



# Nahuel Moreno

A socialist and  
revolutionary  
electoral  
campaign

# Nahuel Moreno

## A socialist and revolutionary electoral campaign

December 1972–January 1973

Archive material

**English translation:** Daniel Iglesias

**Editor Notes:** Daniel Iglesias

**Cover and interior design:** Daniel Iglesias

[www.nahuelmoreno.org](http://www.nahuelmoreno.org)

[www.uit-ci.org](http://www.uit-ci.org)

[www.izquierdasocialista.org.ar](http://www.izquierdasocialista.org.ar)

Copyright by *CEHUS*, Centro de Estudios Humanos y Sociales

Buenos Aires, 2020

[cehus2014@gmail.com](mailto:cehus2014@gmail.com)



# Contents

Foreword .....	1
----------------	---

## A socialist and revolutionary electoral campaign

<b>1. Our electoral campaign.....</b>	<b>2</b>
I. Why does a revolutionary party participate in an election campaign? .....	2
II. The national perspectives and the elections.....	4
III. Using the elections to explain the need for an Argentinazo .....	4
IV. The electoral campaign and the fight for good labour agreements, for the victory of the workers' disputes .....	6
V. The electoral strategy of setting up the workers' and socialist pole .....	6
VI. The electoral platform.....	8
VII. The electoral campaign .....	9
VIII. The organisational goals: Let us form dozens and dozens of workers, youth and socialist committees in favour of our slates .....	11
<b>2. Let's run a revolutionary socialist campaign.....</b>	<b>12</b>
How to prepare the electoral campaign?.....	13
The organisation of the zone and the party .....	16
Let's learn to dialogue and work with our class .....	17
Let's take care of the language and learn to listen.....	18
The proletarian housewife .....	20
The grassroots worker .....	20
The party's candidate.....	21
The union activist.....	22
The young worker or student.....	23
The electoral campaign.....	23
The axis of our activity during the fight for the labour agreements .....	23
The electoral campaign and workers' conflicts.....	24
Let's block the factories .....	25
The rallies .....	26
The other media.....	26

The organisms we will have to create to develop the campaign.....	27
a) The Workers' Front.....	27
b) The Socialist Front.....	28
c) The other fronts.....	29
Once again: let's strengthen the party.....	29

# Foreword

This important document was approved by the PST congress in December 1972 and immediately published as a brochure. Nahuel Moreno wrote it using the nickname “Miguel”. It was the first time the Morenist current faced a national electoral campaign of this magnitude since legality had been achieved at the national level and in numerous provinces. With the tactics of the workers’ front, the candidacies of important workers’ leaders were promoted, even when they were not members of the PST but who were willing to promote their policy of class independence.

The first chapter armed the militancy with the basic reasons and goals of the revolutionaries’ participation in the elections, which were synthesised in the strengthening of the party. It set the state of the national situation in which the March 1973 elections would take place and within it the tactic of the workers’ and socialist pole that the PST was raising.

It placed much emphasis on the importance of planning activities in factories and other places of work and study, and in the working-class and popular neighbourhoods. Also in the different dialogues with workers, housewives, students.

It ends with a platform with the central proposals that the candidates would spread in the electoral agitation.

We publish it for the first time since 1973. All notes are by the editor.

**The Editors**

December 2020

# A socialist and revolutionary electoral campaign

Miguel [Nahuel Moreno], 7 December 1972

## 1. Our electoral campaign

Our party is preparing to take part in the elections. During the year now ending our main political campaign has been to put ourselves in legal conditions to take part in them. All the comrades know, even better than the leadership, the sacrifices we have had to make to be able to participate in the elections and have a legally recognised party. The time has come to use this formidable political tool: the legal party, to educate the working class and organise the working class and student vanguard on the political plane. This document is intended to clearly specify the nature of our electoral campaign.

### I. Why does a revolutionary party participate in an election campaign?

The great revolutionary who was Rosa Luxemburg defined many years ago the reasons for the participation of the revolutionaries in the elections:

“The true purpose (of our participation) in the parliamentary elections (Reichstag) is to enable us to extend socialist education [...]”

In another of her works, she insists that both parliamentary and union activity are very important in convincing the workers that by themselves they are not helpful:

“[...] as a result of its trade union and parliamentary struggles, the proletariat becomes convinced, of the impossibility of accomplishing a fundamental social change through such activity and arrives at the understanding that the conquest of power is unavoidable.”<sup>1</sup> And once again she insists: “[...] trade-union and parliamentary activity are important for the socialist movement because such activity prepares the proletariat, that is to say, creates the subjective factor of the socialist transformation, for the task of realising socialism.”<sup>2</sup>

That this is not a mere Luxembourgian concept is demonstrated by Lenin when he insists on the same thing: “The principal question for Social-Democrats who value the elections primarily as a means for the political enlightenment of the people, is, of course, the ideological and political content of all the propaganda and agitation to be carried on in connection with them.”<sup>3</sup>

1 Rosa Luxemburg, *Reform or Revolution*, 1900, Chapter IV Capitalism and the State, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1900/reform-revolution/ch04.htm>.

2 Ibid.

3 V.I. Lenin, “The Election Campaign and the Election Platform”, *Collected Works, Vol 17 (December 1910–April 1912)*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 279.

And Trotsky, for a situation quite similar to the one we are currently experiencing in our country, in the early 1930s in Spain, insisted: “The Communists need the forum of the Cortes as a bond with the masses; and from this bond will develop actions that will submerge the Cortes. This is the essence of the revolutionary dialectic with regard to parliament.”<sup>4</sup>

The propaganda of a revolutionary party for the elections has three goals that are synthesised in one: *to develop and strengthen the party*.

The *first goal* is to unmask and denounce the regime. In this case, the semi-colonial and capitalist regime that oppresses the country and exploits the workers. The *second goal* is to show the working class that the solution to their problems comes from their mobilisations and not from possible parliamentary or electoral activity. We must demonstrate the falsehood of bourgeois democracy and how only the activity and unity of the exploited can free the workers. The *third goal* is to demonstrate the need for the workers’ and socialist revolution, how the working class must take power as the only way to overcome the crisis of the country and the workers.

These three goals are synthesised into one: the elections must be used to fortify the party, opening a much broader path of contact with the mass movement and with its vanguard. Anything that leads to a strengthening of the party in extension and the recruitment of the best fighters of the working class and the oppressed sectors is a step forward in the development of the workers’ revolution in the country since the lack of a powerful revolutionary socialist party is the greatest obstacle the Argentine masses have to come to power.

This supreme goal, to strengthen the party for these elections, opening for us a much wider channel of contact with the mass movement, must not be forgotten for a minute. This means our main goal is not to get a large number of votes but to educate the masses and the vanguard and thereby strengthen the party. Hence, some tactics and organisational measures, even if they allow us to obtain a few thousand more votes, may not be appropriate if they do not go in the direction of extending and strengthening the influence of the party that will be measured by expanding its sphere of militants and supporters, in the number of newspapers sold, etc.

The way to fortify the party goes through a combined contradictory activity of agitation, organisation and propaganda. To educate the masses during the electoral campaign, the means is agitation, launching a few ideas or slogans so that the largest possible sectors of the workers will understand. By this means, we popularise the party as an organisational, vanguard tool for the application of these democratic, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and revolutionary slogans. But this activity by itself is not enough since, after the elections, it vanishes; it remains as a much generalised, abstract liking for the party. For this liking to last, it must be organised during the elections to continue later, that is, to fortify the party’s organic sphere of influence. For this, the fundamental thing is to link ourselves to the vanguard of the workers, mainly the blue-collar workers’ vanguard. Therefore, the elections must be used to reach this workers’ vanguard with our propaganda and organise it around it. Our position of workers’ candidates allows us to group, organise and reach the workers’ vanguard. If we were to limit ourselves to making propaganda to the workers’ vanguard and not organising it, we would isolate it from the great masses. On the contrary, if we organise it — starting by organising it on the slates and in the electoral activity — we can win it not only through propaganda but also through a common activity, in this case electoral. We repeat, at a much higher level, what we commonly do when we participate in a workers’ or democratic conflict: at the beat of the conflict, we try to bring together the vanguard to respond, in an organised way, to the requirements of the struggle as the first step of their incorporation to the party and a revolutionary Marxist conception.

4 Leon Trotsky, “The Spanish revolution and the dangers threatening it”, 28 May 1931, *The Spanish Revolution (1931-39)*, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1973.

## II. The national perspectives and the elections

Many guerrilla sympathisers will wonder: how long will the curtailed democratic rights last? Are there prospects for a more or less prolonged bourgeois-democratic stage? Are we not becoming electoralist and parliamentarist by deviating from the preparation of the armed struggle of the masses?

We believe that our country, like other Latin American countries, will live a bourgeois-democratic stage for as long as the unstable balance between the classes allows. If no one can achieve a decisive victory and if the working class does not reach a revolutionary situation or close to it, as in Bolivia under Torres or now in Chile, the current stage will extend. In other words, the duration will depend on the situation of the class struggle. This situation can take us back to an Onganía<sup>5</sup> or Brazilian-type government, it can keep an unstable balance as a consequence of the bureaucratic leaderships of the workers' movement and Peronism that will strive to guarantee it or it can evolve towards a situation similar to that of Chile or Bolivia under Torres. We believe that with much slowness and mediation this last trend is the most likely. This means a slow dynamic towards weak, Kerenskyist governments, like Allende or Torres and insurrectionary situations. For this probable future situation to lead to a victory for the working class, the existence of a strong revolutionary party is necessary, which it can only be built if it fully engages in the mass movement using all its possibilities.

To propose that the most important task today is to “prepare for the armed struggle” is to play with the perspectives of another stage and not with the current situation since the tasks of the revolutionists always arise from the present reality. Only by penetrating the mass movement in the present hour with the present program can we face the future stages. And at the present hour, the elections are what the masses will attend and will not boycott, even if some ultra-left sects so propose.

Furthermore, proposing as part of the electoral program the armament of the workers, when the workers do not consider it, is as ridiculous as the proposal of the Stalinists in the third period, in Spain, who proposed the same thing in 1931. Trotsky responded to this proposal of the ultra-leftists with these words that we make our own: “To counterpose the slogan of arming the workers to the reality of the political processes that grip the masses at their vitals means to isolate oneself from the masses — and the masses from arms.”<sup>6</sup>

## III. Using the elections to explain the need for an Argentinazo

These elections are held for two reasons. The first is the rise of the workers' and mass movement in the country that has caused a clear pre-revolutionary situation of general instability. The Cordobazos, Rosariazos and Rocazos, like the workers' disputes that have taken place continuously, led to several semi-insurrectionary situations in the country. The danger of these semi-insurrections ending in a semi-insurrection or general insurrection, the Argentinazo, led the Argentine bourgeoisie to attempt to divert the mass movement, leading it to a dead end: the elections, granting Peronism conditional freedom to run in them.

If after 17 years the Argentine bourgeoisie decides to appeal to Peron and Peronism to save them, it is because the situation is desperate. But this appeal to Peronism has two faces: damping and confusing the rise, one; accelerating the crisis of Peronism by unleashing the hopes of the mass movement and thus facilitating the speed of a new rise, the other.

The combination of the rise of the mass movement, on the one hand, and the bourgeois manoeuvring to divert it, on the other, is what explains the current democratic rights and elections, linked to legislation and repressive measures of the worst kind.

