



Nahuel Moreno

**The break
with
Pabloism**

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1953

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English Translation: Daniel Iglesias

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cehus2014@gmail.com



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Foreword

Nahuel Moreno participated in the Second World Congress of the Fourth International in 1948. Since then both he and the entire leadership of his party have been actively accompanying the construction of the international. Years later, Moreno defined that this had been the most important decision of his life.

In August 1951, the Third World Congress was held. Moreno and Jose Speroni (aka Lombardi) travelled. They carried a document with the signature of 50 union leaders to endorse the proposal to be recognised as an official section. And they presented a few points for debate and of criticism of the positions of the leadership of Pablo and Mandel and their group in Argentina, GCI, led by Jorge Posadas. Several of them were approved in the International Theses of the Second Congress of the POR in August 1950. Among other issues, they pointed out: the recovery of the European economy, against Mandel's "stagnation and morass" forecasts; the defence of class political independence from the Peronist government, denouncing the capitulation to it by GCI; the interpretation of Tito's break with Stalin as part of the world crisis of Stalinism and the pressures of imperialism, rejecting any expectation or support for the Yugoslav bureaucracy; the recognition of a revolution in China, without accepting the ambiguous and capitulating positions concerning Maoism; the rejection of Pablo's bureaucratic methods.

This attitude, of holding its own and critical positions, even within the framework of supporting, in general, the Pabloite-Mandelist leadership and the resolutions of the congress, gave rise to the recognition as an official section of GCI, headed by Posadas, totally servile to Pablo's orders.

After the congress, there were important events in the reality of the class struggle and within the Fourth International, since Pabloism began to radically modify the resolutions of the world congress. In January 1952, Pablo tried to force the French section to join the French Communist Party. Most of its leadership flatly refused and the section was expelled. A few months later, the betraying policy of supporting the bourgeois government of MNR in Bolivia took place after the workers' revolution of April 1952, where Trotskyism had an important weight in the leadership of the COB (Bolivian Workers Central).

These and other events (such as the prospect of an inevitable world war and the long-term entryism into communist parties with the expectation they would become revolutionaries), led to the division of the Fourth International. In March 1953, the POR leadership presented a strong polemic against the International Secretariat, expressed in this text of the "Letter to the International Secretariat", and written by Moreno, which we are publishing for the first time and in its full version.

In November 1953, the split was formalised, when the English, French, American, Swiss and New Zealand sections made the call to form the International Committee of the Fourth International,

which was immediately joined by the POR of Argentina and quickly grouped the largest part of Fourth-Internationalist Trotskyism.

Mercedes Petit

September 2020

The break with Pabloism

A. Letter to the International Secretariat

Buenos Aires, 10 March 1953

Dear comrades of the International Secretariat,

You would know our party has opened the discussion for its National Congress and its second item on the agenda deals with the positions and situation of our International. On this agenda item, we will discuss especially our resolutions on you as the international leadership, adopted in our central committee (CC) of September [1952]. We believe it is necessary to repeat them, although you must know them:

“For all these conclusions the CC of the POR resolves:

“1) To consider that the International Secretariat (IS) has modified in its letter of 15 January and the speech of comrade Pablo¹ the spirit and the letter of the political resolutions of the World Congress;

“2) To study exhaustively all the theoretical discussion before and after the World Congress to corroborate whether the confusing and contradictory nature of some of the documents and resolutions gave rise to the modifications that have been carried out;

“3) To consider the methods of the International Secretariat as contrary to a responsible leadership that strives first of all to clarify the points of view, characteristic of a completely confused leadership who tries to hide their changes of positions or the clear formulation of their thoughts to save their prestige, completely weakening the education of our cadres;

“4) To not regard this resolution as a pronouncement on the new line and the new characterisation made by the International Secretariat but forcing us to pronounce ourselves at the next party congress.

“The CC of POR, having regard to the positions of the International Secretariat regarding our party and the French *Parti Communiste Internationaliste* (International Communist Party, PCI), resolves to suspend the old party characterisation of absolute political trust in the international leadership as part of our proletarian tendency until our National Congress pronounces on the new positions of the Secretariat and its trajectory.”

¹ **Michel Pablo** was the pseudonym of **Michel Raptis** (1911-1996), Greek Trotskyist and main leader of the Fourth International after the Second World War. He and Mandel were the authors of the tactic of “entryism sui generis” — i.e., for an extended period— in Stalinist Communist Parties. He later broke from Trotskyism. Together with Ernest Mandel, they promoted a revisionist policy of capitulation to the Stalinist communist parties, social democracy and bourgeois nationalist movements type MNR of Bolivia. They promoted the “sui generis entryism”, which meant the dissolution of the Trotskyists in the Communist Parties. In the 1960s he moved away from Trotskyism and was an advisor to the bourgeois government of Ben Bella in Algeria. [Editor]

For months we have passed copies of these resolutions and the invitation to speak at our Congress to the official section of the International.² As they have not yet sent any collaboration to defend the official position of our International, we are forced to send this letter with the dual purpose of ensuring our position is understood and that they speak to defend your policy.

For your part, there must be a special interest in showing our mistakes, wherever they are, to us, who are, so to speak, Pabloites from the early days. From the Second [1948] to the Third [1951] World Congress, we have been giving a parallel line to the one Pablo and Michele Mestre³ have defended in France and internationally. Both Germain⁴ and Pablo know this to be true because they know our publications, especially our international thesis of December 1951 and the articles on Korea and Yugoslavia in our newspaper, *Frente Proletario*. Despite this, it will not be superfluous to recall some important quotes, to show how we have been the first founders and supporters of what we could call the Pabloite tendency:

1) We have argued the Glacis⁵ were workers' states and the Stalinist-bourgeois power before 1948 was a sui-generis dual power, independently of the International Secretariat and Pablo, but agreeing with this comrade:

“29. Despite its proletarian tendency, the International Secretariat has made a series of errors in its method of analysis, which it is necessary to point out and overcome. ... b) Regarding the Glacis, the International Secretariat, the World Congress and the April Conference have interpreted that as long as they remain countries independent of the USSR, they would continue to be capitalist countries without understanding the enormous political power of the bureaucracy and the weak power of the Glacis bourgeoisie, isolated from imperialism as a consequence of the crisis of the latter, resulted in a dual power of two antagonistic social regimes in a sui-generis form with a bourgeois property base. This dual power, like any dual power, was extremely unstable and to the extent that power was resolved by the agency of the USSR, a whole process of liquidation of capitalism began within the borders of the country, eliminating the bourgeoisie as a dominant class and implementing nationalised property.

“In the event of a war with the Glacis, the World Congress (it does not specify which war) advises, given the characterisation of the Glacis as capitalism, revolutionary defeatism. This is the tremendous error of the World Congress since it starts from a false premise: that any wars in which capitalist countries take part, we must practice revolutionary defeatism. It's not so. Defeatism is the strategy of any war between big imperialist bandits and not between just capitalist countries. In a war between the USSR and imperialism, the latter's war against the Glacis will be a war against the socialist gains carried out by the Stalinist bureaucracy and not to liberate those countries from the Stalinist rule; for the return of the lands to the landlords and the factories to imperialism, against a country of the Glacis, as a whole, or against the USSR and its sphere of influence.” (*POR International Thesis*, 1950.)

2) Regarding Yugoslavia we have acknowledged that “these conclusions agree in general lines with those adopted by the Pablo, Hansen, Mestre faction.” (*POR International Thesis*, already quoted.)

2 The Third World Congress had recognised as official Argentine section the Group Fourth International (GCI) which published *Voz Proletaria* and was led by Posadas. [Editor]

3 **Michele Mestre** was a leader of *Parti Communiste Internationaliste* (International Communist Party), French section of the International Secretariat. [Editor]

4 **Ernest Germain** was a pseudonym of **Ernest Mandel** (1923-1995). Born in Belgium, he was one of the main leaders of Trotskyism since the postwar period, and also a Marxist economist. Together with Michel Pablo, he promoted the reorganisation of the Fourth International after the assassination of Trotsky, and since the beginning of the 1950s they led the opportunist sector, responsible for the crisis and dispersion of Trotskyism since then. From the 1960s until his death, he headed the so called “United Secretariat” of the Fourth International. [Editor]

5 In military engineering **glacis** is an artificial slope as part of a medieval castle or in early modern fortresses. It was used to prevent enemy siege engines from weakening defensive walls. By extension, the countries of the **Glacis** (Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria) provided the USSR with a protective buffer from imperialist aggression. [Editor]

3) Independently of the International Secretariat we have insisted, without knowing the 9th Plenum and Pablo's work, *Where Are We Going?*: "We must understand this situation and the need to work fully on the cadres of the big workers' parties in Europe and Asia. Regarding this task, we have to eliminate the anti-Stalinist prejudice when its militants are the best and most conscientious of the exploited in a country, even with all their prejudices. Our sections must carefully study the possibility of entryism into the communist parties of the Asian and Glacis countries, tending to structure with great care and without haste a proletarian tendency in these parties, working essentially on the proletariat and its vanguard. In Italy and France, we will keep our section in complete independence but we will do work on the Stalinist ranks, although without practising any entryism." (*POR International Thesis*, already quoted.)

4) We argued there was a revolution of extraordinary importance in China and we supported the North Korean war from the outset in disagreement with the position of the current official section (we do not agree with the interpretation of the Chinese Revolution by Pablo and the International Secretariat, despite the ambiguous character of the latter).

5) We argued there was a great deal of sectarianism and "normativism" in our ranks and that Pablo's opinions were an important step forward;

6) Our Political Bureau approved as fair in general, despite considering them in some parts confusing and contradictory, the Theses of the 9th Plenum and the work of Pablo *Where are we going?*

We have quoted these antecedents to show how our trajectory has nothing in common with that of the majority of the French section. We were on the other side of the barricade and that is why our break with you must be explained in all seriousness, both by you and by us.

