar*, [already] since the World Congress, is the problem of the political program to go there.

**AF:** Would it be inferior to the Peruvian Peasant Student and Popular Front (FOCEP) in this sense?

**N. Moreno:** Totally. It is the opposite of FOCEP; for now, it is the opposite. FOCEP was political. This is why I think your definition that [*A Luchar*] is of the vanguard with elements of masses is correct but we must insist much, much, on the problem of mass influence. In the unions, they're very strong, [though] not of masses because I think they don't have the strength to do their [own] central. That's why I agree: it's not of masses.

So I think we're [very well], we'll get along, and we [do not have to] dilute ourselves now. Then [we have to] take *A Luchar* as a union-political bulletin, but fundamentally a union bulletin. It comes out and our atomic bomb is the political battle to create the revolutionary party.

Because for me, and also for Lucas, we have very serious problems there: the pressure of M-19, the problem of FARC, the same [Frente Ricardo] Franco, what you say that the guerrillas are dominated by them. We have to keep preparing for a recruiting of the vanguard. We have a scourge there, which are FARC and the backwardness of the working class. And we, where are we top dogs? When the workers' proposal of substance comes, there all our motions prevail. [This] isn't by chance; the process of class struggle moves to the guerrilla and we are increasingly marginalised; the workers' movement comes and we go to centre [stage]. We have to discuss like this. That's why I see an impasse in you. You see you're very well located, and at the same time, you don't know where to go. That is the impression I have. And it is because of this we are in a confusing project, confusing everywhere. Even those who say "move ahead" can be the height of confusion. They tell you themselves.

[We have to make them] this same proposal. They're very good people, we will recruit many. To keep the relationship well, we have to begin to agree on whether or not there is a political agreement. Knowing that *A Luchar* is immovable, it remains as it is because it is something great. *A Luchar* is objective for us, and it is great; not big; great.

Why didn't FOCEP happen? I think it has to do with objective causes: the Colombian proletariat is also ignorant, like the Argentine one. We have two great misfortunes. And the Peruvian proletariat is extraordinary; it has a very high level. So it is logical *A Luchar* takes place in Colombia and it is logical FOCEP takes place in Peru.

**Lucas:** In *A Luchar* no one bets on a clear project.

**N. Moreno:** And [there is] no one who can bet on a project which means to dissolve theirs. Only us who are Marxists. I mean it, it's true. They take care of their business, they're petty bourgeois.

**Lucas:** If the national strike takes place, we are well placed to convince about the need for a revolutionary party. If there is no strike, if there is very large ebb, everything will be channelled through the guerrilla movement.

**N. Moreno:** Sure.

**Lucas:** Then we'll be left pretty screwed up in our politics, in our perspective.

**N. Moreno:** Oh, no. You may lose [but only] for the moment ... God forbid! You're already [ideally] placed. They're in a bad position. Yes, yes, [the guerrillas] will recruit by thousands and us by units, but [in the end], you're left with the package. Twenty times more than in Nicaragua. You're left with the package because the working class won't disappear, the struggle won't disappear. The continuity of *A Luchar* ... [Navarro Wolf], all those will fail despite their extraordinary successes. We have to keep discussing. That is the strong point of *Lutte Ouvrière*. Did you know *Lutte Ouvrière* says in 1947 they led Renault? Forty-five thousand workers in a factory all together on the edge of Paris. So you see: a small group of less than 100 [militants], shook France. If they had had that strength in 1968, the history of France changes.

**Lucas:** Our recruitment policy isn't directly to the party but to organise *A Luchar* circles lead by us. This is the way to organise people that the party would take.

**N. Moreno:** If you have a good newspaper, that tactic is great.

**Lucas:** We think we can supply the newspaper with a good political bulletin that goes to everybody, to the party, to its periphery, and even to the circles, to recruit and politically arm the party.

**N. Moreno:** Very well, it can also be a magazine, a monthly. But here you have a problem: the bulletin of *A Luchar* is horrible in this sense. They don't have the weekly answer. But this is tactical. It can be a once-a-month magazine, it can be a bulletin so as not to crash, whatever. The important thing is by which way we give the [systematic] fight for our program. Because, for me, [transforming *A Luchar* into a revolutionary party] isn't a slogan today. There aren't enough elements of judgment, or knowledge of them, or of reality. Neither can we do it now for the characteristics of Colombia. Unfortunately, the seminar wasn't done. It is a false perspective to believe we can transform *A Luchar* into a revolutionary party... Right now, categorically, that perspective doesn't exist. Imposing it means breaking *A Luchar*. This doesn't mean we can't achieve it with some sectors. But even [we might not achieve it] with anyone because we'll find they have different party projects. Maybe 80 percent agrees with the point "Let's make a party of *A Luchar*", but everyone thinks: "My party". That is another serious thing: "My party."

**[?]:** Can't we go to more advanced processes of discussion with any of those sectors to go towards a party?

**N. Moreno:** Yes, to the bitter end. But you can only know it once you send them a note and they tell you: "Look, we agree on these points and not on these."

**[?]:** And trying a thorough discussion with the ELN?

**N. Moreno:** But if I'm proposing before sending the letter, you gather everyone and say: "Well, I want to discuss this project with you; these are our points." See what they say and then discuss thoroughly.

Why be guided by psychological impressions? Why don't we give a note to each one and say whether or not there is an agreement? And they tell us: "We agree on this and not on this." It is the first [step]. Or a discussion, a seminar, a thorough talk, but [that be] already precise: "Do you agree on this, on this, on this?" I say [this] for the political project, [always] taking care of *A Luchar* as the girl of our eyes because *A Luchar* is a conquest and the rest is 100 pigeons flying. I don't know whether you understand me. So, this conquest has to be kept by taking good care of it, being conservative in this. In case that by pressing the accelerator we divide it. Is it clear or not?