<sup>5</sup> Juan Carlos Onganía (1914–1995) was de facto President of Argentina from 29 June 1966 to 8 June 1970. He rose to power as military dictator after toppling the president Arturo Illia in a *coup d'état* self-named “Argentine Revolution”.

<sup>6</sup> L. Trotsky, “The Spanish revolution and the dangers threatening it”, op. cit.)

This pre-revolutionary stage has been and will continue to be characterised by one fact: the questioning of bourgeois power through semi-insurrectionary situations. Fortunately for the bourgeoisie, their electoral manoeuvre takes place at the moment of the greatest ebb of the workers' movement since the Cordobazo. But this momentary decline in the workers' struggles should not mislead us about the general dynamics of the class struggle after the elections. For economic or democratic reasons, there will be in the short term of a few months —which can be up to two years at the most— new large worker and popular mobilisations that will question the government of the day and the bourgeois order. Whether for wage problems, or reasons of repression, or the struggle against imperialism, the working masses will once again be on a war footing. The curtailed democratic rights, such as the legality of Peronism, will only facilitate these struggles, which will become crystal clear.

Any circumstantial improvement of the bourgeois economy, based on its structural crisis and the present pre-revolutionary situation, which has as its fundamental element the fact the masses have not been defeated, will only revive the rise of the workers' movement that remains latent. In this sense, economic improvement will be added to democratic rights to facilitate this revival that will lead to new Cordobazos.

That is the reason why our fundamental goal when running in the elections is to educate the workers so they draw fundamental experiences of their own actions from the Cordobazo until now.

There are several fundamental conclusions we want them to draw. First: that the struggle began for minimal or democratic reasons. Second: that all the semi-insurrections were in fact against the government. This conclusion is more necessary than ever for us to popularise because, by Peronism running in the elections, it will give wings to the hope that now the bourgeois government somehow belongs or will give satisfaction to the working class. To unmask this manoeuvre, we must take these hopes into account by making the masses demand that Peronism satisfy their most heartfelt needs.

We will have to translate this policy into our language, both oral and written, trying to avoid a clash of our language with the Peronist hopes. We will have to unmask them, denounce them, but without clashing with insulting phrases, rather patiently explaining the role of Peronism, of Peron himself, taking into account those hopes, when they point in a revolutionary sense to encourage actions and measures that unmask Peron himself.

At the same time, we must popularise that everything achieved in terms of democratic rights was achieved by the struggle of the masses in the streets and we should not have any trust that Peronism or the government will expand those democratic rights, repealing the repressive legislation and releasing the related political prisoners, the guerrillas.

Therefore, the great slogans of our electoral campaign should be: For the release of the related political and social prisoners! For democratic rights, for the repeal of all repressive laws! Down with the current military government! Down with the bourgeois government of the day! Let's do the Argentinazo to definitively free ourselves from imperialism and capitalism!

These slogans have an obvious aim: to make the workers understand the current stage of the revolution and bring into their awareness the experience of their struggles. The slogan in favour of the Argentinazo must be explained in the following way: we want a peaceful transformation of society but we do not believe in it since the national and foreign exploiters will not accept without a civil war that the masses peacefully take away their privileges. Did Spain just gladly allow us to become independent from it? Did Onganía or the Junta of Commanders-in-Chief give hidden democratic rights or promised elections or, on the contrary, did they have to be ripped off with Cordobazos and Rosariazos?

We do not want the dead and wounded of the Cordobazos but we must prepare for it because they will be inevitable since the exploiters will force us to do so.

#### IV. The electoral campaign and the fight for good labour agreements, for the victory of the workers' disputes

This statement about the need to propagandise the Argentinazo should not make us forget that the campaign is carried out at a special time for the working class when new labour agreements are being discussed. We have said the elections are being held at a time of certain apathy that is on the way to being overcome. Our running in the elections should deepen and enrich the party's customary activity and not weaken it. This activity is characterised by our first-line participation in all the concrete problems and disputes faced by the workers. The electoral campaign must not divert us from this line.

We will have to give ourselves a national line and for each union regarding the discussion of the agreements. This line will be the axis of our militant activity within our class. The electoral campaign should allow us to intensify the application of this line. Our axis that the workers will only solve their problems by their activity and not by the elections, must have immediate application. The great problem of poverty, of starvation wages, must be addressed by the party and by our factions and militants immediately, using the discussion of the labour agreements. We must be the champions and the vanguard in the fight for good agreements that curb hunger.

What we say about the agreements we say about the workers' disputes. We have always characterised ourselves for linking up and proposing ourselves as an alternative leadership of whichever dispute we manage to contact or learn about. The elections should expand and intensify this essential task of the party. This is decisive precisely because we believe the discussion of the agreements, just like the terrible cost of living, will begin to provoke defensive disputes of the working class, disputes to which we must link ourselves and propose ourselves as leaders. The elections allow us to increase tenfold this activity that we have done since we exist as an organisation. This activity, more than any other, will allow us to impact the class and activists with our electoral campaign.

#### V. The electoral strategy of setting up the workers' and socialist pole

If the overall situation can be defined as pre-revolutionary, it is reflected in a certain way within the ranks of the workers' movement and the trade unions, the only mass organisations existing in the country. This particular refraction manifests itself in the outbreak of workers' and popular conflicts or struggles, led by a new vanguard that does not follow Peronism and is intransigently opposed to the union bureaucracy. The Cordobazos and the workers' strikes have not just questioned the government but the union leaderships that are completely bureaucratised and subservient to the state and, indirectly, to Peronism. The revolutionary crisis manifests itself at the level of the mass movement as a crisis of the Peronist union and political leaderships.

This crisis has an uneven pace: it is hatred for the bureaucratised union leaderships, support for the new class-struggle union leaderships where there are worker struggles, without that hatred having come to touch, politically, the leadership of Peron himself. This uneven development, the break with the union leadership is much broader and qualitatively higher than the break with Peron, it is the fundamental contradiction that we revolutionaries have to face to overcome it. The most negative aspect of this contradiction is manifested in a tragic event for the Argentine workers' movement: despite the struggles that question the regime, it remains politically subordinate to a bourgeois current: Peronism.

Our strategy for the setting up of a workers' and socialist pole responds to the imperative need to overcome this contradiction, raising the new workers' vanguard, that until now has essentially fought on the union level against the servants of the bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy, to fight on the political level, to directly combat the influence or ideology of Peronism and Peron.

We do not believe for even a minute that at this time this struggle can be a mass success. The weight of inertia, the lack of unity and organisation of the workers' vanguard, and the lack

of a revolutionary party to organise it and elevate it to an overall political activity over the mass movement mean that at the level of the majority of the workers this battle is impossible to win for these elections. But that we cannot win it at this moment does not mean the battle should not begin to be fought with all audacity and determination. It begins by trying to organise and elevate the new workers' vanguard so they begin to fight this political battle. Hence, the most important aspect of our electoral strategy is our call to the workers' vanguard to organise and elevate their fight against the bureaucracy from the union level to the political level and then return to the union level itself from a total activity, not merely a unionist one. Thus, our campaign in favour of the workers' candidacies has an immediate goal: to organise the vanguard against the bourgeois candidacies of the union bureaucracy. We must centre this campaign on the hatred of the working class for the bureaucracy, pointing out that the workers who hate it cannot vote for the bourgeois candidates proposed by this bureaucracy.

This essential axis of our campaign in favour of the political independence of the workers' movement, in favour of the independent political organisation of the workers' vanguard, coincides, on the other hand, with a profound objective need for this vanguard. Limited to mere union struggle, sooner or later the best activists are isolated from their working-class grassroots after any defeat since government and bosses' repression transforms them into pariahs. Through the electoral campaign, we can achieve that this vanguard be organised at a higher level in its fight against the bureaucracy and the bosses, the political level, and at a much broader level, that of the working class, without limiting itself to its factory or union. The hundreds of Paez, Fote or Rodríguez, who today are isolated from their grassroots as a result of repression and partial defeats, will thus be able to organise at the national or provincial level and thus have a new, much richer means of communication with the workers' movement.

This fundamental activity and organisation are combined with another of a less important character, the unification of the vanguard or the old leaders who claim to be for socialism; logically we are not referring to the militants of our party, be they old or young. The revolutionary rise makes tendencies and personalities emerge from the student movement and also from the old left movements who believe the conditions begin to emerge to propagate socialist ideas. We consider these sectors, regardless of their past, play a positive role by joining the propaganda in favour of socialism and the political independence of the workers' movement. We need to prevent these sectors from running on their own and confusing the clarity of the political solutions or options offered to the working class and vanguard. We need to do everything possible so the class and its vanguard face clear options: on the one hand, clearly bourgeois parties or fronts: Radicalism and Peronism; left popular frontism —Alende, Sueldo, Sandler— supported by the Communist Party, who are against an Argentina immediately working-class and socialist, which is lost through the twists and turns of the revolution in stages and the parliamentary route; and on the other hand, the worker and socialist variant.

To facilitate the formation of this clear workers' and socialist pole, we must avoid leaving out of it any sector that claims for socialism or the political independence of the working class.

This combination must be contingent on what the comrades of the current workers' vanguard say, to their level of understanding of this need, since the main goal of our strategy is to organise and promote the political activity of the new workers' vanguard and not to bring old socialist leaders to the front. This means that agreements with old figures of reformist socialism are subject, as a tactic, to our electoral strategy of incorporation of the new workers' vanguard to the workers' and socialist pole. The discussion with this vanguard will allow us to verify the possibilities of this tactical incorporation.

## VI. The electoral platform

As the essential thing during the electoral campaign is agitation, the slogans, more than the electoral platform, mark the tone of the campaign. The fundamental slogans, as stated in the previous two points, are as follows:

- Freedom of related political and social prisoners.
- For democratic rights, down with repressive legislation.
- Down with the military government.
- Out with the future capitalist government.
- Let's resist the imperialist and capitalist repression with an Argentinazo that imposes a workers' and popular government.
- Do not vote the military, or union bureaucrats, do not vote doctors, or bosses, vote for your comrades. Vote worker candidates.
- Do not vote for the bosses candidates of Coria and Miguel.<sup>7</sup>

On these essential axes, we must develop our electoral agitative platform, different from our mere electoral platform, which is the update for the elections of our transitional program at present. The elections allow us to reach the great masses and they are reached by agitation, that is, with a few slogans, the fewer the better, not the worse, since the omnibus programs are not understood by the masses.

Its central axes must be:

- a) Wages issue: for an immediate 40 per cent increase and a minimum wage of AR\$ 120,000 and from there the sliding scale of wages applied by a workers' committee or with a workers' majority, which we must link to our fight for the labour agreements.
- b) Unemployment insurance and for the immediate nationalisation of any factory or establishment that stops, so it continues to produce with workers' control.
- c) Housing: immediate expropriation for reasons of the public need of all summer homes to make them available to homeless workers. Home construction loans will be repaid with 10 per cent of salary or family income.
- d) Free nationalised medical care and medicines for all the country's inhabitants.
- e) Equality between women and men in salary, opportunities, and rights. Childcare centres 24 hours a day totally free. Pensions equal to half salary for each child of a single or separated mother.
- f) For the teaching staff-student-non teaching staff control of the University, with a majority for students.
- g) Control of the retirement funds by the retirees and not by the State, authorising them to expropriate establishments that do not pay the funds and for their nationalisation with workers' control.
- h) For the nationalisation of all imperialist and national monopolies. For the nationalisation of foreign trade with workers' control. For the repudiation of the foreign debt.