This letter has this aim in addition to those already noted.

We know of our historical limitations: lack of experience, provincial isolation. Faced with these dangers, which we know, we want to save ourselves not by shutting up or approving what you say but by clinging more than ever to the method of our Marxist thought. Thus, we want you to answer us by pointing out where we were wrong and not just that we were wrong because we are "political provincials".

A false quote which is a method: Disloyalty in small and large things

For us, the problem of loyalty is not an issue by itself but it is linked to the movement. Revolutionary loyalty is a necessity and disloyalty a detriment to the revolution. It is only from this point of view that we will consider one attitude of yours of great importance and its connection with many other disloyal, petty attitudes, on matters of little importance. We stated we have never given too much importance to these issues, as they could be accidental errors. Today, we begin to see them in another light.

On 21 January of this year, you sent a note to all PCI members where you told them: "The decision of the International Secretariat falls within the attributions the statutes of the International give it (Section III, articles 11, 12, and 13 and section IV, article 18 of the Second World Congress) in a general way and specifically in the mandate the Third World Congress had given it as regards the French Party, namely:

"If it is found the French leadership does not respond to this hope (note: to apply loyally the line of the International), the IEC and the International Secretariat will be in charge of taking all the necessary organisational measures to transform the situation of the party" (International Secretariat letter, 21 January 1952).

In this part of your letter, there are two issues, one of form and one of substance. The one of substance is that for you to be able to apply the resolution of the Third World Congress it was essential to demonstrate that "the leadership of the French section did not loyally apply the line of the International". This fundamental question has never been raised or tried to demonstrate by

any document of yours. The truth about your letter is that the majority of the French section did not comply with your request of five days earlier of practising “sui-generis entryism”. Precisely, the French majority argued your letter of 14 January 1952 did not respond to the line of the International voted at the Third World Congress. You responded to this substantive accusation with organisational measures and not with an exhaustive political demonstration, which is the least that could be expected from a responsible leadership. The application of the World Congress resolution is thus invalidated for political reasons.

Let’s go to the issue of form: the statutes of the International. Suppose it is correct that if the statute gives an attribution, it can be applied without political criteria. You quote the attribution of generally suspending members of a CC “the International Secretariat to take (the leadership of the French section) until the IEC pronounces itself.” “The International Secretariat, therefore, constitutes your only qualified statutory leadership.” The latter is the true measure taken by the International Secretariat and not the suspension of the majority of the CC members as you say at the beginning of the letter.

If we depart from the general rights that the International Secretariat and the Executive Committee of the International have to adopt decisions and the sections and militants to abide by them, and we enter the specific rights of the International Secretariat and the IEC, as you pretend in your letter already quoted, we find that none of these bodies had, not even formally, that is, statutorily, any right to suspend the 16 comrades and to appoint the leadership of the French section. Article 12 says about the rights of the IEC: “It has the right to demand from the sections that they sanction or expel individuals or groups who have infringed proletarian discipline; if such measures are resisted by the national section, they have the right to undertake their application.” Article 13 is more explicit: ‘For a serious reason, such as total inactivity or *flagrant indiscipline towards the political or organisational decisions of the World Congress, the IEC can suspend a national section and can also provisionally recognise a group that had not been recognised until then. Such a measure, if protested, will be taken in case of extreme gravity and must be ratified by the next ordinary or extraordinary World Congress. Only the World Congress has the right to definitively expel an official section of the International.*’

Section IV, article 18, identifies the powers of the International Secretariat as acting on behalf of the IEC while it is not meeting “except that it cannot recognise groups as official sections, or suspend official sections, or organise under secretariats. Its decisions force the sections, etc.”

It is clear from all these quotes that the right to suspend members of a national directorate first, an entire directorate later, and to expel a section, as you have done with the French section, is not explicitly granted in the statute. On the other hand, it is explicitly deduced from the statutes that the majority of the French section continues to be the French section, at most suspended, if the IEC adopts that measure.

You have misquoted the statutes and applied them with absolute dishonesty: you have not recognised that according to the statutes the majority of the French section remains, whatever it does, the French section of our International until the next World Congress. This disloyal method of yours, which is revealed in the attempt to liquidate one of the most important Trotskyist parties in the world, through manoeuvres that hide behind centralism and the authority of being the leaders of our movement, is the common currency for the POR, albeit in minor matters. Let’s quote at least a few:

1) Six months before the World Congress, you sent a letter to our party through [Comrade] Ortiz⁶ attacking us for meddling in the Bolivian Section, independently of the International Secretariat and international discipline and for going against or, rather, not collaborating with the International (fundamentally for missing financial contributions). This letter, despite its inconsequential nature, was used by GCI and the Uruguayan LOR, which delivered it to the other Latin American sections without showing it to us.

6 Ortiz was the highest leader of the Uruguayan Trotskyist group Revolutionary Workers Group (LOR). [Editor]

We sent you a violent criticism of the Uruguayan LOR behaviour, for dropping the charges and requesting we be authorised to criticise Ortiz's procedure. We specifically asked whether Ortiz had been authorised to display and publish the letter before showing it to us. You answered by Olympically ignoring all our questions.

2) Regarding our financial contribution to the International, in that same letter we quoted our previous letters, which had been received by you, where we requested the way to remit our contribution. You had never answered these questions of ours and, despite it, you attacked us for not making contributions.

3) Our intervention in Bolivia, which you attacked in the letter, was because of the signing of an agreement with a leader of the Bolivian region, to help the sister section. This agreement, which you saw as the denial of international discipline, was your most crass affirmation since it specified it would be carried out as long as the Latin American Bureau and the International Secretariat approved it. Our defence, like the other points, was left unanswered by you.

4) After the World Congress, you made us financial proposals for us to make a loan to the International for 45,000 pesos (two thousand dollars then). Part of these proposals was the agreement for some of our comrades to stay there. All your proposals were later revealed as an accumulation of lies to cheat us of 45,000 pesos, which we never saw again. You accompanied this fact with two ingeniously combined measures: by international discipline, we had to keep absolute silence about why our comrades had to remain in Europe and, on the other hand, you discredited us before the militants and the European leaderships as if we were revolutionary tourists.

5) We have repeatedly requested you guarantee in writing that you would apply in Argentina the resolution of the World Congress of a national congress one year after the section was recognised. This simple request — that you say in a letter “we will apply the resolution of the World Congress” — did not have an affirmative answer. This shows how you, in combination with the section leadership, were not willing to comply with the World Congress resolution. That this is so is shown by the fact the section did not comply with the resolution of the World Congress. Your disloyalty and small manoeuvres do not end there. Faced with a public attack in the section's official newspaper against our party in which a series of facts were notoriously falsified, we requested you expressly confirm or deny those facts by letter. Instead of answering frankly: the section is right or wrong, you responded with a very violent letter, which did not answer our questions, saying you do not like our tone. We are not disgusted by your tone but your methods.

The POR can synthesise your procedures, concerning the French section and us, in a few words: you are disloyal in small and large things.

From the world war as a very probable trend without a fixed term of the present time...

A serious and responsible, that is, proletarian leadership is characterised by continuity in its method. An essential part of this method is to keep making a self-criticism when they have made a mistake, when reality does not match with the schema. The little and the big bureaucrats, the petty-bourgeois of all kinds, act in exactly the opposite way: they are always right, their position today is the logical continuation of yesterday's position, they need to confuse their positions today so they can defend themselves tomorrow. The commanding premise of bureaucrats and petty-bourgeois is the same: save face! You curious mix of declassed petty-bourgeois and aspiring heads of big apparatuses are no exception. Through a few examples, we will deal with the underlying question that existed between you and the French section to show why you do not apply the resolution of the 9th Plenum and the World Congress and that, on the contrary, you change their fundamental aspects.

Your analysis of the international situation prior to the World Congress was precise (we agree with it): “X. In reality, if the bourgeoisie persists in pursuing its colossal armaments program, which is necessary to temporarily avert the precipitation of an economic crisis, and if it confidently

continues to envisage a general war, it will be forced to abandon all pretence of combining a policy of 'social justice' with intense preparation for war and will be obliged to lower the standard of living of the masses everywhere, including the United States.

"It will only be able to succeed in this task by smashing the inevitable resistance of the masses in the course of a series of far-reaching struggles which will definitively decide what possibilities the bourgeoisie have of conducting the war. (...)

"Despite the Stalinist and reformist leaderships of the workers' movement in the countries of Western Europe, and despite the treacherous role of the trade union bureaucracy in the US, no section of the bourgeoisie is yet able to envisage its success in the years immediately ahead in inflicting a series of decisive defeats upon the proletariat and in establishing 'authoritarian', dictatorial or fascist regimes which would be capable of conducting the war."

"VII. However, these preparations of imperialism will inevitably run up against the resistance of the masses of Western Europe, the Asiatic countries and of the United States itself to a new deterioration of their standard of living, and to the destruction of their rights which the bourgeoisie will require to effect its armaments and war program" (*Theses on Orientation and Perspectives*, Resolution approved in the 9th Plenum and adopted by the Third Congress of the Fourth International, 1951, *Fourth International*, Vol XII No 6, Nov-Dec 1951, p. 185, reproduced in <https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/document/fi/1950-1953/fi-3rdcongress/1951-congress06.htm>).

As we see, in the fundamental part of the theses of the 9th Plenum, which since the Third World Congress have become the decisive theses of our international movement, it continues in its general lines with the old analysis of the International that imperialism had to defeat the proletariat in a number of important countries for it to unleash war. Noting this prior defeat was quite difficult since the reaction of the masses, including the US, was inevitable. The different element incorporated into the theses of the 9th Plenum, in a juxtaposed but confused and contradictory way with the part that we have just quoted, is the possibility of imperialism declaring war without having previously defeated the proletariat in several important countries.