**CC:** Ultimately, that's what we thought.

**N. Moreno:** This line was very good: we were to go to the seminar, we were to discuss in depth. [Here] we considered [the hypothesis] that [*A Luchar*] would divide. The real plan here was that, when making the presentation at the seminar, a wing would inevitably [emerge]. Our great joy [would have been that] the majority was in our favour.

**AF:** But not to divide *A Luchar* but to see how far it can go.

**N. Moreno:** No, not to divide it, but from this point on we went back to [insisting on the discussion of] the party, but not to divide. Do you see it very difficult like this?

**Lucas:** There is a discussion about the perspective of making a party, the programmatic frame, etc., which is already open and goes through the organisations. I don't see the letter: they won't answer us.

**N. Moreno:** Well, but then we don't write them a letter. [We take out a] weekly newspaper where we bombard them with that every week. We have to hammer every week: "In Colombia, nothing is settled if we don't make a party among the revolutionaries based on this minimal program." And you have to tell them that and not orally but [reaching] thousands.

So you don't have to publish a magazine or a bulletin. And [during] the entire campaign you publish a newspaper that essentially says: "There has been a crisis, essentially of Maoism. Maoism had these positive aspects for those who were in it: it held the opinion the

apparatus of the bourgeois state had to be destroyed, etcetera, etcetera. On the other hand are us, the Trotskyists. Thus, it isn't about [arguing] whether the Trotskyists or the Maoists were right, but it is about seeing, after this experience, whether former Maoists and current Trotskyists agree on the next minimum program to make a revolutionary party."

**Lucas:** What if we propose a discussion bulletin of *A Luchar* where each one presents their positions?

**N. Moreno:** Ah, ok, but then this means recruiting.

**[?]:** Of course, alignments take place in fact.

**N. Moreno:** No, not in fact, because you can't do political discussion just because. If you open a discussion bulletin you have opened an alignment of people. For me, [*A Luchar*] is broken after 15 days, nothing is left. You'll bury the union organisation. [For example,] you go to Barranquilla and there is a discussion; those of Pan y Libertad of Barranquilla are against, you give them a beating and they're still against. Then they take the phone and say: "We have to break *A Luchar* because they take out everybody." I don't believe you can achieve a bulletin like this. Because then you take the internal struggle to their ranks. Instead, what I say is perfect: "This is untouchable and there is no internal bulletin because it is union [current]. And the son of a bitch who wants to come here to bring a political thesis, we kick him out of *A Luchar*." "Who proposes it?" "We do: he is kicked out. We are democratic." Then nobody can say anything against it. And we get a newspaper that gives [our] line every week.

**CC:** That is, we manage two parallel projects.

**N. Moreno:** United but parallel.

**CC:** We take care of *A Luchar* and we discuss with the other currents from the newspaper.

**N. Moreno:** And with great care. *A Luchar* of Barranquilla is very good, there is a current very much in our favour, and we don't accept it [within the party]. We only sell them the newspaper and [we hold] the meeting. In any case, this goes ... the boat goes. And nobody can tell you anything. I say [this is better] because the internal bulletin means the factional struggle within *A Luchar*. I'm against [this]. Precisely, *A Luchar* is so great that I take care of it. Here is the dialectic: how we take care of *A Luchar*. And besides [there are] other people who aren't in *A Luchar* who can sympathise [with us], we can win them.

Think. Now, if they withstand the bulletin, fabulous, I'm in favour of the bulletin. But I know it will cause thorough friction. The good thing about the bulletin [is] those who are on your side are coming quickly.

**Lucas:** What if an agreement is reached at the leadership?

**N. Moreno:** Ah, that would be great. You have to go and stay even one or two months without getting out a bulletin, or a newspaper, or anything. This is big as a house. But speaking clearly, without manoeuvres: "Look, *A Luchar* is great in the union [field], comrades, thus we don't want to mess with anyone. We want to have good relations, to unite, to continue *A Luchar*. But there is another problem: there has to be a political project. We are delaying and this stuffs up everything. It leaves us open to the M-19, it leaves us open to the official CP, which, according to you, are opportunists. Well, then we have to start the discussion. And this discussion has to go to the ranks, seeing how [is to be done] so it doesn't screw anyone because it isn't about someone being screwed but about winning all of them. Although we have different projects we have a fraternal attitude, we are militating in the union field which is the most important front for us, for our party. We didn't do the seminar — and we propose the seminar again —, we propose to do it to reach agreements. Let's discuss a full month; every Saturday, we meet four or five hours to discuss the problems." Nothing giving the impression you come with a project to bust them, [something] new or crazy.

**Lucas:** That seems feasible because the leaderships work.

**N. Moreno:** Well, then fantastic. And then you explain to them: “And if we don’t do this, we have to keep getting the newspaper *A Luchar* monthly, well union-like, and all the parties may publish their newspapers, make their campaign, and try to win without [touching *A Luchar*]. Our project remains: [it’s] not our party. There will be no revolutionary Marxist party with mass influence based on our party. No. There will be one through individual unions and with revolutionary groups. And we believe you’re all revolutionaries. What we want most is to see whether we achieve a common party project.”

Maybe you find yourself with a surprise: that the leaderships are the ones most in favour.

**AF:** Then you can move forward with a program.

**N. Moreno:** But you bring the program, the document, and you say: “What do you think of this?” I don’t know whether you understand me: [we must] start with the political. I’m terrified we will start with movementism and optimism and later, in the end, we will find surprises.