<sup>7</sup> **Rogelio Coria** (1928–1973), a corrupt union bureaucrat, was Secretary General of the powerful Construction Workers Union. During his leadership in the union, he bought 1000 hectares in San Bernardino, Paraguay. In July 1973 he was assassinated by a guerrilla group.

**Lorenzo Miguel** (1927-2002) was one of the historic chiefs of the Peronist trade union bureaucracy. Head of the powerful metalworkers union (UOM) since 1970. During the government of Isabel Peron, he linked with Jose Lopez Rega to give birth to the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance or Triple-A a death squad that appeared on the scene in 1973. After the coup against Isabel Peron, he was sent to prison but his close relationship with Junta member Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera protected him.

i) Immediate recognition of Cuba. Withdrawal from the OAS and all the international organisations that tie us to the imperialist yoke. Breaking of the colonizing pacts.

j) Diplomatic and material support to the peoples who fight against imperialism, beginning with the support of the heroic Vietnamese people, infamously attacked by Yankee imperialism. Demand that the Yankee army and armed forces immediately withdraw from Vietnam, thus ceasing to attack the Vietnamese people who must determine their own destiny.

k) Critical support for any measure of national independence adopted by any Latin American people or government. At present, especially to those adopted by the Chilean people and government, without falling into support for the state or capitalist government of that country.

l) For an economic plan drawn up by a CGT grassroots congress that develops the national economy for the benefit of the workers and the country.

m) Expropriation of the big-state landowners and distribution of the lands by the State to carry out new agrarian colonization in individual or collective plots, as the future settlers or current workers of the land want.

n) The central slogans already mentioned and the fundamental one of: for a Socialist Argentina.

## VII. The electoral campaign

We can divide the electoral campaign into several stages: the first has been the one we are already finishing, drawing up the slates and getting the candidates; the second is the electoral campaign itself and which the party will begin approximately from 7 January; the third is the electoral act; the fourth, the balance and the perspectives that the electoral campaign leaves us.

Regarding the making of slates, they are being carried out based on leaders and activists in factories, unions or workers' neighbourhoods who essentially agree in one point of our electoral program: for workers' candidates against the bourgeois candidates of all parties. These candidates are joined by comrades from other leftist tendencies that agree with our electoral program. Finally, the party's own candidates who provide magnificent cadres of militant socialist workers.

The most important task is to achieve the presentation of slates in the greatest number of districts, appealing for it, if necessary, to grassroots workers and left-wing militants, when there are no real leaders. The danger is that we fall, in the eagerness to draw the slates, in the demagoguery of promising the moon or, worse, that we do not select the candidates allowing political adventurers to infiltrate us. The best way to control this process is to hold large meetings of all possible candidates, as well as carefully research their biography. The party must make efforts to guarantee the seriousness and discipline of the comrades who are candidates for positions that may be won, trying to choose for those positions comrades proven in the party or the class struggle. But the essential thing goes through the recognition of the union activists, the authentic rank-and-file leaders, of the right they have to form committees of the Workers' Front that, democratically, in a principled agreement with the party, will be able to draw up the slates.

*The central organisational slogan of the party for the electoral campaign, which is now beginning to take shape for the preparation of the slates, is that of the Workers' Front Committees. We offer these committees the right they have to use, without any conditions, our legal status to run for election, provided we agree with the central point of our electoral program: the political independence of the workers' movement. This means we will fight for electoral Workers' Front committees to be set up at all levels to choose the candidates.*

The party will only appoint a delegate to coordinate the activities and will participate, with its union activities, in the meetings of the workers' front, with the same rights and obligations as all the other members of the front. With an addition: each of our militants and supporters will act, with authorisation of the party, independently and not factionally, to prevent the workers' front committees from becoming collateral of the party. We prefer the initiative and independence of these

committees than their transformation into a partisan appendage. Every activist on the committee should feel it as his own and not as if he is being used by the party.

Regarding the presidential ticket, we must adopt a tactic according to our principles, elaborating it with the National Committee of the Workers' Front, once it is elected. It is based on the discussion with that Committee that we will end up adopting a definitive line concerning this delicate tactical problem. In principle, we see the following possibilities: Fote, Paez, any other Cordovan labour leader because of their symbolic meaning, Nora, Coral. The ideal would be a workers' ticket formed by a great Cordovan leader and a female comrade, essentially a worker.

The essence of the electoral campaign will take place from 7 January until the elections. It will be two months of intense activity. We must carefully distinguish the campaign from the electoral act itself. The campaign may be very good, have reached broad layers with our education and organisation, and the result of the vote adverse. This is the greatest probability since the mechanism of bourgeois elections makes the worker prone to vote by tradition or for whom they consider the winner, not to lose the vote, even if they sympathise with us. Thus, we must not get dizzy with the results, which we believe with great enthusiasm and as a great success will approach at most 100,000 votes throughout the country. The important thing is that those 100,000 voters are consciously voting for a program and a revolutionary workers' party. This will mean we have impacted the vanguard, which we have already begun to organise and direct it politically.

That is why the essential thing will be the electoral campaign. This will have different levels. One will be the use of the mass media: radio, television and the bourgeois press. Another will be public rallies. The local, provincial, factory, union, national flyers, and the newspaper made available for electoral propaganda, will be part of this aspect of the campaign.

This should be carried out at a level of general propaganda from above, using the mass media as much as possible, and another fundamental one, from below, blocking the factories and combing in working-class neighbourhoods.

The national leadership will have to budget for the electoral campaign to see how the expenses are distributed to use the mass media, without getting dizzy by these means, since their use, in our character as a proletarian party, will be minimal concerning the bourgeois parties. A variant that combines the two methods will be the possibility of making one or two movies to be screened at the rallies.

At the grassroots level, which is the essential work, the zones will have to plan carefully, during the holiday week, the factories and working-class neighbourhoods to which they will direct their efforts. They should, as far as possible, before or during the electoral campaign, specify the nature of each workplace, in order to carry out a bold campaign of public rallies and distribution of flyers. We must reach all neighbourhoods and all factories. For the more remote places or in the interior of the country, we must prepare groups of comrade agitators, party or workers' and youth front teams, who with a car and loudspeaker carry out the campaign. We have to have the audacity to know how to raise the factory or local problem that impacts or links the specific problems to our general electoral campaign. The zonal leadership, aided by the party leadership, should know how to pose the concrete problem that afflicts any sector of workers: wages, rationalisation, union bureaucratisation within a factory or guild; water, medical care, land, house, street lighting or paving in the neighbourhoods; to elevate those workers to the understanding of our overall program.

Together with the campaign, we must prepare a financial campaign that allows us to pay for the electoral campaign by the support of the workers.

The time has come for us to use all the experience we have gained in affiliating and obtaining workers' candidates to expand the influence of the party and our program by 10, 20, or 100 fold. The electoral campaign allows us to.

## VIII. The organisational goals: Let us form dozens and dozens of workers, youth and socialist committees in favour of our slates

This entire campaign will be like writing on water if we do not accompany it with an attempt to crystallize its development in organisational forms. Of these, two are the main ones: the workers' and youth front committees.

It is precisely in this area where we must show we are not electoralist since we sacrifice, if necessary, getting votes to the constitution of these committees.

Wherever the possibility of setting up these committees opens up to us, we should not hesitate for a moment, no matter how tiring or slow, to halt our direct electoral campaign, as a party, to set up these committees, be their animators and use them as the main organising tool of our electoral campaign.

As soon as we make contact with a small group of workers or activists who agree with us, in the neighbourhood, in a factory or union, we must fully devote ourselves to trying to organise them so that, with our contribution, they are the ones who carry out the electoral campaign; in those places and, if possible, in others.

The same thing as soon as groups of young people who agree with our campaign emerge, we must organise them immediately so they get to work, making all kinds of concessions so they are the ones who carry out the campaign in their sector.

We must be the collective organisers of the workers' and youth vanguard who show up in agreement with our electoral campaign. Every lead that opens up in this sense must be exploited to the maximum since it is our main organisational task, without wasting time trying to extend ourselves on our own, taking care of those workers and youth leads. The extension must come from the initiative and activity of these organisms. To form these groups we must learn not to be sectarian. Any lead that opens up to us is positive if it goes in the sense of grouping and organising vanguard workers or youth. We have hinted that they agree with our program: we must rectify ourselves. It is enough they are in favour of any point on the program. Even if they only have sympathy for us. The important thing is they organise from two or three comrades to help us in the campaign. The art of our militants will be to find the tasks they want to do and not impose our schema on them. However minimal this task is, it is the beginning of its functionality and it does not group them in other organisational forms, good on paper, but that do not reflect reality.

We have to do something similar with the intellectuals or leftist militants who agree with our campaign. We must organise them to form a committee to support the electoral campaign.

We cannot foresee the greater or lesser success of this organising campaign since it depends on the situations and moods of the youth and the workers' vanguard that we do not control. The important thing is to point out that the greater or lesser success of our campaign will be measured in a fundamental measure, by the greater or lesser extension of these committees.

This entire campaign should have a post-electoral goal: to bring together new workers' and youth plenaries, after the elections, to draw the conclusions of the electoral act and a perspective for the future.

If we succeed in making each of these plenaries double or triple the one that we will carry out on the 16th, the electoral campaign will be a success, since the party's bond with those four thousand worker and youth activists will not end with the electoral act but, on the contrary, this will be the beginning of a bond that will become closer every day.

If these organisational goals are combined with the opening of premises by these committees (not by us), with the tripling of the sale of our newspaper during the campaign (which may be reduced to double after the electoral campaign), we can say, whichever votes we get (between 50,000 and 100,000), we have achieved *colossal success since the party has at least doubled its sphere of influence thanks to the electoral campaign.*

## 2. Let's run a revolutionary socialist campaign

It is necessary that we specify again, but now in a more concrete way, why we participate in the elections. The goal is obvious: to strengthen the Party. We do not participate to obtain massive votes, or to manoeuvre between different bourgeois candidates that “give us prestige in the face of public opinion”, or to “play a good role”. We are the only revolutionary sector that stands in the elections and logically we will have everything against us: radio, television, the bourgeois press and the opposition of all bourgeois parties. This series of negative factors could be opposed — to a certain extent but not to win the elections — by the mobilisation and massive support of the workers’ movement. This is not the case; the working class will not follow us for these elections, not even to a lesser degree. In other words, no important sector of the workers will support us.

The electoral mechanics are beginning to turn completely against us. The lack of a workers’ rise combines with the fact the crisis of Peronism is beginning to bring to light all kinds of electoral organisations and variants that create a series of barriers between the different working-class and popular currents that lean towards socialism and us. Of these barriers, the most dangerous and the one we will have to fight the most will be the centre-left formula, supported by Stalinism: Alende-Sueldo.<sup>1</sup> But on a provincial scale, possibly in Tucuman and other provinces, we will find neo-Peronist workerist and populist variants, with which we will have to deal. All of this causes total confusion in the workers’ electorate that no matter how much effort we make, we will be unable to completely overcome. Our forecast of an election in which we will get around 100,000 votes is presented today as the most likely variant. Let us recall that the PSA [Argentine Socialist Party] when it was united, with a great electoral experience and with Palacios’ heritage intact, got fewer than 180,000 votes throughout the country. In just over seven years, we do not believe we can overcome that moment of electoral splendour of the old PSA. This perspective regarding the number of votes will not prevent our campaign from being a total success if we face it as revolutionary socialists. A hypothetical example will demonstrate this statement.