All these elements:

"V. "Despite the now reinforced orientation of imperialism toward war, the perspective of temporary compromises between the USSR and the USA continues to remain open."

"VI. For this reason, it is much more probable that imperialism will prolong the period of its preparation until it exhausts its ability to avert the economic crisis and to maintain its control over the American masses.

"On the other hand, it will be all the more possible for imperialism to pursue this course since the Soviet bureaucracy, for its own reasons, is also anxious to avert the outbreak of a general war and will lend itself to the conclusion of limited or even more extensive partial compromises and to the policy of the division of zones of influence and of mutual concessions." (Ibid.)

These theses of the 9th Plenum introduce an important variation because they make the war dependent on a completely subjective factor such as the moment when the Yankee bourgeoisie considers it has reached the limit of "its ability to avert the economic crisis and to maintain its control over the American masses." Since the bourgeoisie has no objective means of determining this limit, it is clear war can break out at any time, although the subjective tendency of the Yankee bourgeoisie is to prolong the outbreak of war as long as possible.

This clarification on the two aspects raised by the 9th Plenum is important because the clarifications that have been made of this thesis introduce a different characterisation of the possibility of war: this no longer depends on the triumph of the bourgeoisie in some important countries as in theses X and VII of the 9th Plenum, or the criterion of the capacity of the Yankee bourgeoisie, as in thesis VI of the same document, but rather on the advance of the world revolution and the retreat of the US revolution. This characterisation, that does not exist in the 9th Plenum, we insist again, it arises in *Where are we going?* by Pablo. In reality, the Korean War has shown that the international balance of forces (let us say, to make a schema, the balance of forces between the two

blocs) did not tend towards a prolonged equilibrium but evolved to an increasing disadvantage for imperialism.

“On the other hand, *in accord with this rectification, it would be wrong to set down as a necessary condition for imperialism to unleash a major war that its preparation should be completed so that it may also conduct and win (read: have good chances of winning) the unleashed war.*

“It may happen that imperialism, unsuccessful in stabilising its present positions and finding itself compelled to retreat from certain positions which it considers fundamental will plunge into war, despite all the risks and in spite of its diminishing rather than growing chances of success.” [Michel Pablo, *Where are we going?*, SWP International Information Bulletin, March 1951, p. 7, reproduced in <https://www.marxists.org/archive/pablo/1951/01/where.html>]

This reasoning is above all applicable to US imperialism, which constitutes the essential core of today’s capitalist forces.

“It is possible that American capitalism, if it maintains its control over the American masses and feels relatively strong by virtue of the progress of its Intensive rearmament, may in two or three years, for example, prefer war with all its risks to a new retreat on the Korean model.

“This possibility, which flows precisely from the dimensions of the setback of imperialism now taking place in the world, and consequently of its crisis (even though that does not manifest itself immediately in all its acuteness), is no longer excluded, particularly for American imperialism.

“*It is the advance of forces opposing imperialism which brings nearer the possibility of a final and desperate resort to war by imperialism – unless we can expect the disappearance without a struggle of the capitalist regime as a whole, including the still extremely powerful fortress which Yankee imperialism constitutes.*

“For this reason, in the ‘Theses on the International Perspectives and the Orientation of the Fourth International Movement’, while we emphasise the reasons which cause imperialism to hesitate In unleashing war and to continue to temporize, *we do not exclude the possibility of a general war, even during the period in which the relationship of forces remains, as at present, fundamentally unfavourable to imperialism.*” (Ibid. p. 7.)

This document raises the war, as we have already pointed out, as a direct consequence of an ultimate reaction of Yankee imperialism in the face of the advance of the revolution in the world. Insistently, in all these documents, war is given as a possibility or, better said, as a tendency that there is some possibility it may materialise in some years but this is not even the surest possibility in the coming years since it is, we again insist, a possibility.

A month later, you insist again on the possibility of war but as a mere possibility:

“But this preparation is carried out in a relationship of forces unfavourable to capitalism and running the risk of becoming even worse.

“From this finding, there are two considerations included in the document (referring to the document of the 9th Plenum which we have already seen is false): precisely because this relationship of forces is unfavourable, and imperialism runs the risk of it being even more so, *the threat of war is moving away* and at the same time is more precise, and Yankee imperialism in particular with its own economic, military and social base (control over the masses) will be able to launch itself into war sooner than to retreat even further from its world positions.

“The text of the 9th Plenum, underlining the elements that make the relationship of forces unfavourable to imperialism, underlining the obstacles opposing the path to war, and that make it hesitate to declare it, insists at the same time on *the not excluded possibility that the imperialism, Yankee imperialism, in particular, be forced to declare war before it manages to change the relationship of forces to its benefit and precisely to prevent this relationship of forces from looking increasingly worse.* (Letter from the International Secretariat to the *Parti Communiste Internationaliste*, PCI, 26 February 1951)

Regardless of the differences and contradictions between the 9th Plenum and the other two documents that we have quoted, it is clear from all the positions of those months that you held:

1) War is a trend but not at a fixed term, two, three or four years: “it is moving away and at the same time is more precise”, it is a “case” or a “not excluded possibility”.

2) In opposition to the 8th Plenum, which always believed the “possibility” of war was distant, the “not excluded possibility” that it takes place in a short term of two or three years as a consequence of the advance of the revolution and the reaction of imperialism.

3) The mass movement in the world and in particular in the US plays a major role in terms of time and the possibility of war. For the 9th Plenum, it is enough that the masses of some important countries are not defeated for there to be war, and it is very difficult for that defeat to occur, including the United States.

... War as inevitable at a fixed-term of two to four years

It is Germain who deserves the credit for having introduced the fixed term for the war. Before the discussion papers for the World Congress, the entire official phrases concerning war said “in case of war”, “in the possibility of war”, “in the not excluded possibility of war”. With Germain, we get the phrases: “the world war”, without case or possibility and from now on “two or three years”. On the other hand, it is also Germain who argues for the first time that the time limit of the war has practically nothing to do with the class struggle; for Germain, there is war in two or three years inevitably even if the masses of the whole world mobilise including the American masses. Only one impossibility: “the socialist revolution in America in two or three years” can prevent war.

“... It is precisely for this reason that imperialism has embarked on military preparation for war, to do so as soon as possible, once the military apparatus has reached a certain level (at the latest in two or three years). No international revolutionary victory, except that of the American Revolution, can prevent this march towards the Wall Street war. (E. Germain: “Fax Fuyant et confusion, or de l’art de couvrir la retraite”, Bulletin of *La Verité*, July 1951, p. 5.)

“... It is precisely because there is this particular polarisation of forces or extreme weakness of international capitalism, the supreme power of American capitalism, that war has become inevitable. After all, the American bourgeoisie has understood that, if they wait long after the achievement of their current rearmament program, it runs the risk of introducing the revolutionary crisis even in its stronghold.” (Ibid., p. 7.)

The confusion in the documents of the International between Germain’s position and the position of the other documents was reflected in the subsequent document prepared by you: “The International Situation and Tasks in the Struggle against Imperialist War”. This is how you said it: “*Only the strongest reactions of the masses, and especially a strong reaction of the American masses, can once again endanger the cohesion of the bourgeoisie, as well as the concrete military plans of imperialism, their timing and their implementation.*” (*Fourth International*, Vol 12 No 6, November-December 1951, p. 192. Reproduced in <https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/document/fi/1950-1953/fi-3rdcongress/1951-congress07.htm>.)

In this quote, you still hold as important the class struggle factor for the timeframes of the war, not only in America but in general throughout the imperialist world since it is about the general cohesion of the world bourgeoisie and imperialism. There is no doubt here there is already an important difference with the previous documents of the International since the inevitability of these vigorous reactions of the masses is not taken for granted, as in the Theses of the 9th Plenum, mainly of the Yankee masses.

But this document adheres in substance to Germain’s thesis: “... but what we consider to be the most probable variant by far, the one that fits with our conceptions about the breadth of the general

revolutionary process, this perspective is isolated from its context by Comrade Favre-Bleibtreu⁷ since he considers a compromise with the Kremlin or ‘localized wars’ as possible without examining to what extent the development of the Asian revolution, the internal needs of the American economy and, above all, the logic of American rearmament allow another alternative” (Germain, ob. cit., p. 6).

This position of Germain is repeated in the Theses on Tasks already quoted from the International when it is said: “*The very logic of this new orientation of capitalist economy toward an armaments economy carries within itself an ineluctable drift toward a pure and simple war economy. On the other hand, once this orientation becomes a fact and is put in operation it creates an irreversible process; its cessation would inevitably cause a fall of prices, unemployment, and economic crisis rebounding from the United States to the entire capitalist world.*” (*The International Situation and Tasks...*, op. cit., p. 190.) Together with this, another quote in which he defines himself by the same position: “The armaments economy and the war itself are envisaged by imperialism as its last resort for eliminating the threat of the economic crisis, for recuperating lost territories and for crushing the revolutionary movement of the masses, which is the precondition for a real stabilisation.” (Ibid., p. 190.)

The confusion in the official documents continued. Comrade Pablo’s report to the World Congress somewhat modified the theses of the 9th Plenum but without setting — like Germain — a fixed term for the war. “A second important conclusion flows from this new understanding of the situation in which the perspective of the war must be placed. If in all probability the relationship of forces remains unfavourable to imperialism for the immediate future, the eventuality of war cannot be excluded but, on the contrary, becomes more certain. This is due principally to the fact that the fundamental base, and by far the most important base of imperialism, in a way lies outside the regions of the world engulfed or threatened by the revolution. It is not in Asia or in Europe, but in the United States.” (“World Trotskyism Rearms”, Report by Michel Pablo to the Third World Congress, *Fourth International*, Vol. 12 No. 6, November–December 1951, p. 169.)