Let’s suppose that the Alende-Sueldo ticket, with the support of the Communist Party and now Matora, gets 1,500,000 votes and we get 130,000. This will possibly mean that Alende and Sueldo will have contributed between 600 and 700 thousand votes, Matora about 500 thousand and the Communist Party between 300 and 400 thousand votes. In this case, the relationship between the

<sup>1</sup> **Alende-Sueldo**: Presidential ticket of the Popular Revolutionary Alliance, a centre-left front formed by the Intransigent Party, the Christian Revolutionary Party, and the Communist Party. **Oscar Alende** (1909–1996), a doctor and politician of the Intransigent Party, of which he was founder, was the candidate for president and for vice-president **Horacio Jorge Sueldo** (1923–2016), a lawyer, journalist and politician, a founding member of the Christian Democratic Party, who was a national deputy between 1973 and 1976.

Communist Party and us will be one vote of ours for every three or four of the Communist Party. If we take into account the financial apparatus, in professionals and publications of the CP, added to the fact it is a party with a long tradition that has a large periphery structured in dozens of years, which means that many professionals, men and women of the middle class and old workers vote for it by tradition, we will have to lower the relationship between the CP and us regarding the new generation of workers and students. There the relationship will be equal: one for them, one for us. At best it will be slightly favourable to them. This means we will have already begun to replace the CP as the strongest party on the Argentine left.

But the substantive analysis of the elections cannot end there. Because of its form and politics, the CP has ceased to be a fighting, revolutionary, combat party. Its structure, its membership, is directly social-democratic. Any of the comrades who have belonged to the CP in recent years confirm that the party members do not pay their contributions or the newspapers they sell, that there is no discipline and that it is more like a development society than a party of struggle, centralised and disciplined. The 100 thousand votes the CP may get in the working-class and student youth will be for that policy and that almost neighbourhood organisation.

Our party is directly the opposite: we are a Revolutionary Party because of our program and because of our organisation, made up of militants, highly centralist-democratic and disciplined. The 70 thousand or 100 thousand votes that we may get in the working and student youth will be for our program and our party. In other words, those votes will fortify the revolutionary Party, just as the votes for Alende-Sueldo will reinforce the opportunist political-organisational tendencies of the Communist Party.

### How to prepare the electoral campaign?

The electoral campaign is such a diversified activity; so many things can be done at the same time, that there is a very great danger: we get drunk with these activities and we do them without rhyme or reason, any which way, without any order, as they appear. Hence, we need to strictly plan this campaign. For this, we need to take into account, very carefully, the following needs:

**First:** *We must make a census of the working-class neighbourhoods and factories in the areas or districts in which we are going to work, as well as the stations through which blue-collar and white-collar workers in general circulate; with a very important addition: city centres are a fundamental workplace since public servants, commercial and banking employees are concentrated there, i.e., white-collar workers, who we try to win for our program. We then have three clearly delimited workplaces: city centres to hit specifically on public servants, commercial and banking employees (including office workers); working-class neighbourhoods and factories. A special case, for being the summer season, is Mar del Plata and other holiday spots. There, we need to census and study the working-class and middle-class hotels.*

To do the census, we have to get a map of the area that we can buy if sold or ask for it at the Municipality. We have to manage to get this map. Once we get it, we have to expand it to be able to clearly mark the different neighbourhoods and existing factories. This element and the electoral roll of the respective zones are the two most important tools with which we will face the electoral campaign.

Along with this, we have to specify, as far as possible, the characteristics of the neighbourhoods and factories. Regarding the neighbourhoods, we will have to know if their character is essentially working-class, lumpen or petty-bourgeois; if it is working-class, of what sector and nationality. Quickly, in the first days of the campaign, we have to attempt to check which neighbourhood or factory is the most prone to our arguments to avoid going to all of them and then have the possibility of concentrating on the places offering us the greatest possibilities. We will have to specify in the centre of the city or each neighbourhood, the following elements: Do we have candidates? Militants? Sympathisers? Contacts? Are they known and respected? Is it possible to form a youth, female or adult committee to support the workers’ front? Are there friends or relatives of candidates, activists,

supporters or contacts? Is there a development society? Who does it respond to? Is it active? Is it prestigious? Are there clubs? If there are, we will have to ask ourselves the same questions as about the development societies. Can we get a sector of the club or the development society, or these as a whole, to turn in favour of our campaign?

Concerning the factories, we have to ask ourselves similar questions: How many workers does it have? What type of worker: combative, well or badly paid? Does the bureaucracy have weight or not? Does it have activists? What is the proportion of men and women? Adults and youth? Do we have candidates? Militants? Sympathisers? Contacts? Relatives of these? Is it possible to create a youth or adult support committee? Is there a tendency or a current of union opposition? Are there union activists?

We should not be alarmed if, in taking this census, we discover we know very little. The mistake would be to start the campaign without making the map and the census, without answering these questions to the best of our knowledge. The campaign will allow us to correct the wrong reports and fill the huge gaps we have at the beginning. The important thing is that the day we start the campaign we have done the provisional census. From that day on, the party leadership will go down to all the zones and the first thing they will ask to begin discussing the campaign will be to be shown the map and the census.

Those zones deemed capable of doing so should work on the map with small flags of different colours to indicate the neighbourhoods, factories and their different characteristics.

**Second:** *We need to adapt the electoral program to each zone, neighbourhood or factory.* This is as important as the census and much of the success or failure of the electoral campaign will depend on how we can adapt our program to the needs of each sector. Let's look at some examples.

Our fundamental slogans for the electoral campaign revolve around a class proposition: *Let's not vote bosses, doctors, bureaucrats; let's vote workers' and socialist candidates.* These slogans must be embodied, specified, so they are understood. If there are comrades of ours who are members of a factory, of a union, of a neighbourhood, we can already embody the campaign perfectly well because we can insist that voting for us is voting for this or these very dear and respected comrades as opposed to the candidates of Peronism or the centre-left alliance who are the opposite. We must establish this difference clearly but taking great care not to fall into personal insult. This is a way of specifying the most important aspect of our program: the workers' and socialist character of our candidates.

This most concrete and personal development of our campaign will be the secret of many successes. There is an example that proves it: in 1952, we decided to confront the bureaucracy in the textile union and the Argentine Alpargatas Factory. This bureaucracy was one of the most hated and dangerous in the entire workers' movement. We discovered that a fundamental part of the workforce was immigrant, Italian. We realised that this sector was not taken into account in their program by the bureaucracy. We raised the slogan to take into account their right to transfer part of their wage to their relatives based on a stable currency. We were not satisfied with it and we launched a flyer in Italian explaining our position. The miracle happened: the bureaucracy was defeated in the Argentine Alpargatas Factory, and thanks to that in the union, by 3,000 votes; the unanimous vote of the Italian comrades being a fundamental part of this victory. This story can be repeated in hundreds of cases. We must be vigilant to detect what need can be answered with our slogan or with our important support if there is any mobilisation. Both at the level of each municipality and each neighbourhood, there are very heartfelt problems to which we must give a transitional response to educate the working class in the defence of their interests. The same at the level of each factory. Detecting these problems, responding with a flyer and working on it, must be a permanent attitude of our teams and leaders, either of the zone, union or neighbourhood. It can be an educational or health problem in a working-class neighbourhood, where we will raise the demand for a free school or dispensary. It may be a security problem, in which case we can propose that neighbourhood commissions democratically guarantee the security of all in the face of the robberies that take place

daily, authorising these commissions to be the only armed authority in the area and demanding that they be provided with the money spent on official security officers.

Just like this slogan, we can propose many others that are a concrete application to the neighbourhood or the factory of our program in general. But we must not lose sight of the fact that the axis of our campaign and what we have to specify is the class approach: *Do not vote enemies of the working class, vote workers, vote for our class.* Everything else aims to demonstrate the need for this class vote; for example, the need for a dispensary or a neighbourhood school must be raised by pointing out that the other candidates can't fight thoroughly for this or other transitional slogans for their class character, as opposed to our candidates who — by their position in society — have no other perspective than to defend the working class.

**Third: Means.** An electoral campaign cannot be carried out with the hands. We need to know what means are available. One of the most important means is the car. We need to make a careful census of the possibilities of getting vehicles available in each zone and of the time they can be used. Along with cars, we must study the problem of amplifiers for premises and vehicles. Ideally, all available cars should have amplifier equipment. This must be studied and contemplated immediately, summoning technical comrades to see how much it costs us for around 20 or 30 amplifiers or the modification of those existing in many of our premises.

The premises themselves are a very powerful medium. Our premises must be very neat and arranged to impress well the comrade workers and of the left who attend there. The whole place must revolve around the electoral campaign. Ornamentation must be carefully studied. If it is not adequate or with the most impact, it will not be serious, the very serious will be if the premises are untidy or directly dirty because in this case, the impression of the comrades will be deplorable.

Each premise must have a team to print flyers immediately. In the same way, we have to learn the technique of making posters by hand as part of that team. We must be able to make very good posters by hand in a standardized way, which will allow us at any time to make very cheaply, one hundred or more posters to block a factory or comb a neighbourhood.

As soon as we read this document, we have to go out and discover the few walls that are left free to paint large signs. We must use the fronts of the houses of fellow militants or supporters, committing ourselves to repaint them after the elections. We must try to rent some strategic frontage, if they are cheap and we can, to do propaganda. The same as we say about painting signs is true for banners painted on fabric. There are comrades of ours like those at the Ramos Mejia headquarters who can paint spectacular banners so that they can be seen by hundreds of thousands of people, depending on where we place them.

**Fourth: Finance.** We must develop a financial plan that allows us to pay for our electoral campaign. At the level of each zone and the level of the entire party, we must develop a minimum financial program that takes into account: 1st the loudspeaker equipment, 2nd the cars, 3rd the flyers to be published, 4th the posters, 5th the possible professionals and 6th the rallies. This plan should be made based on a financial campaign that pays for it. Along with this, a plan must be given to increase the sale of the newspaper by at least threefold. We should study the possibility of selling subscriptions to the newspaper for three months for a value of AR\$ 1000. As part of this plan, we will have to develop an overall and for each area financial program. It is essential and decisive to establish the premise that in every rally, meeting or interview that has to do with the electoral problem, we give ourselves the line of raising money, previously explaining the reason for our requests. Our campaign, contrary to the bourgeois parties, will be paid for by the workers, the militants and supporters of the party. We must be thorough in explaining the need for such help. We will have to appeal to the supporters or activists of a good economic situation to set up a commission of national finances and others for the zones, to try to make them the ones that address the financial problem.

The slogan is to transform finances into an essential element of the electoral campaign, at the same time that it will be an objective measure of our real progress in this activity. We insist: the financial campaign must pay for the electoral campaign. It occurs to us that on a national scale we should take out bonds of \$ 500, \$ 1000 and \$ 10,000 to be sold at all rallies and meetings.

## The organisation of the zone and the party

The way the party organises is a very delicate problem. If the electoral work goes very well, this will very possibly mean that an organisational set up of the party will emerge from it that is appropriate to the achievements achieved during the campaign. Specifically, that many new party teams and members emerge. The problem to be determined is whether we are in a period of political-organisational transition towards a spectacular leap for the party or whether, simply, the elections will allow us to greatly increase our influence but not to the degree in which there is a change in the physiognomy of the party. This overall forecast is decisive, fundamental, to make the necessary organisational adaptation. If, for example, we will not achieve a fundamental change for the party with our electoral participation, it is best to leave the current party structure intact, only expanding its activity. If, on the other hand, there is a chance of a total change, which begins with the campaign, it is convenient to start outlining this possible change, without altering the current structure too much, just allowing the new structure to emerge from the old one.

Without venturing too much and taking into account that the campaign has not yet begun, we have the impression it will mean a complete leap in the activity, penetration, influence, social composition and party structure. The decisive facts will be the substantive penetration of the workers' movement and the working-class neighbourhoods as well as a doubling of the militancy. The campaign for legality has allowed us to transform ourselves into a truly national party — with important gaps but national. This was a very important leap. Now the prospect of *transforming ourselves into a proletarian party for its social composition* opens up to us. It is a question of penetrating the workers' movement and its neighbourhoods from the urban centres already won by the party. Another aspect: thanks to legality we have been able to make footing, and in some places with a big footprint — may we say so — as in San Nicolas, Viedma or Comodoro Rivadavia. Now it is a question of using the electoral campaign to make the party penetrate deeply into the factories and working-class sectors of the different towns and neighbourhoods. Or rather, *of all the working-class populations of the country*. Each zone leadership has to have this obsession: how we penetrate all the sectors of workers and the left existing in their zone. We have two precious months to get there.

For this, it is necessary to impose hard work, intensive on the part of rank and file militants and extensive on the part of special teams. For intensive work, it is convenient to select small party teams that must be given all the possibilities and margin of initiative they want. To do this, the main thing is we put at least one comrade who has the conditions of a middle cadre in each of these teams. These teams can be two or three comrades as long as they are guaranteed the leadership of a middle cadre. The leadership has to guarantee the team has a workplace with possibilities and well defined, concrete, be it a neighbourhood, factory or union, because otherwise there is a risk of frustrating this experience. These small teams must be given goals for when the campaign ends and during the campaign: number of newspapers to sell, picket members, rallies and visits to be made. The national, zonal or local leaderships must get used to keeping statistics: how many comrades are contacted, of how many we have the address, to keep files with the characteristics of each one, who was visited in the neighbourhood and who we have met family, friends, etc. The same at the level of factories and unions. The leadership should be concerned with teaching how to keep these statistics, mainly to keep the addresses and general characteristics of each of these contacts. But more important than this fundamental aspect is to teach these small teams to work: how they should chat with workers, with young people and how they should learn to detect what they can do. We are inclined that together with this experimental training of small teams, we begin to base ourselves in local premises more than in the current zones, leading the professionals of each zone to become professionals of local premises who we consider can do a very good job that allows them to gain experience in the workers' movement. This work should be an example for the rest of the zone, without forgetting the possibility that perhaps by going to local premises that are weak for lack of zone leadership, it can carry out this model campaign and perhaps the strongest premises of the zone will not weaken.

These two organisational measures: small teams and concentrating professionals in the local premises have the same goal: to test new leaders in the campaign, tending to transform the small

teams into solid teams at the end of the electoral process and each premises in a zone with its professionalised leadership. It would be the most colossal achievement of the electoral campaign.

These goals have to be accompanied by several revolutions in personal and party life habits. First and foremost, we will have to see whether there are possibilities to professionalise the best comrades during the last month of the campaign, mainly the working-class comrades who have stood out in the first month. Without falling into workerism, we must begin to tend towards the professionalisation of great worker activists. We will have to take care they do not lose their jobs because not all those working-class comrades will serve, after the electoral campaign — because of their political level — as party professionals. But the trend must be that. This professionalisation must be achieved with the finances of the zone itself. It will be an index of the possibilities and the maturity of this achievement. Asking the party leadership to do so would be a serious mistake except for exceptional reasons.

The other aspect is that the elections must begin the placement of many comrades who come from the student movement in the workers' movement. This must be achieved in two stages: attempting for the teams which have started a good job in a working-class neighbourhood go to live there as much as possible, taking care of the forms so they do not look like Martians, and — when the elections are over — entering the factories, mainly in those places where some work has been started or in the unions where there is already a work with possibilities.

Concerning the national leadership, we believe that a division of tasks is imposed that will allow the current professionals, who must turn to grassroots work, to be replaced at the zone level. We consider the secretariat should contemplate the attention of the following electoral and party zones: *1st Patagonia*, based in Bahía Blanca, which takes care of the sixth electoral section of the province of Buenos Aires, La Pampa, Rio Negro, Neuquen and Chubut; *2nd Centre of Buenos Aires Province*, based in Mar del Plata; *3rd West and North of Buenos Aires Province* with seat in San Nicolas; *4th Greater Buenos Aires South* with seat in Avellaneda or La Plata; *5th Greater Buenos Aires West* with seat in Ramos Mejia; *6th Greater Buenos Aires North* with seat in San Martín; *7th Buenos Aires CBD* with seat in Callao [Street headquarters]; *8th Buenos Aires South* with seat in Dean Funes [Street headquarters]; *9th Buenos Aires West and North* with seat in Donato [Alvarez Street headquarters]; *10th Littoral*<sup>2</sup> with seat in Rosario; *11th Northeast* based in Misiones; *12th Centre* with seat in Córdoba, which takes care of San Luis, Mendoza and San Juan; and *13th Northwest* with seat in Tucuman.

This division of tasks on the part of the party leadership is for the same reason as the subdivision to be carried out in the zones: the need to intensify the work to guarantee the strengthening of the party avoiding that it be not achieved because of the lack of experience of middle leadership comrades who are just being formed. After the campaign, the leadership will be re-centralised with specific tasks and during this process, a central team will be kept for the central tasks, especially for the electoral activity.

## Let's learn to dialogue and work with our class

We will have two unique months that may not be repeated, or that if they do, it will be very occasionally. We must use them thoroughly and for it, we must definitely learn the art and science of dialogue and doing activities in common with the workers.

To achieve this, we also need to know how to apply a transitional program. We say this because many comrades believe that to win a fellow worker only one element is needed: propaganda, that by showing him we are right we win him. For this, we give them courses and more courses, or talks and more talks and we explain all our positions to them. *This is indispensable but by itself not enough, rather it is totally insufficient*. If propaganda is not combined and spun around a common activity, we will never really win over this worker. Many comrades accept this but apply it horribly wrong: to win a comrade they use propaganda and only when they have won him they propose an activity. They

<sup>2</sup> The Argentine **littoral** is a region formed by the provinces bordering the Parana River: Misiones, Formosa, Chaco, Corrientes, Entre Rios, and Santa Fe.

have a transitional program for propaganda: they discuss and teach it based on what most concerns the comrade but for the activity, they have a maximum program: only once they have recruited him, they propose a common activity, the same one as we carry out ourselves. The transitional program must have two faces, activity in common from the moment we shake hands with an acquaintance, and propaganda. Only this way it is a complete program.

There is also the opposite mistake: we become so enthusiastic about the common activity with some comrades or groups that we renounce propaganda, to fight for the general and particular positions of the party.

What is needed is a close combination of the two aspects. Given that we live in a unique stage of two months, the most serious danger is propaganda, that is, to settle for propaganda and not common activities. With the elections, we will contact hundreds and hundreds of comrades and in our relationship with them, we must emphasise finding common activities.

This is very easy to say but much more difficult to do. It is very common for many mainly young comrades to pass through our premises, which is going to increase during the electoral period. The art of our militants and especially of our leaderships is to study each comrade or group of comrades who approach us or we meet to see what they can do. Out of every ten comrades who approach us, eight or nine can do *something*, most of the time very little, but *something* in favour of our campaign. We have to discover that *something*, the art is there and get them to do it. It is not about doing *everything* the militants do or our scheme of what a supporter can do, but *something*, just *something*.

We know this has not yet been fully experienced because the electoral campaign has not started and because our leaders have been very busy getting the candidates. But now the time has come when all the time spent on these tasks reverts in the sense of what we are saying.

The possibilities are endless for everyone who approaches us or is already close, such as young people who have already visited us or candidates who have agreed to form our slates, to start doing *something*.

To achieve this *something*, our militants and leaderships have to start by studying the group or comrade in question. What is it? A group or a former Stalinist militant used to work in development societies? A worker who comes from the ultra-left? A proletarianised student? A young man who has just approached the left movement? A proletarian housewife? An intellectualised or grassroots worker? A candidate who accepted by compromise? A candidate with electoralist tendencies? A small Peronist or independent neighbourhood chief with leadership aspirations or, on the contrary, he is completely honest that he wants to promote the revolution? And finally, the main thing: is he a union activist from his factory or his union? Is it a group of young people from the neighbourhood or factory full of concerns although without any union or factory experience?

The electoral campaign allows us precisely to be able to give *something* to do for all of them.

## Let's take care of the language and learn to listen

Party comrades are used to living in a narrow circle: party members, supporters and friends. When contact is made with new comrades, they quickly assimilate into the party's customs or language. Every human group of any extraction whatsoever usually has its own language, its jargon. Some examples will demonstrate what we say: in popular language, "crème caramel" is a dessert, in our language, it is a weak person, sometimes a centrist; In common language, the person who does not work is called lazy, in our language, she is lumpen. For the people, a person who works but who has fun on a public holiday is a person who rests or "chills out", in our jargon this person "is lumpening". In common language, going to distribute flyers to a factory is "going to distribute flyers", for us it is "blocking it"; For a worker who is having problems with his girlfriend or boyfriend and as a consequence is listless, melancholic "she is sad because she fought with her boyfriend", for us "she is in crisis" and if the one who says it went through the Philosophy and Letters Faculty,

she is "in crisis with her partner". Thus, we could continue to make a true dictionary of the left and our party. This language, typical of each left-wing party, acquires such magnitude that one of the most important bureaucrats of the Peronist era, Puricelli, a metalworker from Avellaneda, used to give total freedom to every newly elected delegates committee for several months, provided their meetings were held in the union in his presence. For years we did not understand the reason for this exaggerated freedom, without any participation on his part, only with his presence, until we caught on: he always took a roll call of those present and kept it. When a delegate said "he's a progressive comrade", Puricelli asked him "what's your name?" And he made a mark on the roll. Another said "proletariat" and Puricelli asked him "what's your name?" And made another mark on the roll. Later we learned the meaning of the marks: he classified the delegates politically, by their words. He marked the one who had said "progressive" as "red bug" (the insulting expression of the bureaucracy towards the comrades of the Communist Party), the one who said "proletariat", he detected as a militant of *Voz Proletaria*, the one who insisted that "in front of the boss we had to unite", he detected him as our comrade, and so on.

Now we are going to work on sectors that are totally foreign to the party and therefore, any unusual word or expression goes against our attempt to establish contact with those sectors. We must make every effort not to appear strange in any way, mainly in our language.

This question of language, of words, hides a much more important question: that of learning to link with our class, of getting used to establishing a close link with all its sectors. Many comrades want the workers or students who join us to learn from the great historical experiences, they confuse how a student or an exceptional element of the workers' vanguard learns — which is through books and long historical or theoretical discussions — with learning generally of the class and the vanguard. The workers do not learn through books, nor from our experience, but *through their own experience, their life and their activity*. The comrades forget that the entire history of the class struggle of the country and the world is concentrated in the concrete life of each activist or rank and file worker. Every worker suffers exploitation, alienation; every activist lives the class struggle that every worker suffers; every proletarian housewife endures double exploitation. This is why we need to know how to listen, to get the fellow worker or the groups of workers that we contact to speak. By listening and getting the comrades to speak we will learn their language and behind the language, we will get to know their life, their experience, and their struggles. We want the comrade to get the fundamental teachings from his life and his experiences and for this, we need to know these.