This report does not yet give war at a fixed-term but it is already given as the most likely prospect. Here words that were common to previous documents have also been eliminated: “it moves away”. Before, it was permanently said the advancement of the revolution in the world distanced and defined the possibility of war, with this document it is only defined. The important thing is that in this report the determining factor of the war, or rather the immediately determining factor, continues to be the advance of the revolution in the world since “But the Theses stress the unequal development of the revolutionary process: the fact that new possible victories in Asia and Europe, far from diminishing the threat of war, can precipitate it, since American imperialism has now decided to stop this process...” (Ibid. p. 169.)

As we see, the armaments economy in itself is not the immediate determining factor of the war. Pierre Frank⁸ in his report at the Mutualite on the World Congress, in contrast to this report by Pablo, gave a deadline of two to four years for the outbreak of war. All these new positions, of the inevitable outbreak of the world war in a couple of years, were embodied by definitively sweeping the entire conception of the 9th Plenum, in the 10th Plenum and the letters sent to the French section.

7 **Marcel “Favre” Bleibtreu**, (1918-2001). He entered Trotskyism in 1934. He was a pediatrician. He participated in the entryism to the SFIO advised by Trotsky to the French section, which was expelled by the Socialists in 1936. In 1944 he assumed the direction of the newspaper *La Verité*. He was the first PCI leader to criticise from the beginning the wrong positions that Pablo was presenting. Author of *Where is Pablo going?* When the section was expelled, it was led by Breibtreu and Lambert. Regarding Algeria, he rejected Lambert’s position of support for Messali Hajd’s MNA, correctly proposing support for the sector that shortly afterwards founded the FLN. He was expelled by Lambert. He continued to militate, promoted the rejection of the US war against the Vietnamese, participated in May 1968 and in the 1990s called for the repudiation of the imperialist blockade of Iraq. [Editor]

8 **Pierre Frank** (1905–1984) was one of the leaders of Trotskyism. In 1930 he collaborated with Trotsky in Prinkipo for the organisation of the conference of the Left Opposition; he was elected to the leadership of the Parti Communiste Internationaliste (1935). Pierre Frank became part of the International Secretariat of the Fourth International (1948) and promoted in 1963 the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (together with Ernest Mandel, Livio Maitán and Joseph Hansen. He systematically supported Mandel’s opportunist positions.[Editor]

Thus the French section is criticised for “not defining a perspective of world war in a relatively short term but ignoring almost completely international relationship of forces, drawing a perspective that Yankee imperialism is only in an economy ‘preparatory to an armaments economy’, and scared of inflation and the Soviet bureaucracy, the two seek a compromise... “ (*Letter to the PCI*, 14 January 1951).

All this is given as in contradiction to the documents of the Third World Congress. Specifically, the International Secretariat in January 1951 believes that whoever supports the possibility of compromises between the Kremlin and Wall Street and in the non-infallibility of war in the short term, i.e., that world war is a possibility but not certain in two, three or four years, he is against the resolutions of the World Congress, forgetting that the 9th Plenum held precisely the same. The 10th Plenum makes Germain’s position official and eliminates the confusion: “The counter-revolutionary war which united imperialism is preparing and toward which it will be fatally pushed (if one excludes the hypothesis that a revolution will gain throughout the world including above all the United States before the war breaks out, or that imperialism, including that of the United States will be so frightened as to yield without a struggle) in a relatively short time, this war far from arresting the destructive processes of capitalism will on the contrary carry them to a higher level — the international civil war, the war-revolution...” (...) Even if two or three years and even a little more are left us before the decisive struggle, that is not a great deal of time in which to prepare ourselves.” (“The building of the revolutionary party”, report by Michel Pablo to the 10th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Fourth International, February 1952, printed in SWP’s *International Information Bulletin*, June 1952, p. 6 and p. 23.)

Thus, we see how from the first documents to the last, through an indescribable confusion, you move from one concept to another antagonistic, from the war as a trend to take shape, and as a “possibility not excluded” to war as inevitable within a given period of two or three years. Germain, with the ease so typical of him of explaining or codifying what has already been said by others, is the one who best substantiates the two antagonistic concepts. On the one hand, he explains the tendency to war: “In the event of significant development of the revolution, a compromise with the Soviet bureaucracy could only channel it but, dear comrade Favre-Bleibtreu, this is not exactly the current situation! Could a compromise between the Kremlin and Wall Street channel the Chinese Revolution, the revolution throughout Asia? Could it channel tomorrow’s Spanish revolution? Could it also channel the German revolution? Isn’t this precisely what characterises the current dynamics of the revolutionary process, which tends to amplify itself beyond any possibility of being channelled? Isn’t this, on the other hand, what American imperialism imposes, a last attempt to crush it by arms?” (Germain, op. cit., p. 5).

A few lines before and a few lines after, Germain denies this tendency since he makes the war depend on a fixed term and not on the victory of the revolution in important bastions (a victory whose day cannot be predicted), which makes the war depend on the Yankee armaments plan. We do not ignore that you take the world revolution as a backdrop, that is, the armament plan is determined directly or indirectly by the world revolution. It is about seeing what is immediately decisive, that is, to be scientists and not charlatans.

The confusion about the dynamics towards world war reaches its maximum in you as you continually change the characterisation of the determining motive in the leap towards war. First, we had a subjective factor: the limit of Yankee imperialism ability “to avert the economic crisis and to maintain its control over the American masses” that had nothing to do directly with the development of the world revolution and which showed how Yankee imperialism tended to declare war as soon as possible or when it completed its armaments program. On the other hand, this analysis did not agree with that of the uneven development of the revolution as the immediate cause of the war. Your third criterion, given in the first documents, was that the defeat of the proletariat of the great capitalist countries was necessary for war to break out and that this defeat was very difficult. Germain contributes the fourth different concept in the determination of the war and the one that makes it inevitable in two or three years: this will no longer be the consequence of an opinion of the Yankee bourgeoisie, nor of the advance of the world revolution, nor the previous defeat of the

proletariat of the great capitalist countries but it will be a consequence of the Yankee armament plan, from 5,005 jet planes to 5,006 there is the war against the world revolution. Class struggle my foot!! How Germain agrees with Pablo that the reality of today is much more complex than the pre-war reality is a mystery since the most important contemporary problem is solved with clarity and meridian simplicity.

Faced with the dilemma of explaining the world war as inevitable in two or three years, you encountered this logical drawback: if the world war is a consequence of the uneven development of the revolution and its important victories, no one can guarantee in two or three years victories of the revolution so important that they inevitably lead to world war. To explain the world war as inevitable in two or three years it was necessary for you to find other reasons as determinants and that they act axiomatically and mechanically in two or three years. Germain solved this logical problem by leaving aside the law of uneven development of the revolution as the immediate cause of the world war since the only thing that can explain unequal development is the possibility of world war and this “is moving away and at the same time is more precise”. Therefore, Germain takes as the fundamental cause of the world war the Yankee and only Yankee armament plan. The victory of the revolution in the world, the mass movements in the United States, in other words, the class struggle is no longer the decisive factor in the declaration or paralysis of the trend towards world war.

As your commanding voice was to explain the inevitability of war in two or three years, not only did you resort to the Germain explanation, eliminating the other explanations but you were gradually eliminating the role of the mass movement within the terms of the tendency towards war. First, for war to break out the proletariat had to be defeated even in America and in some large countries, given the inevitable mobilisation the armaments plan would cause (Thesis of 9th Plenum). Afterwards, it is the proletariat that must attack strongly, must mobilise, not just defend itself, especially the Yankee proletariat, so that war does not break out in the short term. And your third position, that of Germain, that of the 10th Plenum session, totally eliminates the importance of the class struggle in the timing of war, or, rather, it poses an impossibility: “the hypothesis of the victory of the revolution on a world scale and especially in the United States...”

From a workers' bureaucracy (particularly Stalinist) that in an exceptional case can unite or lead the revolution...

Your first documents were clear in the perspective on the character of the bureaucracy in general, including Stalinist.

“XVIII. By its very nature, the Soviet bureaucracy is fundamentally opposed to the development of the revolutionary forces in the world, and it is excluded, even in the case of a general war against the USSR, that the bureaucracy can impel the CPs to take power in areas of the world that it will not be able to control, among others, for example, the USA, which, however, is the citadel of imperialism.” (*Theses on Orientation and Perspectives*, op. cit., p. 187.)

“To be sure, the policy of the Soviet bureaucracy constantly places in peril all the conquests up to now and can facilitate a new shift in the relationship of forces to the advantage of capitalism.” (Michel Pablo, “*Where are we going?*”, op. cit., p. 15.)

In *Where are we going?*, Pablo, with even greater clarity, tells us: “In Europe where the Communist Parties manipulate the proletarian masses to assure the success of the foreign policy of the Soviet bureaucracy and its special aims in each country and does not at all struggle for the revolution and the taking of power, such a policy toward these parties is naturally excluded.” (Ibid., p. 18.)

However, nothing clarifies your first opinion on the perspectives of the bureaucracy better than the question raised at the World Congress about Germain's *Ten Theses*. The majority of the French section requested these theses be put to the vote in opposition to the criteria of what they called Pabloism. Germain attacked this position as a manoeuvre because he considered that his

thesis defended those of the 9th Plenum. Livingston's statement was clear in this regard: "Comrade Germain's 'Ten Theses' were by written him and discussed by the International not as a resolution or as a supplementary document to the Theses of the 9th Plenum, but as a contribution to the discussion dealing with the various questions raised by the Theses of the 9th Plenum and in support of these theses." ("Declarations" of the Third World Congress, SWP's International Information Bulletin, December 1951, p. 26.) That is, two members of the International Secretariat agreed on the fact that Germain's theses were clear concerning the future of the Stalinist parties and the bureaucracy in Europe:

"(...) in the coming revolutionary upsurge in Western Europe, during the period of preparation and unleashing of war, the growing pressure of the masses is liable to force the French and Italian Communist Parties to modify their pacifist course of 'neutralising' the bourgeoisie. These parties could then, as the Theses of the 9th Plenum of the IEC declare, 'project a revolutionary orientation' and 'see themselves forced to undertake a struggle for power' if they wish to avoid having the masses advance directly towards the second stage of outstripping them, which would mean an organisational break with the leadership of these parties and the direct struggle against them.