Listening, we will find the old Peronist worker who received a house or had summer holidays for the first time in Mar del Plata under the Peron government. He is going to tell us "How great he was, we owe him everything". If we have not listened to this worker and we limit ourselves to saying that "Peron is a typical representative of bourgeois populism who no longer has the possibility of giving concessions to the workers' movement because the situation of the Argentine and Latin American bourgeoisie is one of crisis", that previously there were "fat cows" and that is why the workers received "concessions", they will not understand us even if we talk for a century.

Everything will change if, listening patiently to that grassroots worker, we understand his reasons, which are not exactly the same as ours, but no less strong for that. The only thing he knows, what he has lived through is that under Peronism his standard of living improved colossally. If we accept this truth: that under Peronism his standard of living improved substantially, if we emphasise his gains and systematically, while we develop the conversation, we keep telling him we have only one difference with him: we do not believe Peron gave him those gains but they were won by the struggle of millions and millions of comrades like him who risked their lives on 17 October and many other occasions. That we want them to continue this united struggle of the working class that achieved wonders under Peronism, which has begun to achieve wonders since the Cordobazo. Based on that agreement on the facts and that we will take care of emphasising: that under Peronism he lived his best time as a worker, we will develop the dialogue that will inevitably leave a positive balance. Mainly, that we are not gorillas,<sup>3</sup> nor contras, rather we are more to the left than Peronism

<sup>3</sup> **Gorilla** is a term from Argentina's domestic politics, historically used to refer in a derogatory or pejorative way to those who gave a coup against Peron. Over the years, the term has been extended to a greater or lesser extent to other

but we recognise the achievements of the stage. If we say this in a language he understands, we will be surprised by the results.

It is a matter of the workers learning essentially from their experiences and for this, we must listen to them carefully to learn from those experiences. It is about beginning to elevate each worker or sector of our class so that, influenced and led by our party, they are the ones who make history by convincing them there is no greater power than the united and mobilised working class. To convince them of this there is no other way than to convince them with examples from the history of our class and the history of each sector or individual. We try to ensure they gain confidence in their strength and not have it in the parties and institutions of the bourgeoisie, for this we must ensure they develop from what they are and from how they speak.

### The proletarian housewife

Let us look at some examples. Let's start with the proletarian housewife who agrees with us on some point.

Previously, we should have earned her sympathy for having listened to her problems and issues and for having adapted to her language and concerns. We have to propose she write a letter to her friends in the neighbourhood advising them to vote for our slates. If this is too much because she does not dare, we should propose she held an informal meeting among her friends in the neighbourhood, the same as she usually does but organised in this case so no one is missing and one of our female comrades comes to explain to two, three, four or five proletarian housewives, our program with our goals. If the meeting can be a little larger, we will commit that our female candidates will attend those meetings, starting with Nora, if she is available. If we see this works, we will launch the slogan of meetings in the working-class neighbourhoods, organised by these housewives, so that our female candidates can make contact and explain our program, especially the part that has to do with women. The goal is minimum, not maximum: a meeting of at least two women in a workers' house in a working-class neighbourhood. The key must be for the comrade we have contacted to do *something* for that meeting. The maximum is that she is the maximum organiser, but it is enough that she represents us and allows us to invite to the meeting on her behalf so that she is already doing *something*. While we propose this to the proletarian housewife, we must be watching very carefully her children, mainly her daughters, to see if they accompany us in this proposal in favour of women.

But suppose that because of shyness the housewife does not dare to do anything we say (surely it will be for the incapacity of our comrades, but let's leave things like this), nothing prevents us from inviting her to come one day a week to our premises, with the prior authorisation of her partner (it would be a criminal mistake, for example, to try to overcome the paternalistic and macho structure of many proletarian marriages in one fell swoop), to do *something* there. The alienation of daily life in the proletarian neighbourhood, the joy of going to the "centre" of the city where she lives as a way to get out of that alienation and monotony, can help us if we are cautious enough to know how to attend to it with all fraternity and prepare some useful work for her that she can do very well for the campaign. For example, embroidering a banner or painting a poster or any other task appropriate to her knowledge that makes her feel very useful and incorporated into the campaign.

### The grassroots worker

Let us now go to the grassroots worker, who we may have met in the factory blockade or in combing a neighbourhood. Here too, we will have to start from what the worker is. An example will clarify the case. The author of this work had the opportunity in one of his visits to the interior of the country, to arrive in a small city whose only factory was a wool laundry. Our comrades were linked to some workers in the construction of that factory and inhabitants of the city through artistic activity. When the author went, they arranged a meeting with several workers from the factory because it was bankrupt and about to close. Only one worker came, out of friendship with his workmates. Our comrades, clearly understanding the role of the bureaucracy, were attacking the union leadership

---

countries in Latin America as synonymous with "reactionary right".

very hard for not doing anything substantial in favour of the workers. When their friend — rather than a comrade — arrived, they began to criticise the bureaucracy harshly. The author managed to get the fellow worker to speak. After a long chat, where he did not venture an opinion and only made questions, he came to the following conclusion: the worker was from the more conservative, pro-bosses sector of the factory, but at that moment hard hit by the prospect of closure, he was beginning to radicalise very slowly. So far, his criticisms of the bureaucracy were from the right. With a true class instinct, he considered the fundamental thing was not to criticise the bureaucracy but to win the conflict. The party proposals opened a fruitful dialogue and relationship with that worker: "Tell your leaders that our party is unconditionally at the service of the textile union, of your current struggle for your sources of work, and that we are willing to discuss with them how we organise all the unions, workers and the people of the city in your favour. We want to see the Secretary-General to coordinate this common action. Let's put the past criticism behind us and face the factory closure together."

We tell this anecdote because in the face of the grassroots worker we should not enter into violent criticism of anyone but rather listen very patiently to the reason for their contact with us to develop it from there. It can be liking for us or some candidate and nothing more. Human liking, not political. It can be mistrust or hatred of the bosses' candidates, the doctors and nothing else. It may be a slight political liking. We will have to define what motivates him to link to us, as it can also be only curiosity and that will be the most difficult case. After all, it can be combined with the fact that this curiosity happens because it was female comrades who looked like students who linked him and, in this case, curiosity would not be so much political and human in general but of a more concrete nature. As good Marxist politicians, we will have to start from the characterisation to give us a policy for him. The goal, as in the case of the housewife, will be to see what are the possibilities of holding meetings at the level of his house, club or development society in the neighbourhood or bar (if he is a factory workmate) to organise a talk, to which male comrades should go and not just female comrades, having the central axis of the talk carried by a working-class comrade, if possible from the same union. We must see if we can enter his house to contact his family, wife, sons and daughters, brothers, etc., to do the same.

*For the author of this document, this is the most fascinating experience for any revolutionary socialist militant worth their salt: learning to talk with proletarian housewives and grassroots workers and getting them to do something because we come to understand and guide them.*

### The party's candidate

Regarding the candidate with electoral aspirations, we are faced with a problem similar to the previous ones. We must start from what he wants — to be elected — to encourage the formation of a committee to support him as a candidate. If the party has taken him as a candidate, it may be because, regardless of his electoral aspirations, he has some strength in his neighbourhood or factory. From these two facts, we should fully promote the grassroots organisation in his favour. It is very difficult for him not to help us if we try to form a committee directly on his behalf. This committee will take advantage of the campaign to make propaganda in favour of the party's program and will try to make contact and organise all the young people who support it or who support us in that factory or neighbourhood. Logically, to make this committee work we will have to put aside all psychological aspects of the candidate, whether he is very egotistical or not, selfish or not, to concentrate on the organisation of the grassroots committee. Time will work in favour of our party and its program and not of the candidate's egotism. The slightest subjective comment against the candidate, if it has negative psychological aspects, will go against us, not him, since it can undermine the cohesion of the group or committee we have organised.

We have taken all these examples without taking into account the programmatic aspects of the problems. With what slogans do we approach the housewife or the grassroots worker? We take for granted these slogans have already been developed by the party and specified by each zone.

## The union activist

This is the sector that interests us the most — along with the young worker or student. With the union activist, we have to get straight to the point: his daily struggle with the bosses and, in many cases, with the bureaucracy. Along with this, we must ask him what he thinks of the labour agreements and their discussion, as well as the situation of his factory.

Here we should also know how to listen to the history of their struggles. The obligatory question will be to ask him whether he believes that the fight against the boss of his factory or his union should be extended to a national scale and elevate it from the union level to the political level. If he is a union fighter with a clear anti-bureaucratic conscience, there is a much more concrete question: will you fight against the bosses' candidates of the bureaucracy?

If the union activist has unionist tendencies, the discussion will be arduous and difficult. He will tell us that he is not interested in politics; that politics, in general, is for the bosses since the workers have nothing to do with it because everything the workers achieve they will achieve it through union activity. We must then point out how political activity, although it entails certain risks for the workers' movement, in general, is the only way that workers can definitively free themselves from exploitation. The problem is whether or not we are against exploitation. If we are for the elimination of exploitation, we cannot limit ourselves only to union activity, since this is always a palliative and ultimately does not fix anything, as sooner or later everything we gain with the union struggle is lost on the political level for not having the government.

It is possible that underneath the unionist approach there is a deep distrust towards the possibilities of the workers' movement, that the unionist ends up telling us "what you say is very nice, but the workers will never be able to reach the government because they don't have the knowledge." We must point out this is a lie, this is exactly what the bosses say when working conditions and wages are discussed, claiming the workers do not understand the problems of the company. We believe there are many things the worker does not know deeply but the same happens with the majority of the bosses who do not know anything about politics, or business administration. Many times they do not even know their companies, as it happens with the capitalists of the big international monopolies or with the big oligarchs. We must give concrete examples of the bourgeoisie who have their companies run by technicians and managers. The same thing the bosses do, we can do much better ourselves, both for politics and for the administration of the companies: to put the best men but controlled by the workers who know the problems very well because that is why they work in the country and the companies. Class politics means just that: insisting the workers, and especially the union activists, lose their complex in the face of the political and economic problem and postulate themselves as the only political, union and economic leaders who can save the country and the workers, as long as they organise themselves in a revolutionary party. If they don't, no one will.

If the union activist has ultra-left influences, because of the influence in the factory of some students who entered as workers, the discussion will be much more difficult because instead of not having confidence — like the honest unionist who experiences the tremendous power of the bourgeoisie — he will tell us just the opposite: he has so much confidence in his organisation, his ideas and the current revolutionary consciousness of the workers that he considers it ridiculous to participate in elections. All the workers, according to them, have already understood that a revolution must be carried out, why waste time in using the elections to combat the electoral deception of the bourgeoisie. Logically, there is no important working-class sector that will not vote for the bourgeois tickets on election day, but the ultra-left is not interested in that: their dreams are important, the balloon that they inflate every day in the sect to which they belong, "neither coup nor election, revolution", "class-struggle front for the elections", etc. It is very difficult to convince these honest and sacrificed comrades. To do this, you have to rely on your own class experience and what the classics of Marxism have said about it. If they are so busy blowing up the balloon that they refuse to hear and see we had better not waste time: the reality of our campaign is more important than trying to convince these inveterate sectarians, who believe and will continue to believe, in many cases, that the only existing reality is what they imagine.

## The young worker or student

When making contact with young people, we must begin by telling them our youth comrades want to see them. Sometimes not even that: we directly register them and notify our youth comrades. The young person doesn't need to agree on something with us. By the mere fact that they are young who can listen to us, they are a possibility for our positions and our program.

The youth comrades will be in charge of developing an entire program and a way of approaching and contacting young people. Therefore, we will only limit ourselves to giving some general indications.

First of all, the young person must feel, that for us, all present and future times are superior to the past in terms of the youth. More specifically, we believe in this youth because we believe in the revolution and it is precisely the youth who will make the revolution. But we must not fall into any generational approach other than this, since the revolution will be made by young people based on the Marxist heritage and the country's class struggle. Just as there is continuity in the class struggle, there is also continuity in the generations.

The other aspect that we have to touch on — if the young person is a worker — is their specific problems as a worker: low pay and work equal to that of adults; the lack of opportunity for him to study, and the social injustice this means. To young people in general, we must point out how our party is the only one that has confidence in youth and how, for this very reason, it takes young workers as candidates for president and vice-president and in all the main positions. This is what our adult party should say to the youth; the rest will be a matter to be elaborated and applied by the undefeated youth.

## The electoral campaign

This will be developed during the discussion of the labour agreements by the bureaucracy. Given the colossal increase in the cost of living, that affects the entire working class as the number one problem, much more than the problem of the elections, the axis of our electoral campaign is to combine it with the concrete struggle and expectations of the working class regarding the labour agreements.

Given our condition as a non-electoralist party, which tries to educate the working class on the true path to its liberation, it is essential that all the party teams, the zone leaderships and the party as a whole, overcome the drunkenness caused by the effort of so many months to achieve legality, to return to a great extent to do the same thing we have always done: to pose ourselves as a real alternative in the concrete struggles of the working class. *This means we have to rethink and do what we have done all our lives in the face of the discussion of the labour agreements, the economic problems of the working class in general and in particular in every union or establishment, as in the face of all workers' disputes.* From reading this document, we must immediately adopt a line and a concrete program, as we have always done in the face of the discussion of the labour agreements in each factory and union on which we work. We will have to denounce very strongly, without falling into personal insults, the lack of democracy to discuss the specifications of the agreements, we must demand an increase and minimum wage according to the perspectives and concerns of the union in question and we will have to demand that nothing be signed without consulting the ranks in an assembly or through a referendum. We insist again: we have to go back to doing what we have always done, not falling into electoral drunkenness.

## The axis of our activity during the fight for the labour agreements

The electoral campaign must allow us to do this activity even stronger, not weaker. The main point of our electoral campaign must be precisely this: the electoral campaign serves to produce generalised drunkenness that allows the bosses to divert the workers from an immediate, urgent, peremptory struggle: the struggle for their survival, the fight for a salary that will allow the workers

to overcome the current hunger and misery. The union leaders are playing the game of the bosses. *The national slogan of the party at this time must be: Let's prevent the elections from diverting the working class from the fight for good labour agreements and a substantial increase in salaries.* Let us apply this line and make propaganda for it immediately, everywhere. We must publish one or two weekly flyers in each union or workplace, exclusively touching on this subject of the labour agreements to give our concrete position on the subject.

Its link with the electoral problem will come through various means. *First* will be that these flyers will always be signed by the party faction of that union or company. In other cases, they will be signed directly by the party's candidates in the sector. *Second:* the faction that signs these concrete proposals, will give in other flyers our full political position and its link with the problem of the labour agreements: if these are signed in terrible conditions, we will point out this happens because of the bureaucratic nature of the leadership, without insulting them, and that the same thing is happening in the political field, in which those leaderships have a suicidal line for the workers' movement. *Third:* in the signed flyers, specific to the agreements, we will have to refer to our political position in passing. *Fourth:* we will permanently have to address the leadership of the unions with a respectful position as a united front concerning the discussion of the labour agreements (we must not give the impression we are demagogues who take this position to win votes but, on the contrary, we want a good labour agreement and we are the best fighters to achieve it), proposing a union-political agreement, for example notifying them that we support such a specific agreement (the one of the bureaucracy or the one we draw up) and that if we are successful we will impose it by law, asking them if they want us to sign that agreement publicly.

So they do not believe that we are manoeuvring, we will have to tell the union leaders that our goal is not to win votes or to discredit them for their political positions — Peronist or whatever — since we are so honest that we are willing to make a front for that union with the parties they believe appropriate, all the parties if they believe so, but fundamentally the Peronist party, so that they commit themselves that, if they succeed, the next day they will vote for that labour agreement: for example in banking, that the Banks will be nationalised in their entirety and will be controlled by the workers to guarantee a minimum salary of 120 thousand pesos (the sliding salary from this minimum as of January) and promotion within the banks according to capacity, seniority, etc. In these public notes of a proposal of the united front, we will have to insist over and over again we want unity to get a good labour agreement that fixes the situation of the union *using the elections.* Our proposal has to be: the elections are causing a euphoria that makes the working class forget its real big concrete problems, at this moment the starvation wages. Let us transform the elections into the opposite, into a formidable tool to overcome this problem, forcing the different parties to commit themselves to legislate the working conditions the workers decide.

### The electoral campaign and workers' conflicts

This is the essential axis of our electoral campaign, with its practical consequence: we will have to get involved in all conflicts or conflict preparations for the labour agreements that arise during this stage. The electoral activity should not be a reason for us to distance ourselves from conflicts, on the contrary, the campaign should allow us to detect and participate in many more conflicts than we are used to. If we act like this, our campaign will not be electoralist; if we do not, despite all the revolutionary phrases that we may use, we will be deviating from the experiences and real struggles of our class to propagandism.

The massive distribution of flyers, the factory blockades must allow us to detect all possible conflicts and any existing conflicts. The party, with its candidates and leaderships, must fully engage in these conflicts. In them, we will have to rise why the other most important candidates of the other parties are not present, and we will have to demand that a united front be formed of all the parties that are in favour of the victory of the working class. At the same time, we must be the champions of the conflict, picketers, propagandists, organisers, without any sectarianism, whether or not they agree with our program and electoral candidates.

Despite being summer, there are possibilities that conflicts will break out or that some of them will be prepared, the electoral campaign should serve us to link to them.

Summarising, we can say that the electoral campaign does not mean abandoning the typical activity of the party in the concrete struggles of the working class, from the salary increases to the Cordobazos, but rather expanding and developing the enormous experience we have in this type of struggle.

### Let's block the factories

The most important goal of our electoral campaign is to penetrate the workers' movement. We can achieve this objective if the essential axis of our activity at the zone level is the blockade of factories, as are the city centres to work on white-collar workers.

We will have to try the blockade of the factories be carried out by the same comrades. We have to get our comrades to become familiar with the problems and the workers in the factory. This will only be achieved if the same comrades are always the ones who go. Before the first picket, we must explain to the picketers who block the factory or factories what are the characteristics of the factory and we ask them systematically what they can think of to improve our work. We must avoid transforming comrades into a tool to distribute flyers; we must make them aware of the task and ensure they contribute to it from day one. This is why it is convenient to discuss the results of the picketing after the same.

Taking advantage of the campaign, each picket and factory blockade must be transformed into a small rally. To do this, we have to figure out the best way, without appearing bizarre, to impact and force the workers to pay us attention and read our flyers. Maybe bringing several photographers with flashes and our main candidates, along with posters carried by our comrades, will have a full impact on the workers around us. Factories must be distinguished by their character and whether it is possible to send candidates from the same union or sector of work. We will have to give great importance to the factories where a majority of women work, to bring Nora and to picket with a majority of female comrades, to impact them. We must carefully study the characteristics of each factory, hours, location, before doing the picketing. This, together with a good command of the problems of the factory and the union, mainly the labour agreement, will lead us to transform the picketing into a success.

The other decisive sector of our work will be the city centres, but to hit hard on white-collar workers. The party attaches great importance to this work, we consider this sector closely linked to the working class, forming part of it in fact since they are salaried, they live on a salary. The current development of capitalism makes this sector increasingly important numerically, as a consequence of the development of technology. Everything we have said about the blockade of factories, but corrected and increased, we say it for the city centres. Our rallies must be even more spectacular. After exhaustive information on the margins of legality, we must go all out in terms of imagination and spectacularity of the rallies. In the summer cities, it's about blocking the workers' hotels.

Neighbourhood work will be much less important, although perhaps it is the main sector for young people and women's work. Here it is about combing, as when affiliation, house by house, taking care that it is at appropriate times, especially now in summer. The most convenient thing will be after 18:00 or 19:00 hours. Finally, a very important sector to be thoroughly picketed is the railway stations where thousands of workers go through. Each zone should study the picketing at those stations, also trying to ensure they are always the same picketers.

Accompanying this work of distribution of flyers and pickets, like a shadow, we will have to carry *Avanzada Socialista*, which must always be offered. If there are possibilities to bring tables, we will bring all our literature.

## The rallies

All areas and the national leadership will focus during the first stage of the campaign's initiation, that is, the week that runs from Monday, 8 January to 15 January, to prepare the campaign and within it to consult different alternatives of rallies. Of these, there are two types: local and national. These last rallies are the ones that will have Coral, Nora and Paez as speakers. The local rallies will be those that the zones prepare directly. These rallies, although they may attract very few spectators, should be carried out, both in the neighbourhoods and outside the factories. We need to take advantage of these rallies to test comrades as speakers. We have already said we must give great importance to transforming each picket or distribution of flyers into a lightning rally. We must have comrades prepared for this type of rally and know how to get involved with our most representative personalities, Coral, Nora, Fote, Paez, etc. to workplaces and at the end of shift of the factories to accompany the lightning rallies and our picketers. It will be very important to see the possibilities of achieving for these lightning rallies, or rather, for their propaganda some jingles that we will have to record to send to all zones.

We must quickly find out the legal possibilities of the rallies. Party speakers should prepare appropriately giving great importance to their task. They should start from the premise that it is about convincing those who are not convinced and that when we use the mass media the audience is fabulously expanded and we want to convince the audience, not to strengthen our militants. The axis of our campaign is simple: we must vote for a workers' and socialist program and workers' and socialist candidates; we must not vote for our class enemies. You should not let the electoral campaign keep you from fighting now for the labour agreements and a minimum wage of 120,000 pesos. The central argument of all our campaign must be: Comrade, you are exploited inside and outside the factory, the bosses and merchants say you cannot run companies or control trade to better exploit you. Do not allow your vote to be exploited, do not let those who take advantage of your work all year long, take advantage of your vote on Sunday, 11 March, do not vote for them, win your vote for you, for your class.

All arguments must be careful about their language and concepts, which must be simple, clear, without any ideological terrorism, without giving the impression we are arrogant or pedants who believe we have the world by the tail. We have to take great care not to be pejorative — except with the exploiters — but rather convincing with workers and employees who do not know us or know us very little, who have not heard our jargon or language, who, in many cases, believe the Communist Party is well to the left or who are confused, who never heard the Leninist phrase of “use of legality”, who when they hear it, they think it is a new brand of soup. *We speak for them, we insist; for them and not for us. We need to find the arguments and the words to reach them and for them to say, at the very least: How clear the Workers' and Socialist Front speak! How modest! They are great, although I do not agree.* This is what our speakers must achieve.

## The other media

*Posters and flyers* will be other fundamental tools of our campaign. We have to make *large and striking posters* with the fundamental slogans of the party and with the photos of the candidates to which we will add a small biography of them, explaining who they are, with a final question: *will the workers vote for a fighter of their class, like them? Or for the bosses, doctors or bureaucrats?* There may be variations but we should not settle for the mere photo and the name, although they should be the essential part of these posters. The graffiti on the walls and the large murals will be similar.