"*The projecting of a struggle for power is one thing, and the effective conquest of power is quite another.*" (Emphasis by Germain) (Ernest Germain, *The Question of Stalinism (Ten Theses)*, SWP International Information Bulletin, April 1951, p. 5. Reproduced in <https://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/1951/04/10theses.htm>.)

"The listing of these factors permits us to specify that a similar conquest of power by an independent Communist Party could be duplicated in the Middle East and in East Asia, but is extremely improbable in an industrially advanced country of Western Europe or America. In these countries the revolution could never advance from the countryside to the city, but will always proceed from the cities to the countryside. A large-scale military struggle could not precede but only follow the revolutionary mobilisation of the industrial proletariat. This proletariat, by virtue of its traditions, its past, its level of class consciousness, possesses a considerable vanguard which is consciously oriented toward the socialist revolution, even if it still follows the Communist Party. An independent assumption of power by the Communist parties of these countries is possible only through a genuine revolutionary mobilisation of the *proletarian* masses which demands a genuine outstripping of the program, the policy, and the organisational forms of Stalinism. On its own side, the Kremlin, for whom such a development in an advanced country would represent a thousandfold more deadly threat than the Yugoslav revolution, would really do its utmost to prevent such a development. A friendly coexistence for any length of time of the victorious revolution in an advanced country and of the Soviet bureaucracy is therefore not very probable." (Ibid., p. 6.)

If there is anything clear here, it is that the communist parties of France and Italy will hardly fight for power. At most, they will make a pretence of struggle. Better not to talk about the politics of the bureaucracy.

... To a bureaucracy that will inevitably lead the revolution to the taking of power

Already in the theses approved by the World Congress on the International Situation and Tasks, you give a 180-degree turn concerning the general characterisation of the Stalinist bureaucracy by the Trotskyist movement in the entire world: "But on the other hand, the Soviet bureaucracy, faced with the obvious and accelerated preparations of imperialism for war and with the revolutionary reactions of the masses, is obliged to carry on a red struggle against these preparations through the medium of the CPs and to a certain extent to take into account the reactions of the masses. Hence the combined character of its present policy, which is a mixture of a pacifist, petty-bourgeois opportunism and "anti-imperialist" and "anti-capitalist" leftism leading to class actions against the preparations for war." (*The International Situation and Tasks...*, op. cit., p. 194.)

For the first time in a Trotskyist document, the general policy of the Stalinist bureaucracy is characterised not as counter-revolutionary but as a left-wing centrist, placing it in the general field of the revolution. This characterisation is important because it shows this policy of the bureaucracy not as an immediate consequence of the revolutionary process of the masses but of the imperialist encirclement. In your later documents, this change in the characterisation of the Soviet bureaucracy and the communist parties is accentuated. It is necessary to clarify that you systematically confuse the Stalinist movement with the Stalinist leaderships.

“It is because this movement is, on the other hand, located by such objective conditions, by the evolution of the international situation towards the counter-revolutionary war of the united imperialism, that, independently of the plans and the will of its bureaucratic leadership at the service of Kremlin policy, it will be forced, compelled to radicalise (...) to practically outline a revolutionary orientation and act in the event of a war, with arms in hand for power.” (Letter from the International Secretariat to the CC of the PCI, 14 January, 1951.)

The almost impossibility for Stalinism to seize power in Western Europe of the first documents and Germain’s *Ten Theses* is transformed in later documents into the absolute certainty that if there is war, and you take war for granted, the communist parties, together with the bureaucracy, will fight for power against the bourgeoisie.

From a world strategy to structure mass Trotskyist parties in the short term...

In *Where are we going?* a whole general strategy is proposed for “In those countries where Stalinism is practically non-existent or exercises weak influence over the masses, our movement will strive to become the principal leadership of the proletariat in the years ahead: in the United States, England, Germany, Canada, in all of Latin America, in Australia, Indonesia, perhaps in India. *The main immediate future of our movement* resides far more in these places than in countries where the Stalinist influence still reigns. (M. Pablo, *Where are we going?*, op. cit., p. 18.)

This position is further specified in the theses on *The International Situation and Tasks...*:

“On the other hand, in the concrete conditions in which this decomposition occurs — with the USSR and Stalinism exploiting part of this crisis for their own benefit, — the role of our organisations in the rising revolutionary movement varies according to the influence of Stalinism in the areas involved.

“In the second case, which includes countries such as the USA, England, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, all of Latin America, Africa and even India, Indonesia, the Middle East, our movement must act in the years ahead with the determination to become the revolutionary leadership of the masses whose task will be to organise the struggle for power in all of these countries. Unless this role is performed audaciously and unless preparations for it are begun now, there is the danger that the inevitable spread of the crisis of capitalism into these countries will benefit centrist or even Stalinist organisations which are now in a state of stagnation and even of decay in these countries.

“In all other countries where the revolutionary mass movement still remains mainly in the channel of Stalinist or Stalinist-influenced organisations, our essential preoccupation should be to keep from being cut off from these masses, to seek to intermingle with them and to profit from the common struggle against capitalism and imperialism in order through this struggle to set them against the Soviet bureaucracy and Stalinism. The fate of Stalinism is at stake in the global encounter now joined, an encounter which will go through a series of phases and stages before its inevitable denouement.” (Op. cit., p. 195.)

This is the criterion of the Third World Congress in terms of the general strategy. In other words, that we divide the world into two regions: one where we will structure independent parties in the short term, although entryism is practised in some party (the whole non-Stalinist movement,

including England and Belgium) and another longer work (the Stalinist world) without giving up structuring independent parties in the short term.

... To a long-term world strategy of taking over the non-Trotskyist revolutionary parties or the revolutionary centrist tendencies

The 10th Plenum completely modified the analysis of the Third World Congress. In order not to give the enormity of quotes that prove this success, we will limit ourselves to this very short one that synthesises all the others: “Our activity must be considered essentially independent in all those countries where the existence of another leadership, reformist or Stalinist, has not been solidly established among the masses and consequently does not impose a long-term entryism such as we now envisage in all other cases.” (“The Building of the Revolutionary Party”, ob. cit. p. 8.) In other words, for the 10th Plenum, there are two fundamental sectors of activity: one where long-term entryism is practised and another where it is not practised in opposition to the analysis of the Third World Congress that divided the actors in which there was a Stalinist influence or not.

That is why we cannot help but laugh when Pablo in the 10th plenary session, tells us: “As a matter of fact the tactical conception defined by the Third World Congress *simultaneously trains its sights in three distinct directions according to the special characteristics of the mass movement in each country*: essentially independent work; work directed toward the reformist workers and organisations; work directed toward the Stalinist workers and organisations.” (Ibid., pp. 7–8.)

The important thing about your whole conception about the role of the bureaucracy of the reformist and Stalinist parties is that you believe they will become a revolutionary tendency throughout the world. Put another way, the situation will not only transform Stalinist centrism into revolutionary but all centrism in general. For you, not only should the chapter of the program that deals with the counter-revolutionary role of the Soviet bureaucracy be modified or is old but also the general role of centrism in this period. Our *Transitional Program* points out that centrism has no chance at this stage, either mediate or immediate. For you, for all the countries or movements controlled by the socialists at present, “it is infinitely probable that except for new and at present unforeseeable developments, the movement of mass radicalisation and the first stages of the revolution, of the objective revolutionary situation, will manifest themselves within the framework of these organisations.” (Ibid., p. 12.)

“Today it is not exactly the same kind of entryism which concerns us. We are not entering these parties in order to come out of them soon. *We are entering them in order to remain there for a long time banking on the great possibility which exists of seeing these parties, placed under new conditions, develop centrist tendencies which will lead a whole stage of the radicalisation of the masses and of the objective revolutionary processes in their respective countries.* We wish in reality from the inside of these tendencies to amplify and accelerate their left centrist ripening and to contest even with the centrist leaders for the entire leadership of these tendencies.

“Such developments are now possible in contrast with the pre-war situation because the crisis of capitalism is vastly more profound and the mass movement vastly more powerful.

“Does all this mean to say that the reformist parties will become revolutionary parties and that we are entering them not to destroy but in order to strengthen them? No, the reformist parties in their entirety such as they are will never be transformed into revolutionary parties but under exceptional pressure of the masses, they can be transformed into centrist parties either in their entirety or in part.

“We are not entering consequently with the illusion of transforming them into revolutionary parties but to help in the development of their centrist tendencies and to give it leadership. This whole process will not necessarily be a short one but neither will it extend over decades.” (Ibid., pp. 11–12.)

For the World Congress, we had to fight against the centrist socialist or Stalinist tendencies; the work was fundamentally tending to independent (even in England), for the 10th Plenum it is about promoting “the development of their centrist tendencies and to give it leadership” (Ibid. p. 12).

Your change of positions for France is nothing more than a consequence of your other changes

In the 10th Plenum, you have asserted that the statements in your letter of 14 January [1952] to the French section reflected the positions adopted by the World Congress. In our “Resolution on the separation of the French Section from the International” we have dealt extensively with this problem. Thus, we will touch it succinctly.

We do not want to enter into the discussion of what the phrase “necessarily independent” of the 9th Plenum means, that is, the theses “The International Situation and Tasks...”⁹ of the Third World Congress, which points out independent work for our French section. Instead of this discussion about the meaning of a phrase, we better will corroborate by other documents of your international tendency of that time what you really thought.

The minority of the French party, in complete agreement with you, presented to the party congress, held in mid-1951, a project of the orientation of the work that illustrates us better than the discussion on phrases.

“The main areas of party activity continue to be: a) work in companies for the construction of party cells in them. It is the work that can best help us to touch the militants of the CP...” “... To summarise our tasks: We must not modify the nature of our policy, oriented towards mass work but we must readjust the use of our forces in the direction of the workers of the Stalinist party.” “Incorporate into the class the largest number of militants who are not directly linked to a company work; taking into account their personal and political situation they will go to the areas where they will link up with the workers of the Stalinist party: PCF, CGT, Combatants for Peace, MLP or other mass organisations where the workers of the Stalinist party are.” (Resolution already quoted.). This document is clear; the previous orientation is not modified, the main task is independent work in the companies since it tends to be expanded and strengthened as the best way to touch the Stalinist workers. The only modification that is carried out is to bring comrades who have no location into the Stalinist organisations.

This orientation is completely changed by your letter of 14 January and by the 10th Plenum, although swearing you do nothing more than applying the resolutions of the III World Congress. In your letter you say exactly the opposite of the theses of the III World Congress and of the orientation of the work since you divide the entryist and independent work according to the possibilities; everyone who can enter will enter, not everyone will enter because it is not possible but you will tend to do so. The creation of independent company cells as our main task and as the best way to touch the Stalinist militants is completely left aside.

“If we have defined the policy that the International must follow in France as a kind of entryist sui-generis policy, it is because of the specific character of the Stalinist movement whose extremely bureaucratic leadership prevents us from proceeding exactly as in a reformist movement of the same importance. If this were not the case, we would be — and for a long time now — for a total entryist policy. The nature of the Stalinist movement imposes on us, in reality, a combination of independent work and entryist work with the following particularities: independent work must be understood as having as its main purpose to help “entryist” work and to address it also mainly in the direction of the Stalinist workers.

9 The Third World Congress approved two main documents of the 9th Plenum: “The International Situation and Tasks in the Struggle against Imperialist War” and “Theses on Orientation and Perspectives”. The document that uses the phrase “necessarily independent” is “Thesis on Orientation and Perspectives”, not as Moreno states. [Editor]

“Entryist work will be amplified to the beat and as we approach to war.” (Letter from the International Secretariat, 15 January 1952.)

The 10th Plenum does nothing more than confirm this line of the letter.

Your method is wrong and dangerous; the French majority is right

POR critically supported your first statements. It saw in them the aspiration to apply Marxism well, incorporating the “abnormal” into it, not leaving aside the many facets of reality. Your attempt to explain the “abnormal” (China, Yugoslavia) seemed and continues to seem correct to us and an improvement in the face of the dogmatism from which we suffered for a long time. However, we believe you have fallen into a serious error by taking this tendency to study the abnormal to the absolute, transforming abnormality into a norm for dozens of years. This is a serious mistake because it transforms us Trotskyists, those of us who fight and must fight to transform the abnormal into normal, the unconscious revolutionary processes into conscious ones, into mere spectators and worshipers of the accomplished fact.

If this is one of your mistakes, another no less serious is to dissolve concrete reality in an abstraction. The tendency to war, like the possibility of centrist parties becoming in a period leaders of the revolution and even take power, are some of the facets or abstractions of an extremely complex reality, i.e., multifaceted. This extremely complex and dynamic current reality has a basic element, although not the only one, determinant in the national and especially international class struggle. Now, this very class struggle is extremely dynamic and complex. The concrete reality cannot be dissolved, as you do, in a simple aspect of that reality: the tendency towards the inevitable war in two or three years on the part of imperialism and the same tendency to dissolve it in the Yankee armaments program. The reality of the world is the dynamic combination of all the different aspects, in the same way that the tendency to war is not only the Yankee armaments program but the combination of many aspects, one of which is the armaments program.

It is not our goal to argue with you in this document since we reserve for another the elaboration of our thought and the exhaustive criticism of your positions.

Thus, in this letter, we have ignored the enormity of contradictions and caveats present in your documents because our aim was only to show how you changed the positions of the Third World Congress and not the French section, as you have accused them.

Let us summarise:

1) You modify the position on the war elaborated by the Third World Congress, fundamentally by the 9th Plenum, as a possibility and transform it into the inevitable war in two or three years;

2) The clash between the workers’ bureaucracy, mainly Stalinist, in its counter-revolutionary role, with the masses that we were going to agitate for the armaments program immediately, is replaced by you by an agreement for years and years between the bureaucracy and the mass movement which will make a common united front to defend themselves from the war plan and the imperialist war;

3) The general strategy is changed according to the change in the characterisation of the reformist and Stalinist movement. For the Third World Congress we tended to form independent parties in the short term or to strengthen the existing independent parties (except in countries where the CPs have already taken power), by the 10th Plenum this line is completely modified and we cease the struggle for the structuring or strengthening of independent parties in two-thirds of the world;

4) The case of the French section and its tactics is nothing more than a partial case of all these changes, although you have disloyally tried to confuse the controversy by assuring you defended the positions of the Third World Congress;

5) All of the above is irrelevant concerning Pablo’s assertion that some parts of the *Transitional Program* have aged. We believe that, if this is the case, an urgent call to the Fourth World Congress is

imposed to discuss which parts should be modified since we cannot continue with an international leadership that plays hide-and-seek with the pillars of our movement since no one, least of all the leadership, can have doubts about the form and substance of the *Transitional Program* if there is no resolution to the contrary.

Vowing that you will forget the damn prestige of leaders and remember the modesty of revolutionary militants, which would mean you abandon the rogue and lacking self-criticism procedures you are accustomed to, we request you convene the Fourth World Congress to discuss:

1) The amendments to the *Transitional Program* that comrade Pablo will present according to the known speech,

2) The trajectory of the International Secretariat.

With fourth internationalists greetings,

POR Central Committee

PS: Voted by the CC of the POR on 8 March 1953.

The Partido Obrero Revolucionario expressly states it will not form a tendency with any current, outside the program approved by the Third World Congress of the Fourth International.

B. Moreno's report to the Central Committee

Minutes of the summary of the oral report to the CC meeting on March 1953 that approved the letter

Moreno reports:

If the comrade from the Latin American bureau who would have been against the letter and for the defence of the International Secretariat's position were present, my report would have expanded the letter. But since he is not here, I will deal with the fundamentals of the situation of the International and its relations with us. The letter poses a factual situation in the sense that we do not break with the International Secretariat but that the International Secretariat will break with us. Or rather, they have practically broken up. They do not send us publications, nor do they keep us in contact, so that practically, by the imposition of the International Secretariat, we are outside the International.

So far, all the groups left outside the international have fallen into centrism or petty-bourgeois sectarianism and have lost their international perspective, or have become a sect. And we well know that without a correct international perspective, a correct national program cannot be developed either. Thus, all those who left the International sank into the most complete centrism. We too run this danger and even more so since we already fell into it once. Indeed, the GOM [Marxist Workers Group] did not have an organic link with the International in the previous era, nor did it give any importance to its link and work on Latin America. We fundamentally dedicated ourselves to penetrating the mass movement and elaborating a program for the country. Precisely because of these two conditions, which appear as historical merit for our tendency, we were, despite our weak international work, the Bolshevik current within the Argentine Trotskyist movement. The more so since the situation of the International, then much weaker than now, did not press for an intense international militancy.

Later on, we self-criticised and, following our proletarian method, we resolved to work shoulder to shoulder with the International and the Latin American sections. This is how we began by considering the need for the program for Latin America, which we presented at the Second World Congress. We were the only ones to present such a program.

However, we acknowledge it was a very serious failure. It should be noted we also presented the need for a magazine. Together with them, we supported GCI as an agent of the International in the country. We considered then the magazine was fundamental and not the formation of an apparatus with officials as an essential task.

In this new stage, we must ask ourselves the following question: What is a fundamental, formal discipline or the democratic elaboration of a program? First of all, we must not forget Bolshevik discipline is not a word that can be used in any which way but the most powerful weapon of Bolshevik

internationalism. In this emergency, we have to take into account the dangers that we pointed out to develop our decision:

- 1) The fact that we can fall into petty-bourgeois nationalism, empiricism or sectarianism.
- 2) That previously we tended to deviate in this sense.
- 3) That there cannot be Bolshevik cadres even if they are active in the national mass movement as long as they do not have an authentic internationalist orientation and militancy.

Like when the situation in Korea was discussed, I think we must start from a general characterisation, to later draw conclusions. The International was founded at a time of retreat of the mass movement. At a time when the proletariat was defending its minimal conquests, the slogans of the *transitional program* could not have rooted in its broad layers. Trotskyism, like any idea, is more immediately graspable by the intelligentsia, which at the same time was the furthest from the immediate problems and, therefore, the one that could best grasp the perspective the program presented. It was the time when Trotskyism honed the program into an excellent combat weapon. Trotsky knew the importance of this and, at the same time, understood it was essential to making it penetrate the working class, as his polemic supporting the proletarian wing of the SWP denotes. Meanwhile, at the same time, the program was being developed, the bonding with and penetration of the masses were set aside. Thus, all the flaws of the intellectual petty-bourgeois in the formation of the international movement prospered. Along with this, there is an event of enormous importance: the death of Trotsky; with him leaves the man who, within the movement, synthesised all the revolutionary experience and leadership of the masses. While he was alive, the discipline was based directly on his brilliant analysis of the main problems. All this ends with the death of Trotsky and reactions against the petty-bourgeois tendency emerge, such as those of SWP and GOM in Argentina, which, although with a national and not an international character, pose the need for the urgent rooting in the masses. Meanwhile, all the mass movements of Europe, as well as those of Asia, were lost to the International, whose leadership did not know how to find the path that would lead to them.