Flyers will be perhaps the most important tool of the campaign. We will have to print them of all kinds and at all levels: from the national or provincial flyer to the one we will print for a small factory of 20 or 50 workers. The more specific the flyers, the better because they will be clearer. We must insist on this specific character. We have already pointed out the fundamental importance of the fight for the labour agreements and the conflicts that arise from it, now we will insist on the need to exploit the flyers with the personality of comrade fighters of a union or a factory.

At the national and provincial level, it is necessary and urgent that we take out general and special flyers for each union, analysing how the [Popular Revolutionary] Alliance, supported by the CP, has only a few workers in the main positions and the same happens with Justicialism (it has bureaucrats and in a minimal amount) and with the FIP,<sup>4</sup> as opposed to us. We will have to raise the problem of why this union is not represented with candidates of the bourgeois parties with influence in the workers' movement. Besides, we will thoroughly touch the specific problems of each union. These general and union flyers will be an essential axis of our campaign. Along with this, we must have special flyers for women and youth. Regarding women, we will point out the same as about the general flyers of the workers' movement: why do the bourgeois slates ignore them? Concerning youth, we must insist we are the only ones who have young candidates and women.

If finances allow us, we will make *brochures* with the bio of our candidates and what they say in the face of the campaign. These brochures must be carefully edited. Accompanying this entire process, as a fundamental tool, along with the flyers should be the *newspaper*. The editorial staff has to make an overall plan for the entire campaign. We have to study the possibility of some special four-page issues that can be given away or sold for 10 pesos. The editorial staff has to study all these possibilities.

The other fundamental media are the ones we dominate the least: radio and television. For these media, we must avoid testing comrades. We have to use experienced comrades who are good debaters. The comrades must take care of their clothing and grooming to show us young, workers, serious and responsible, avoiding being unfriendly by insulting or defining; we must demonstrate our reasons with simple examples. We must balance which is the radio or television audience we are addressing to adapt our speeches. We must always be ready to give our message, that is, it is not the journalists who carry the program, but us: we want to say such arguments and we say them. Our ability will be to see how we use the circumstances and questions to say what we want.

## The organisms we will have to create to develop the campaign

We need to know how to create organisms that support the party's campaign. Without these organisms, it will be very difficult for us to do much. We have to be very patient and know how to make the most of all the possibilities to create these organisms. The possibilities exist, let's use them!

The first organism we have to fully exploit is the one we can create around our candidates. We need to patiently discuss with the candidates, what their friends, acquaintances, workmates or neighbours can do in favour of their candidacy. It is very unlikely that there will not be two or three relatives or friends who do not want to do something for his candidacy. Our goal is to create support committees for this specific candidate. We want these two or three friends to meet at least to see what they can do, however little it may be since we want them to start putting it into practice. The party must send very good propagandists and organisers to those organisms that specifically support such a candidate to convince them to do something and encourage their initiative.

This is the beginning of the organisms that we want to establish, it is the easiest to start doing but it is not the most important since it is difficult in all cases to organise union activists and youth — our maximum targets — around these committees, except where the candidates are union activists and leaders with influence among the youth or the neighbourhood. Which is why we will stop at the fronts we want to organise and which are fundamental.

### a) The Workers' Front

Together with the socialist front, it is the most important aspect, both political and organisational, of the campaign. In any blockade of a factory or a working-class neighbourhood,

<sup>4</sup> The **Popular Left Front** (FIP) was a political party of the nationalist left founded by **Jorge Abelardo Ramos** (1921–1994) a politician, creator of the political and ideological current called the National Left. In the September 1973 elections, the FIP was part of the Justicialist Liberation Front (Frejuli) supporting the candidacy of Juan Domingo Peron and Maria Estela Martinez de Peron with the slogan “Vote for Peron from the Left”.

we must bear in mind there is no more important task than to group together the supporters of our electoral campaign to carry out any task in favour of the workers' candidacies. The essential and most advanced part of this campaign happens at the level of each factory or groups of factories in each zone and in the attempt to organise the best class-struggle union activists. This aspect is the decisive one, having to sacrifice any aspect of our activity to achieve the organised work of any group of activists within a factory or a union. To do this, we must put aside any sectarian attempt to win them over to the party: every group of activists who works for the workers' front fulfils, by that role alone, a highly progressive function and it would be a crime to ruin it by attitudes they may consider manipulating or attempting to take over the committee from the front. But this should not be a reason to give in to any attempt or pressure from those apolitical sectors or from positions different from ours to stop our electoral campaign. We must be very respectful of the independence of every member of the workers' front who wants to be independent, but demanding freedom of action to propagate our positions.

The task of organising the workers' front committees, whose most precious aspect is the existing union activists within the factory or the union, should already begin by gathering at the level of each zone workers' front committees around the candidates we can, making sure that at the factory or neighbourhood level those committees to support such specific candidate are established. It would be a very concrete way of forming or beginning to organise these committees: We have to name them: workers' front committee to support such candidate or to support such candidates or to support worker candidates in general. They have to start doing propaganda. We are not overly optimistic nor do we believe these workers' front committees can be achieved in a generalised way. On the contrary, we believe they will happen in a localized and fragmentary way, mainly in Greater Buenos Aires. But this does not mean they cannot be achieved in certain sectors. Achieving that they really function autonomously, that a worker recently linked to the party for the electoral campaign be an active part of these workers' front committees, will be a colossal achievement, the main achievement of each zone. It does not matter if few workers' front committees are formed. The important thing is they are achieved and even more important if we managed that they are by factories, unions and with activists or grassroots workers. The attention of the zone leaderships must now focus on the possibility of beginning to structure these workers' front committees, which should never be our collateral, but, no matter how small and although we are their animators, they should have activists who are independent of us.

For our cadres in general and the middle cadres in particular, this will be a litmus test. To achieve these workers' front committees, we will need to understand in-depth the union activists, neighbourhood activists, and also the grassroots workers. We must take care of our language so it does not seem strange and study how to take full advantage of all the possibilities. We must be very careful and attentive with every comrade we contact, since generally — because he has a different language than our jargon — we marginalise him or consider him different from us. On the contrary, we must make efforts to understand their language and thinking and understand once and for all that every comrade who agrees with us in a single millimetre deserves all our attention and care since that millimetre is only the beginning and when the more comfortable he is in our presence, the more easily we will achieve for him to continue agreeing on other points of our program.

The zonal directions should aim to ensure that each small party team is the animator of at least one committee of the workers' or socialist front.

## b) The Socialist Front

The facts are showing that our analysis of the congress at the end of 1971, where we launched the slogan of the *Workers' and Socialists Pole*, is correct. We said at this congress that we saw only two possibilities: on the one hand, the formation of a front with the best activists of the workers' movement and on the other, with the left sectors of the old socialist movement with new sectors of the left of the university movement. Before our eyes, we are seeing the realisation of that forecast. The successes of the workers' front have made us forget, in recent weeks, the historical importance

of the socialist front. The workers' front obeys the deepest present need of the union activists and the working class itself, to achieve the political independence of the workers' movement. But the socialist front reflects the deepest historical need, not immediate, but closely linked to it, which is the need to propagandise socialism. Bourgeois populism and Stalinism have been in charge for several decades to make the workers' movement forget the meaning of socialism, as a new social regime, of proletarian internationalism, the class struggle, etc. The socialist front has this fundamental goal: to start waving the old banners of socialism, class struggle, proletarian internationalism, etc. What for every leftist militant is the ABC, but which is currently totally ignored by Argentine workers.

Faced with the crisis of Peronism, the prospect opens up that this unitary campaign will be led by the party and greatly capitalised by it. For this, we must know that we must unite, in a common action or committees all those who vindicate socialism to develop a more efficient action. This will allow us to mobilise very numerous strata of individuals and small groups, which, thanks to the electoral campaign and our line of forming the committees of the socialist front, will be able to set in motion. As with the workers' committees, we must not have any sectarianism and we must leave them a wide margin of freedom and autonomy, rather, almost a total margin of freedom. This activity can give us many fruits by linking us and setting in motion many individuals and small groups of great intellectual or militant utility but, at the same time, it will give us greater headaches since it will put us in contact with the most disparate sects that will come to us to turn things to their own advantage. It will be one of the essential tasks of all our zone leaderships to strive to establish socialist front committees without any sectarianism with any group or personality who wants to fight for the socialist candidates and the socialist program for these elections. If we know how to work without any sectarianism, we will be surprised at the results this activity can bring us, opening up contacts and unexpected possibilities for the party in all areas. In this way, we will open a path, much broader than the one we achieved by getting legality, towards middle-class intellectuals, activists and supporters, for whom the party will become a true pole of attraction. This is why the national leadership will demand that socialist fronts be built in all areas.

## c) The other fronts

Of the other fronts, the most important, as important as the workers' and socialist fronts, is the youth. The Youth must undertake an activity parallel to that of the party in its specific sector of activity. We do not want to give any line on how to face the electoral task because this is the task of the youth as a whole and their leadership at all levels. The only thing we can say is that a general orientation can emerge from the study of party documents that the youth organisms must adapt to their specific tasks. They must also set up youth fronts of all kinds, mainly workers and socialists.

Another very important front is the specific neighbourhood front, of development societies, which is confused but is not strictly the same as the workers' front. We must draw up a program for the development societies and for the municipalities in the interior of the country that do not have a proletariat since there the struggle also happens through interesting sectors of the middle class for our program and candidates.

The other fundamentally important front, although we may only achieve it at the level of certain sporadic cases, should be the women's front, of the women's struggle. The fact we have so many female candidates must be accompanied by a systematic appeal to women to free themselves from their double exploitation. We will have to see what possibilities exist to specialise from the national leadership a female comrade so she can now turn to the organisations for women's liberation to support our candidacies and our program.

## Once again: let's strengthen the party

This phrase that "we enter the elections to strengthen the party" can be dangerous if we do not specify it, since the party is strengthened by expanding the number of newspapers sold, of contacts,

of general party propaganda. All this is true but, in this specific case, the party is strengthened by increasing the number of supporters and militants.

The party leadership has not wanted to set precise numbers because it does not know well the certain possibilities that open with the elections. It has indicated an uncertain possibility: all the headquarters and zones of the party must come out of the elections — let's say July 1973 — with twice the number of militants, supporters and numbers of newspapers sold. As the campaign begins to be outlined, already a certain possibility arises that we have not anticipated in all its details: the emergence of small premises in working-class neighbourhoods. We will need to specify this perspective which is part of the previously indicated perspectives. If this perspective is confirmed, we would have to add we have to go to at least twice the number of premises we currently have. Time will tell if we have to add this new perspective. The concrete, the immediate, is that we want to enter the elections to come out, as much as possible, with twice the number of militants and everything that this means in premises, newspapers sold, supporters won, etc.

By insisting that we are not sure of these prospects we are referring to several facts. First, our lack of experience in this activity. Second, the difficult objective situation that we face, full of possibilities because of the crisis of Peronism and the revolutionary situation, on the one hand, and of centrist traps and confusion, on the other, complicated by the relative retreat of the workers' movement. Third, we still do not know how the workers' movement and the vanguard will respond to the electoral process, since it has not begun to develop.

These three factors mean the party leadership has not dared to set definitive, mandatory goals for the electoral campaign. At the moment our goals are estimates and will have to fine-tune it by the middle or end of the campaign.

This estimative nature of our goals makes it more necessary than ever to study carefully how to focus the campaign to avoid making a mistake in the orientation.

The electoral campaign will be a litmus test for the national leadership and the different zonal leaderships. The success of our campaign will largely depend on their ability to fully utilize all perspectives and possibilities.

Buenos Aires, 11 January 1973