In other words, despite the correct program, the comrades of the international leadership, as intellectuals, did not know how to make it root in the vanguard. All of this means that in France, after a colossal rise of the masses, we have only about 40 comrades in the party. What is the way out? There may be two responses, depending on whether we consider that the International will integrate organically, peacefully, expanding the cores, which will be favoured by the next waves, or that its development will be bumpy, full of contradictions and struggles. We believe it will happen in the second way, given the conditions posed by the age itself and that the International will be formed and grow thanks to the growth of its national sections and the structuring of the program and their directorates, although in an intimate link with international problems. Any great national leadership, to be so in the current era, will have to have a great international vision. In other words, this process must reflect the contradictions of the time, together with a colossal ideological and assimilation struggle. In this sense, the International is not a mass International and, therefore, it is useless to pretend its interpretations are correct in all its parts since it lacks the experience of the masses, which is irreplaceable. Only when it manages to lead the masses will there be a leadership that can impose itself for its trajectory and experience.

The fact that we do not have a strong leadership stems precisely from political weakness, which detracts from its credit. Their big mistake comes from believing that because they have the correct general program (the one of the Fourth), they also have the capable and necessary leadership within that program. In this way, and because of its political weakness, it tends to strengthen the apparatus and to decree rather than convince. Precisely for this reason, we believe what is imposed is the development of the program rather than the formal discipline of a program that does not exist from the point of view of adaptation to the current moment and different countries. We do not need officials to implement the program, completely abstract, false, without rectifications through the ranks but we need a democratic elaboration of the program. We do not doubt the problem of bureaucracy and elaboration are deeply linked to the audacity of revolutionary thought, but

nevertheless, we must not forget that the audacity of thought does not deny the assimilation of all the achievements of Marxism and the movement to this day.

At present, a systematic change of ideas is required. Along with this, we need to penetrate deeply into national movements since there can be no collaboration for a correct program if there is no rectification from the ranks. Precisely, according to Trotsky, when Lenin was far from the Russian proletariat, he used to err on tactical matters but never when he was in contact with them. Without a mass International there can be no comprehensive program for the masses; and for the same reason, even less at this stage, there can be officials who apply a finished program. At the moment, a time of democratic elaboration of the program and a wide change of ideas within democratic centralism opens. If Lenin made mistakes when he did not have rectification by the ranks, how cannot the international leadership make mistakes....

Unfortunately, the international leadership does not set the tone in the elaboration of the program, on the discussion but they do on the fiercest centralism and discipline and the most complete apparatus. Neither the situation of the workers' movement nor Marxist thought, new situations that demand great leaderships, nor the situation of the International, nor the leadership of the workers' movement (lack of ties to be able to rectify by the ranks and be widely informed), nor the state of our international leadership, which, as we see in the letter, completely lacks seriousness, prevent us from sharing the criterion that centralism, discipline, is the technique of the present period that our International is going through.

This does not mean we are against discipline but we believe the time, our international cadres and the crisis of the International in terms of leadership demand a broad, redoubled discussion and democracy and not an apparatus, as the GCI believes. If we take all this into account, if we continue to intensely penetrate the mass movement, if we militate internationally and preserve and intensify the internationalist education of our cadres, even if sending this letter is a mistake, it will always be a tactical mistake. Instead, if we do not do the above and limit ourselves to being good functionaries of an apparatus, we will distance ourselves from the masses and internationalism.

(Moreno's speech ends; six comrades get the floor; it goes to a vote and is approved.)

C. Report complementary to the letter

The CC of May 1953 resolved to correct the letter, to make it clearer and specify our conclusions, which, as can be inferred from it, are:

1) The objective situation and the possibility of war

Trotsky was forced, for him to explain and interpret some post-war period world phenomena, to make a comparison with internal phenomena of an isolated country. Thus, he explained the phenomenon by comparing it to a bureaucratic union or degenerated workers' state.

Nowadays, to understand the world situation we have to do the same. The world is the same as a country in a revolutionary, ultra-revolutionary period. The theory of permanent revolution and the current revolutionary situation are thus illuminated with better brilliance. And, just as in countries that are experiencing a revolutionary period, all sectors of the population emerge into political life raising their demands, which threaten the capitalist production regime. And also among those sectors of the population: peasantry, working-class, urban petty-bourgeoisie, they all go consciously or unconsciously against capitalism, although their most heartfelt demands are different in the capitalist and Stalinist world. Today, the exploited masses of all countries, including the backward ones, come into world political life by raising claims that go directly or indirectly against the imperialist or bureaucratic rule. This is how Bolivia¹ today is a mirror of the world situation.

Both of them lack a strong revolutionary party that unifies the struggle of the different sectors of the population against capitalism and imperialism. This means the government in Bolivia, despite the distressing situation of capitalism, does not feel so weak and aspires to manoeuvre with the differences existing between the different sectors of the population. In the world, we have the same revolutionary situation, the same inequality between the political levels of the mass sectors that emerge into political life and what is more important, this malady being much more acute internationally than in Bolivia, there is a profound crisis of international revolutionary leadership, which means the bourgeoisie does not have as great a panic as after the First War, despite the fact its objective situation is a thousand times worse.

This is the situation in the world today. The possibility of war arises from it. In the same way that in an isolated country there comes a time when the bourgeoisie resolves to deliver a decisive blow to the revolutionary process that it cannot channel or divert, imperialism in the world is discussing whether or not such moment has come. This discussion will continue as long as the current world revolutionary crisis persists. We have to take it into account because it means the attempt to apply

¹ In Bolivia in 1952 a workers' revolution triumphed, as a result of the mobilisation of workers, especially miners, led by the COB (Bolivian Workers Central), which was frustrated by the betrayal of the bureaucratic and petty-bourgeois leaders of the COB (Lechín). The Bolivian Trotskyists (Pabloites) did not follow an independent path, refusing to promote the COB seizure of power and critically supporting the MNR government. **NM**

the Kornilov and Hitler experience on a world scale; But just as the Kornilov experience failed and in Hitler's, there was the possibility the bourgeoisie or sectors of the bourgeoisie would not apply it because it is very expensive, war is not inevitable in the short term since some important sectors of the world bourgeoisie speculate with the crisis of the revolutionary leadership on the one hand; just as others fear its tremendous cost.

This dynamic towards war "is moving away and at the same time is more precise" then. Faced with a powerful advance of the revolution, the discussion in the capitalist camp can lead to the victory of the warlike sector, just as if this advance or resistance of the masses is very deep, the attempt of the warlike sector will fail for its absolute lack of masses (Kornilov).

This uneven development of the revolution does not mean — as Germain has interpreted — the revolution advances throughout the world except for the United States. Uneven means that next to a country which is in a revolutionary situation, the reaction can triumph in another. It is precisely the unevenness of the revolutionary process that reflects wonderfully the particular form of the application of the law of uneven and combined development in the capitalist era; a process more unified and at the same time more different than ever. The revolutionary process is more intense than ever and at the same time also more different than ever from country to country. Today, the workers' movement is not as even in its manifestations as 30 and 40 years ago but it is also infinitely more powerful and revolutionary.

Hence the situation in Europe, the basis of the unstable equilibrium of the current international situation. In Europe, the first steps of a new revolutionary rise are beginning to be taken, which does not mean the reaction has not achieved some important wins and not the revolution. The application of the armaments plan and the win of Adenauer² are not revolutionary but reactionary victories, which precisely causes a new wave of uprising which manifests itself as defensive in a first stage. This causes an extraordinary unevenness in the world revolutionary process which is aggravated by the crisis of the world revolutionary leadership; in other words, within the world revolutionary situation, we have the ups and downs of a national revolutionary situation and not a single upward process.

2) The march of capitalism and capitalist leadership

The situation of capitalism has been painted as divided into two sectors, one the Yankee which is firmly willing to act in a certain way and which will impose itself on the rest of the capitalist world; the other one, already completely weakened, the European and the colonial ones which all they have left is to attack Yankee politics and protest. From this analysis, it would emerge that the firm leadership of world bourgeois politics is assured and that European capitalism has no or almost no importance in the orientation of this policy. According to the relationship of forces between the different imperialisms, completely favourable to the US, this would seem correct but it is not. Yankee imperialism has had a combined and uneven development that is manifested in its politics: reaching late the complete imperialist domination of the world, it finds that objective antagonistic interests are intertwined. It must dominate and sweep away the other imperialisms according to the competition laws of the capitalist regime but at the same time, it must defend them to prevent the crisis of the imperialist regime in the world and its interests.

Its economy reflects, on the other hand, all the contradictions of world capitalism. Thus, Yankee imperialism is a cluster of economic contradictions: sectors which are only in favour of the development of the domestic market, against those in favour of world trade, sectors that are in favour of large investments abroad against those in favour of world trade, sectors that are in favour of Asia against Europe or Latin America, and so on. All this accumulation of contradictions prevents

2 **Konrad Adenauer** (1876–1967) was a German statesman who served as the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) from 1949 to 1963. He was co-founder and first leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a Christian Democratic party that under his leadership became one of the most influential parties in the country. [Editor]

Yankee imperialism from carrying out a coherent policy and, without suffering the harsh economic or revolutionary crisis of other countries, reflects in its policy the impasse of world imperialism because its dominance of the imperialist world is so great at the time of complete crisis of the latter, which cannot but suffer its contradictions. In other words, the simplistic argument of uniform politics of Yankee imperialism as of a total and complete domination of it ignores the impasse of the policy of Yankee imperialism that reflects the impasse of the imperialist regime as a whole.

3) The general march of the mass movement and its betraying leaderships

The most important experience of the post-war period is that the emergence of forms of mass organisation by Stalinist parties — or even by semi-colonial governments — have been useful forms of organisation for a whole period of the class struggle and have served to lead to victory in Eastern Europe or China or to pose the revolution as in Greece. Along with this experience subsists that of the revolutionary leadership: although a revolutionary leadership has not proved indispensable for the victory of the workers' revolution in a series of extremely backward countries (Yugoslavia and China), it continues to be indispensable to guarantee the advancement of the revolution in the country and the world and not fall into the hands of imperialism or dangerous capitulations (as in Yugoslavia) on the one hand, and on the other as indispensable to lead the proletariat to victory in a series of advanced countries, Italy, France, England, etcetera.

The International Secretariat has drawn the opposite conclusion after the Third World Congress. It began with Stalinism and ended in a general conclusion: the pressure of the masses combined with the pressure in the opposite direction of imperialism, which carries a policy of liquidation of the workers' movement, forces its leaderships to a leftist revolutionary course in a revolutionary period. In this sense, Stalinism has changed its policy, which is transformed forever as a general trend, into a centre-left policy that will lead it, where they control the bulk of the masses, to seize power and make the revolution. Put another way, the theoretical possibility, from the transitional manifesto, that Stalinism in exceptional cases takes power, is transformed into a general certainty.

We believe two problems are confused; the masses and their organisations with their leadership. Generally speaking, these leaderships — even if they are Stalinist — serve imperialism and capitalism in different ways. A Stalinist custom strike, as when the arrival of Ridgway can be done under magnificent slogans but if it does not take into account the balance of forces and is a necessary adventure for Soviet diplomacy, it indirectly imperialism. The mass organisations that they control or may form can be or are extremely useful in the fight against capitalism or imperialism. From this conclusion we must draw another; under no circumstances should we stop being active in the most important mass organisations even making any sacrifice. It is a crime our old policy in Greece, China or Yugoslavia to ignore and not being active in the Stalinist mass organisations, as it was a crime to gamble our militants in the French CGT for the defence of Yugoslavia.³

This does not mean we must be active convinced that these leaderships, because of the revolutionary situation, will sooner or later lead the revolution but, quite the opposite, that the clashes between the leaderships and the mass movement will be profound and that we have ample possibilities to develop our revolutionary politics, in revolutionary periods, in an intransigent struggle against opportunist leaderships and at the same time within these mass organisations. That is, we must not confuse an individual and concrete problem with a general and abstract one. One thing is where our militants are located and where they must remain and the general policy of the party is another. We should not have joined the Yugoslav liberation committees because Tito would lead the revolution but because they were broad grassroots organisations and such is the place of each one of us, as militants of our class.

3 A tactical crime, which led to all our militants being expelled from the mass organisations where they were active by publicly and explicitly promoting the defence of Yugoslavia against the policies of the Soviet bureaucracy. This does not mean giving up the defence of the Yugoslav revolution but rather adapting ourselves tactically by appealing to all resources to keep ourselves in the mass organisations and alongside the vanguard. NM

The party's policy against Tito should not have changed because of this, on the contrary, we should have continued to denounce him systematically, pointing out his capitulations against imperialism and how unlikely it was for him to make the revolution. After he did the revolution, we would have changed our tactic but nothing else: we continue to be against the opportunist leadership as a permanent danger of returning to the capitalist regime. Because if we had entered the liberation committees and we had said we were entering because we are sure that Tito, opportunist and Stalinist, will lead the revolution, we would have committed a betrayal, quite the opposite, we must permanently encourage the most probable variable according to Trotskyism: that opportunist leaderships generally betray the revolution and do not lead it to victory.

On the other hand, it is the same relationship existing between a strike movement and its opportunist leadership and a revolutionary situation in a country. Because of its tremendous pressure, an opportunist leadership can lead the strike movement to victory but, although the opportunist leadership did not mean an obstacle to the final victory of the strike, on the one hand, it was so in its different stages and it is, on the other hand, an enormous obstacle or danger in the development of the revolution in a country, although objectively the victory of the strike can arouse an extraordinary enthusiasm. On an international scale, the victory of the revolution in a country with an opportunistic leadership is fraught with dangers. Two different programs emerge from these two antagonistic analyses. The International Secretariat, which believes the leadership of reformism will lead the revolution, is inclined in revolutionary periods to entryism for a long period in those parties. We, on the contrary, are for compulsory entryism and the permanence in the great mass organisations that arise in revolutionary times, whoever may lead them, and by the need for a completely independent and intransigent policy against the opportunist leaderships and parties that lead it.

4) The crisis of our international leadership

Trotsky's death was irreparable not only because he was a genius and by miles the most capable of all the Fourth-Internationalists but because of something much more serious — because he was the fundamental pillar of our international leadership. His death has meant a serious crisis of our international leadership; a crisis which, as new phenomena take place, appears more serious. Initially, the current leadership of the International played a progressive, proletarian role, defending the Trotskyist heritage against all attempts at revision. But the new leadership was totally unable to understand the new phenomena when they happened: Glacis, Yugoslavia, China, the precise character of the European revolution and the role of the Red Army. This was not only for the only reason given by Pablo — the new reality is much more dynamic than the previous one — but to a subjective phenomenon: inheritance of propagandism, the new formation of the leading cadres, lack of discussion and exchange of information and positions between the different sections, a general weakness of our movement.

The current International Secretariat makes a brutal effort to show how they have risen to the occasion and how they are a competent leadership. Lately, they have gambled their prestige on two cards: the unanimity of the World Congress and the world Trotskyist movement and the inevitability of war in two or three years (1951). This argument of unanimity is by itself valid to judge the current international leadership. Returning to the example of a single country we have given earlier, we will point out it is a matter of creating an international Bolshevik party. This means a party with all the virtues of Bolshevism raised to the nth power. Trotsky would have died of laughter or rage if he had been told the strength of a Bolshevik party lies in that it voted unanimously; it was not like that in the Russian Bolshevik party because it was a Bolshevik party. In a world party, this phenomenon of collective discussion and elaboration, with such an uneven reality, must still be much broader than a national revolutionary party, even if it is the Bolshevik party. Thus, we draw precisely the opposite conclusion about unanimity within our International and the lack of discussion: the general weakness of the cadres, their youth, their lack of experience and political and theoretical level, is what allows the failed centre without any success to impose its point of view. This is reflected with

Bolivia, where an opportunistic policy is being carried out without discussion and participation by the Latin American sections.

This leadership crisis is an indirect reflection of the general situation of the mass movement, subjectively backward in relation to the tasks that are objectively posed. The weakness of Trotskyism is reflected in its leadership at a time of colossal revolutionary rise; and this also has its profound logic because the new revolutionary, Bolshevik leadership of the world proletariat will ultimately be the result of the revolutionary development itself in the world and the consequence of a process much more complicated and lengthy than the formation of the leadership and the Bolshevik party. In any case, it will not be the product of the unanimity of world congresses but of the tears, struggles, contradictions, discussions and experiences of our cadres and the vanguard of the proletariat. It will be a terribly contradictory process because it is about neither more nor less than **achieving the highest form of human organisation and leadership achieved up to now**.

The International Secretariat, limited in their class experience, with almost no real, living experience of the European revolution in which they lived, limited to an intellectual defence and a popularisation of Trotsky, they encountered the malady that Trotsky pointed out before dying, these magnificent propagandists succumb to the pressure of the own intelligentsia that continues being their class. This means, on the one hand, succumbing, as a research method, to the comments of the bourgeois press or, on the other, to the abstraction of taking the mass movements without contradictions, due to their inability to understand them. We have already seen it, even in our movement — the good propagandist becomes an opportunist. These are not times of Kautskys but of theoretical and practical revolutionaries.

5) Our agreement with the majority of the French section

With the majority of the French section we had profound differences, we do not ignore or hide them; however, we have reached some common points:

a) That the *Transitional Program*, contrary to what Pablo asserts, continues to be correct.

b) That the crisis of the opportunist leaderships is accelerating enormously, is centrifugal or can be centrifugal with a correct policy of the revolutionary party in every frankly revolutionary period with large mass organisations.

c) That there is no leftist course of world Stalinism but the old reactionary politics from opportunism to suicidal sectarianism, and so on.

d) The existence of a profound crisis in our international leadership that forces a return to the practices of broad discussions and learning, fundamentally through experience and discussions and not through administrative ukases. On this basis, we are ready to collaborate with these comrades.

This collaboration does not prevent us from continuing to vindicate the Third World Congress and especially the 9th Plenum and Pablo's *Where are we going?*, for the following:

1– Having correctly raised the possibility of war without strengthening imperialism in the world, the threat of war “is moving away and at the same time is more precise”.

2– Pointing out the need to work, even if it is much more difficult, where the strongest organisations of the working class and its vanguard are found.

3– Recognising the revolution in China and Yugoslavia and the bureaucratic revolution of the Glacis;

4– That Stalinist policy in Europe would be opportunist and reactionary and, as a consequence, the next rise would accelerate the crisis of Stalinism and we should work with this perspective.

5– As a consequence of all this:

a) That no kind of entryism should be practised in Stalinism in Western Europe and that we should work independently in the factories and on the Stalinist ranks.

b) That entryism where we may practise it, as in England, would be until the revolutionary rise at the latest and therefore we would leave as soon as possible, i.e., entryism is a policy prior to the revolutionary crisis.

c) In all other places, we had to act intransigently as a workers' vanguard.

These three conclusions are a consequence of the premise the revolutionary crisis forced us more than ever to carry out our independent policy, which is the only one that can give correct solutions to the objective situation.

Buenos Aires, June 1953.